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RETHINKING SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES COMPLIANCE: FROM CRIMINAL 





Fisheries compliance theory has evolved over the past two decades in an attempt to 
understand the factors that influence fishers’ behaviour and to develop appropriate 
strategies to enhance compliance.  However, much of this research, which draws on 
both rationalist and normative perspectives, has largely focussed on the industrial 
fisheries.  Empirical research on the small-scale fisheries sector, therefore, has been 
lacking. The overall aim of this thesis has been to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries compliance by drawing on 
experiences in South Africa.  This has been achieved through a detailed investigation 
of two small-scale fisheries case studies, as well as a review of the small-scale 
fisheries sector generally.  
 
The findings from this research have emphasised the need to rethink our 
understanding of fisheries compliance in the small-scale sector.  By drawing on 
empirical evidence, as well as the literature review, a conceptual framework has been 
developed that enhances existing compliance theory. This study highlights that an 
understanding of compliance behaviour first requires a critical analysis of how law 
has evolved, its history and the power dynamics that have shaped it.  The conceptual 
framework further emphasises the need to understand compliance within a fishery 
system, acknowledging that social, economic, institutional and biophysical factors all 
impact on whether or not fishers’ comply with rules and laws. By applying the 
conceptual framework to two case studies in South Africa, key drivers that influence 
fisher behaviour over time are identified and changes within the fishery system are 
analysed and documented.  This thesis has also contributed to fisheries compliance 
theory by identifying the underlying principles that are seen as necessary to guide an 
alternative and more integrated approach to small-scale fisheries compliance.  In 
addition to the principles of legitimacy and deterrence, which are incorporated into 
existing theories of compliance, this study emphasises that the principle of social 
justice is required to develop a more holistic approach to understanding and 
addressing small-scale fisheries compliance.  By embracing these principles, it is 
argued that fisheries policies will shift away from a sole reliance on criminal justice to 
achieve compliance, to a more integrated approach that aims to sustain the fishery 
system as a whole.  
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Fisheries management, worldwide, struggles to find a balance between protecting 
resources, ensuring equitable access to resources and promoting economic efficiency 
and stability (Hanna 2003). To try to achieve this balance, central governments have 
intervened by formulating policies and establishing rules and regulations, with the aim 
of ensuring compliance. However, it has been widely recognised that non-compliance 
in fisheries is widespread, and researchers and management authorities continue to 
grapple with the factors that lead to non-compliance (Gezelius 2003, Hatcher et al. 
2000, Hemming and Pierce 1997, Hønneland 2000, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, 
McKinlay and Millington 2000, Raakjær-Nielsen 2003).  From a theoretical 
perspective, the past two decades have seen a shift taking place in understanding 
fisheries compliance and conceptualising appropriate responses to non-compliant 
behaviour.   
 
Traditionally, fisheries compliance literature was built upon Becker’s neoclassical 
model of rational criminality (Becker 1968), arguing that non-compliance was 
determined by the balance of expected gains and losses from illegal activities 
(Anderson and Lee 1986, Charles et al. 1999, Sutinen and Andersen 1985).  This 
rationalist approach argues that external influences (such as rewards and punishment) 
prompt individual fishers to act in their own immediate self-interest. Based on this 
perspective of rational choice, fishers will choose to comply (or not) based on 
economic gains, the likelihood of detection and the severity of sanctions.  Fisheries 
management systems worldwide have embraced this approach and governments often 
respond to non-compliance by increasing law enforcement efforts in order to increase 
the probability of detection and conviction (Hatcher et al. 2000, Raakjær-Nielsen 
2003, Sutinen et al. 1990). 
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However, over the years, there has been an increasing realisation that compliance can 
be achieved even when formal law enforcement is weak. This led to an interest in the 
normative approach to compliance, which recognises that norms and morals, as well 
as the legitimacy of law and governance, are important factors that influence fisher 
decision-making (Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004, Hatcher et al. 2000, Jentoft 2000, 
Kuperan and Sutinen 1994, 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen 2003, Sutinen and Kuperan 1999).  
This, therefore, led researchers to argue that a reliance on traditional law enforcement, 
as a primary means to enhance compliance, ignores the complexity of the socio-
economic and political context of fishers and coastal communities.  Thus, there was a 
call for ‘…a radically different approach to enforcement and compliance’ (Berkes et 
al. 2001: 162). The realisation was that increased policing and punishment for non-
compliant fishers often led to further conflict and violent confrontation between the 
fishers and the authorities (Gupta and Sharma 2004, Hauck 1999a, van Ginkel 2005).  
Thus, there was a need to understand compliance, and fisheries management more 
broadly, by tackling the social, economic, political and institutional challenges of the 
fishery in question.  Although many governments continue to rely on law enforcement 
strategies to enhance compliance, research indicates the importance of combining the 
approaches and strategies of both rational and normative action theories to improve 
compliance outcomes (Gezelius 2003, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen 
2003, Sutinen and Kuperan 1999).  
 
However, it is argued in this thesis that fisheries compliance theory needs to be taken 
one step further to question the law itself - how it is formulated, and whose interests it 
serves.  By doing so, one incorporates the important concept of social justice in 
understanding fisheries compliance, and in determining the rationale for certain 
activities being defined ‘illegal’.  By questioning the role of law in criminalising 
fishers, an important issue of terminology arose in this research, whereby the term 
‘illegal’ fishers has largely been replaced by the term ‘informal’ fishers. Thus, 
‘informal fishers’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to those fishers who are not 
formally recognised by law and are therefore perceived by the authorities as ‘illegal’.  
As will be highlighted in Chapter Three, the socio-economic and political context of 
informal fishing has emphasised the need to question the criminalisation of small-
scale fishers. Thus, the term ‘illegal fishers’, or fishery, has been avoided in relation 
to this sector, in order to question the assumption of illegality. 
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By questioning the formulation of law, social justice issues have emerged at the centre 
of this research. Social justice is underpinned by a human rights perspective, 
recognising the importance of equitable distribution and the minimisation of social, 
economic and political harm (Barton et al. 2007b, Scraton 2002).  In a fisheries 
context, social justice refers to the importance of protecting customary practices, 
enhancing food security and sustaining livelihoods, all of which are fundamental to 
equitable fisheries laws and policies (Chuenpagdee et al. 2005, Hernes et al. 2005).  
 
Linked to this is the understanding of fisher behaviour in its social, economic, 
political and institutional context.  Research on fisheries compliance has only recently 
begun to explore the diversity and complexity of relevant variables in attempting to 
understand fishers’ behaviour (Gezelius 2003, Hønneland 2000, Kuperan and Sutinen 
1994, 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003, Roncin et al. 2004, Sutinen and 
Kuperan 1999). Although the need to take a broader approach to understanding 
compliance has been recognised, most of this research is still largely theoretical and 
there have been few empirical attempts to understand the determinants of fishers’ 
compliance behaviour (Hatcher et al. 2000).  Further, Gezelius (2002) argues that 
there are gaps in fisheries compliance research in terms of understanding the actual 
dynamics of non-compliance and in determining under what conditions certain factors 
influence fisher decision-making.  Thus, the research outlined in this thesis attempts 
to understand the diverse factors that lead fishers to comply, or not comply, with 
formal rules and regulations.  Small-scale fisheries in South Africa will be drawn on 
to explore these factors, their linkages, the key drivers that influence fisher behaviour 
over time, and the underlying principles that are necessary to understand and address 
small-scale fisheries compliance in a more integrated manner. Ultimately, the aim of 
this research is to develop a new conceptual framework for understanding small-scale 
fisheries compliance that is embedded in an understanding of the fishery system as a 
whole. 
 
This introductory chapter will begin with a discussion on small-scale fisheries and the 
importance of reflecting on this sector for an understanding of fisheries compliance 
generally, and in relation to South Africa.  A brief overview will then be provided on 
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the discourse of fisheries compliance in relation to Illegal, Unregulated and 
Unreported (IUU) fishing and how this impacts on compliance strategies targeted at 
small-scale fisheries. South Africa’s approach to fisheries compliance will be briefly 
discussed, highlighting the need to understand and address non-compliance 
differently.  The overall aim and objectives of this study will be outlined and finally, 
an overview of the remaining chapters in the thesis will be provided. 
 
2. A FOCUS ON SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES 
 
The research outlined in this thesis will focus on small-scale fisheries, as this is a 
sector that has received little attention in terms of fisheries compliance discourse.  
Compliance theory has emerged from a focus on industrial fisheries, with very little 
reference, and very few empirical studies, aimed at understanding compliance in the 
small-scale fisheries sector1.  This has often led to the development of compliance 
strategies for the commercial fisheries of the North, which are transferred, and 
assumed to be relevant to the small-scale fisheries context of the South.   
 
Small-scale fisheries have not been universally defined but generally encapsulate the 
terms ‘subsistence’, ‘traditional’ and ‘artisanal’ (Schumann et al. 2007, Sowman 
2006). Although each context will be different, small-scale fisheries can be broadly 
characterised as employing labour intensive harvesting methods to exploit fish 
resources by operating from shore or from small fishing vessels.  As Bavinck (2005) 
explains, small-scale fisheries can encompass a wide range of attributes and can be 
differentiated from the better known ‘industrialised’ or ‘modern’ fisheries.  Generally 
speaking, small-scale fishers use less capital intensive gear and their catch per unit of 
effort is much smaller than those in the industrialised fisheries.   
 
It is estimated that 90% of the world’s fishers are small-scale fishers, with most 
residing in developing countries (FAO 2005a). Approximately one billion people rely 
on fish as a major source of animal protein (Ziegler 2004), and according to  Berkes et 
al. (2001), ‘the importance of the world’s fisheries, and especially the small-scale 
                                                
1 For empirical research on small-scale fisheries compliance in Norway and Newfoundland (Canada) 
see Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004; and in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines see Kuperan et al. 1997, 
Kuperan and Sutinen 1994, 1998 and Sutinen and Kuperan 1999. 
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fisheries, in providing food, income and livelihood cannot be overemphasised, 
especially in developing countries’ (p. 223).  However, despite its importance in 
providing food security and livelihoods in coastal communities, small-scale fisheries 
are largely ignored and marginalised throughout the world (Berkes et al. 2001).  This 
is particularly evident in fisheries management policies, which often favour the 
capitalist interests of large-scale industrial fisheries over small-scale traditional ones 
(Crosoer et al. 2006, Ghee and Valencia 1990).  This was emphasised by the FAO 
Committee on Fisheries Research (2003), which stated that economic policies at a 
national level have favoured ‘the development of large-scale approaches over small-
scale ones and the resources being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands’ (p. 9).   
 
This conflict, and the increased reliance of coastal communities on fisheries resources, 
has come at a time when fish stocks, and the ecosystems upon which they depend, are 
being rapidly degraded.  It is estimated that 77% of fish stocks are fully exploited, 
overfished or depleted worldwide (FAO 2005b). Thus, a crisis exists not only in terms 
of the future of fisheries, but also in terms of sustaining the livelihoods of coastal 
communities around the world.   
 
In South Africa the situation is no different. Inshore resources are increasingly over-
exploited (Cockroft et al. 2002), while these resources are critically important for the 
food security and livelihoods of coastal communities (Branch et al. 2002b, Cardoso et 
al. 2005, Sowman et al. 2008). Thus, with a resource-orientated approach to fisheries 
management, the state has responded with more regulation and increased 
enforcement. By relying on a discourse of ‘illegal fishing’, crime control methods are 
expected to ‘solve’ the problem of non-compliance.  Internationally, however, it has 
been recognised that compliance issues relating to small-scale fisheries are not 
adequately understood, and therefore, not adequately addressed (Berkes et al. 2001).  
This study aims to contribute to this understanding of small-scale fisheries 
compliance, and to ascertain its relevance to fisheries compliance more broadly. 
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3. NORTHERN PERSPECTIVES IN A SOUTHERN 
CONTEXT 
 
From an international fisheries management perspective, concerns about fisheries 
non-compliance grew in importance through the efforts of the United Nations (UN), 
which identified IUU fishing as a major contributor to fisheries collapse worldwide 
(FAO 2001, UN 2006). In fact, the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) in the 
United Kingdom (UK) states that IUU fishing represents ‘one of the most serious 
threats to the future of world fisheries’ (EJF 2005: 4). IUU fishing is defined largely 
on the basis of fishing activity that contravenes national, regional and/or international 
laws and regulations (FAO 2001).  It evolved primarily from the international 
community’s concern over illegal fishing in the high seas, and still largely focuses on 
industrial and international fleets (EJF 2005, MRAG 2005, Rigg et al. 2003).  
Certainly in terms of the impact of IUU fishing, there is reason to be concerned.  In 
addition to the resource and ecosystem impacts, economic loss to developing 
countries due to illegal fishing is considered to be in the region of US$2-15 billion per 
year (EJF 2005).  Developing countries with a high dependence on coastal resources 
for poverty reduction and livelihoods are severely impacted by foreign vessels fishing 
illegally in their waters (CEC 2007, EJF 2005).   
 
The drivers of IUU fishing are largely attributed to economic incentives and 
inadequate laws and enforcement strategies to conserve marine resources (CEC 2007, 
EJF 2005).  Thus, a focus on Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS), 
particularly in terms of enhancing enforcement, have been a key focus of international 
organisations with an interest in eliminating IUU fishing (CEC 2007, EJF 2005, FAO 
2003).  Although MCS is considered a critical component of fisheries management 
(Flewelling et al. 2003), the problem is that the discourse of IUU fishing is being 
transferred to the South, where the context of ‘illegal fishing’ in the coastal zone is 
very different.  Thus, although the focus of IUU fishing is on the large-scale industrial 
sector, concepts, approaches and interventions aimed at this problem are being 
incorporated into an understanding of fisheries non-compliance in the South, which 
include small-scale fisheries. The modus operandi, scale, socio-economic context and 
drivers of fishing activities are significantly different and yet inshore fisheries are 
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considered part of the IUU problem (MRAG and CapFish 2008).  In an assessment of 
IUU fishing in Southern Africa, for example, ‘abalone poaching’ in South Africa was 
highlighted as the key compliance issue for South Africa’s territorial waters (MRAG 
2005).  By motivating for increased law enforcement, the problem arises when the 
socio-economic, political, cultural and institutional factors influencing the illicit trade 
are ignored at the expense of following wider IUU rhetoric – originally aimed at high 
seas, international illegal fishing. 
 
Thus, the result is that even in more recent documentation, where poverty and 
marginalisation are recognised as possible drivers to IUU fishing (SIF 2008), the 
overall message is that MCS capacity needs to be strengthened.  For example, in a 
Stop Illegal Fishing report, while ‘individual starvation’ is identified as a possible 
cause of IUU fishing, the following paragraph states: ‘The mindset that motivates 
crime is not too different to that which motivates IUU activities. Seeking personal 
advantage to the disadvantage of others is a fundamental motive for many IUU fishery 
operators’ (SIF 2008: 3).  Thus, the focus on increasing the costs of IUU fishing 
through enforcement and sanctions, which may be appropriate in some cases, ignores 
the complexity of the drivers of IUU fishing, which are not adequately acknowledged 
or understood in the small-scale sector.  This is of great concern due to the fact that 
the empirical research outlined in this thesis highlights the diverse factors that are 
influencing compliance behaviour. 
 
The trend is for developed countries to assist developing countries with IUU fishing 
challenges (CEC 2007, SIF 2008), but the different scales of IUU fishing are not 
sufficiently differentiated in order to develop appropriate strategies.  Although there 
have been attempts to highlight the different IUU activities between industrial and 
artisanal fisheries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and to 
recognise that the drivers of illegal fishing may be different, further analysis is not 
forthcoming, nor are diverse strategies to address the different issues highlighted 
(MRAG and CapFish 2008). As a result, there remains a discourse significantly 
driven by the nation-states of the North, which may be relevant in that context, but are 
inadequate, and even inappropriate, in many developing country contexts.  The result 
is that government authorities participating in these regional and international 
developments, which are heavily funded, are being encouraged to enhance MCS 
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capacity as an effective means with which to address IUU fishing – broadly.  In terms 
of fisheries management more generally, McClanahan and Castilla (2007) state that 
‘fishery management measures for fixing developed and rich consumer societies will 
not necessarily match those required for developing societies’ (p. 313).  A reliance on 
MCS to address non-compliance is a case in point. Small-scale coastal fisheries, 
therefore, need to be understood in the context of customary fishing practices, fragile 
livelihoods, market dynamics, institutional arrangements and legitimate laws, all of 
which will be highlighted from the findings of this research.   
 
4. FISHERIES COMPLIANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa’s coastline is more than 3000 kilometres in length, and it is estimated 
that approximately 10,000 species of marine plants and animals reside in these waters, 
with some being commercially exploited.  Although South Africa’s fisheries sector 
only contributes 0.3% of the overall GDP (Statistics South Africa 2004), and the first-
hand sale value amounts to R3.1 billion (US$413 million)2 a significant number of 
coastal communities rely on marine resources for their livelihoods (Branch et al. 
2002b, Chandler 2003).  Direct employment in fisheries is estimated to be about 
29,000 in the industrial sector, with a further 29,000 estimated to be small-scale 
fishers (Chandler 2003, Clark et al. 2002).  
 
Both a historical and contemporary understanding of fisheries management in South 
Africa is necessary in order to understand the current challenges to achieving 
compliance.  Apartheid laws and policies, for example, which excluded the majority 
of small-scale fishers on the grounds of race, need to be understood.  Similarly, 
capitalist interests in developing export-orientated fisheries need to be considered in 
understanding the marginalisation of the small-scale sector.  Following the democratic 
elections in 1994, South Africa embarked on a new fisheries policy process that aimed 
to address the inequities of the past (Witbooi 2006).  This policy process, as well as 
the legislation that resulted, had important implications for fisheries compliance. 
 
                                                
2 Exchange rate of US$1:R7.50 as of August 2008 
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First, the policy process provided an opportunity for those small-scale fishers who had 
been denied legal access to resources in the past to lobby for formal recognition. This 
often took place as a form of ‘protest fishing’, in which fishers harvested resources 
‘illegally’ and openly as a means to pressure government for access. This raised the 
profile of ‘illegal fishing’ and pressure was placed on the state, by elements of civil 
society, industry and scientists, to address this form of non-compliance (Hauck and 
Kroese 2006).  Second, the promulgation of the Marine Living Resources Act 
(MLRA, No. 18 of 1998) led to a process of ‘fisheries transformation’ in which 
formal rights to marine resources were significantly broadened to include historically 
marginalised fishers.  This led to the extensive redistribution of access rights in the 
industrial fisheries (Branch and Clark 2006, Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006), the 
identification of a limited commercial sector that comprised small-scale fishers 
(Isaacs 2006a) and the legal recognition of subsistence fishers for the first time in 
history (Sowman 2006). Thus, the fisheries authority was faced with many more 
fishers who had legal access to resources, resulting in the need for effective 
institutional arrangements to manage this sector.  Finally, the political pressure to 
redistribute access rights, with limited and often over-exploited resources, led to the 
realisation within government that compliance with fisheries laws was critical.  The 
rationale was that resource over-exploitation (or non-compliance) reduces the scope 
for government to bring new entrants into the fisheries and jeopardises its attempts to 
redistribute economically viable access rights (Hauck and Kroese 2006). Each of 
these factors has motivated the fisheries authority, Marine and Coastal Management 
(MCM) of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), to 
significantly increase its investment in enhancing fisheries compliance. 
 
Thus, in South Africa, there has been a clear move by the fisheries authority to 
strengthen law enforcement capacity as the primary objective and means to achieve 
compliance (Hauck and Kroese 2006).  From 1999, a new institutional structure 
prioritised MCS to the level of a Chief Directorate within MCM, also leading to a 
400% budget increase over the past decade.  This has contributed to a highly skilled 
investigative team, the appointment of state prosecutors to focus on marine crime, a 
strengthening of inter-agency law enforcement cooperation and the procurement of 
four new patrol vessels.  The focus has been on strengthening the ‘policing’ function 
of the fisheries directorate.   
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Although this enhanced law enforcement capacity has been considered important for 
South African fisheries, there has also been concern of an over-reliance on crime 
control strategies to achieve compliance (Hauck and Kroese 2006).  The 
ineffectiveness of this crime control model has been reflected by an increased 
scientific concern for the status of inshore marine resources (Branch and Clark 2006, 
Cockroft et al. 2002), and the perception of small-scale fishers that they are 
criminalised through this approach by the state (Branch et al. 2007, Cardoso et al. 
2005, Hauck et al. 2002).  Political protests, court cases, violent conflict and high 
levels of non-compliance further testify to this (Hauck 1999a, 2007, Hauck et al. 
2002, Isaacs 2006a, Witbooi 2006).   
 
The overall aim of this research, therefore, is to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa. 
Through a detailed investigation of two small-scale fisheries case studies in South 
Africa and a review of the small-scale fisheries sector generally, the following 
specific objectives were addressed: 1) to understand the nature of the small-scale 
fishery systems investigated, 2) to identify the factors that influence compliance 
behaviour in the context of these fisheries, 3) to analyse these factors, and how they 
interact, in order to determine the drivers that change the fishery system over time, 4) 
to identify the principles that are required to inform a more integrated approach to 
small-scale fisheries compliance, and (5) to contribute to fisheries compliance theory 
by fundamentally enhancing the debate to include issues of power and law. Finally, 
although this thesis has drawn on South African experience, the objective is to 
develop a conceptual framework for understanding small-scale fisheries compliance 
that has broader applicability. 
 
5. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
This first chapter has provided an overview of small-scale fisheries, highlighting the 
importance of understanding compliance differently in this sector, as opposed to 
industrial fisheries.  A discussion of the approach taken to address IUU fishing, for 
example, emphasised that it is inappropriate to adopt this approach, and its resulting 
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strategies, in the small-scale sector without a thorough understanding of the factors 
that influence fisher behaviour.  An overview of South Africa’s approach to fisheries 
compliance was provided, as well as the overall aim and objectives of this thesis. 
 
Chapter two outlines the research approach and methods adopted in this study.  It 
begins with a discussion of systems thinking, grounded theory, action research and 
qualitative approaches, which were all used to guide the research and inform the 
choice of methods and techniques used to gather and analyse information.  It then 
outlines the research process, as well as the methods employed in this study.  One of 
the key methods was the use of case studies, which were chosen as ‘telling’ cases, in 
order to provide important insights into factors driving non-compliant behaviour.  The 
two small-scale fisheries, West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) and abalone, were 
chosen for a number of reasons including the high levels of non-compliance in these 
fisheries, the social, cultural and economic significance of these fisheries in coastal 
communities, their inclusion in ‘fisheries transformation’ through the redistribution of 
access rights and the focussed law enforcement interventions that have targeted these 
fishers.  These case studies were then analysed in conjunction with a broader 
overview of small-scale fisheries in South Africa. Other methods, data analysis tools 
and ethical considerations are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Three provides an important theoretical context to this study, briefly outlining 
traditional compliance theory and then challenging some key assumptions.  It draws 
on criminology discourse as a means to question fisheries law, and in particular, the 
rationale behind the criminalisation of some fisher behaviour.  Further, by drawing on 
green criminology, and fisheries systems thinking, an emphasis is placed on 
understanding the root causes of non-compliance and ensuring that compliance 
strategies address the political, social, economic and institutional factors that are 
influencing fishers’ behaviour.  Further, this chapter introduces the preliminary 
conceptual framework that was developed in the beginning stages of the research 
process and which guided further empirical research and theoretical development. 
 
Chapter Four provides a review and broad analysis of small-scale fisheries in South 
Africa, including the challenges related to compliance.  It describes the natural and 
socio-economic systems underlying this sector, drawing on the literature as well as 
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primary research in different areas in the country.  It provides an overview of the legal 
and policy reform process that has taken place in South Africa since 1994 and outlines 
key features of relevant policies and legislation relevant to small-scale fisheries 
compliance. Further, different management strategies adopted by MCM to regulate 
small-scale fisheries are outlined, including the redistribution of marine resources 
through ‘transformation’ processes, MCM’s resource-oriented and scientific approach 
to management, and MCM’s approach to law enforcement.  A discussion on some of 
the underlying factors influencing compliance behaviour is undertaken. 
 
Chapter Five provides an in-depth overview and analysis of the abalone fishery as a 
key case study for this research.  As with Chapters Four and Six, the information is 
presented in a manner that assists the reader to understand the fishery as a ‘system’, 
and thus the natural, socio-economic and management systems are each described.  In 
terms of compliance, the abalone fishery has had a high profile since the mid-1990s, 
and has been identified as the most pressing fisheries compliance challenge in South 
Africa.  The Total Allowable Catch has decreased substantially over the past decade, 
with the Minister of DEAT closing the commercial fishery indefinitely from February 
2008.  Despite a number of focussed interventions, many of them based on a crime 
control model, fishers’ livelihoods have been threatened, the resource is unstable and 
a thriving international illicit trade exists.  An understanding of this fishery, therefore, 
has been key to an understanding of small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa. 
 
Chapter Six provides a detailed description and analysis of the WCRL fishery, with a 
particular focus on one community. The informal fishery is explored in detail, 
highlighting the activities of those fishers who harvest the resource but who do not 
have a formal, or legal, ‘right’ to do so.  This case study provides important insights 
with regard to the customary value of the fishery, the growing black market trade and 
the inconsistent policies that have often prioritised big industry over the small-scale 
fishers.  Further, this case study benefits from the rich historical research that has been 
drawn on for both the description and the analysis of the fishery.   
 
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the case study material and reflects on the 
initial conceptual framework presented in Chapter Three. A revised conceptual 
framework for understanding small-scale fisheries compliance is then provided, which 
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emphasises that an understanding of compliance requires an understanding of law, as 
well as the powerful interests behind its development. Further, the compliance 
framework highlights the importance of understanding compliance within the context 
of the fishery system as a whole. Key to this chapter is an emphasis on the linkages 
between the factors that influence fisher behaviour and the key drivers that lead to a 
change in the fishery system over time. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
underlying principles, which emerged from this research, that are considered 
necessary for developing a more integrated approach to small-scale fisheries 
compliance in South Africa, and more broadly. 
 
Chapter Eight provides an overall conclusion to the thesis. In particular, it highlights 
the key contributions of this research in terms of broadening current compliance 
thinking and highlights the importance of adopting the principle of social justice into 
fisheries law and policy.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 






Limited empirical research has been conducted on fisheries compliance and most of 
this research has focussed on industrial fisheries (Gezelius 2003). Small-scale 
fisheries have received little attention in compliance discourse, despite increased 
regulations by central governments and increased resistance by fishers to laws and 
regulations.  The response by governments is often to increase law enforcement as a 
means of mitigating non-compliance, without adequately considering the history, or 
circumstances of small-scale fishers (Berkes et al. 2001).  There is wide recognition, 
for example, that small-scale fishers are often the poorest members of society (Berkes 
et al. 2001, Béné 2003), requiring a need to understand the social and economic 
factors motivating people to fish.  Further, the political, institutional and biophysical 
dynamics that influence fisheries management decision-making also need to be 
considered when understanding fishers’ behaviour.   
 
In acknowledging the diverse range of factors that influence fishers’ decisions to 
comply or not, one is also recognising the need to look beyond law enforcement to 
achieve compliance in fisheries.  Internationally, although this shift in thinking has 
taken place at a theoretical level (Gezelius 2003, Hatcher et al. 2000, Hønneland 
2000, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003), there has 
been little empirical evidence of such a shift taking place in practice (Raakjær-Nielsen 
2003).  There remains an overwhelming reliance on law enforcement as the primary 
strategy to achieve fisheries compliance.  South Africa is no exception, and the 
research outlined in this thesis begins to challenge traditional thinking on compliance 
and the approach that is being embraced by the authorities. 
 
If one refers to a number of small scale fisheries case studies in South Africa (Harris 
et al. 2007, Hauck and Sowman 2003, Isaacs 2003), it is clear that an overall 
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understanding of the nature of compliance, as well as the strategies to achieve 
compliance in different contexts, is different between researchers, managers and 
fishers.  The past ten years, and more specifically the past five years, have seen a 
significant change in compliance effort, with a particular focus on increasing law 
enforcement capacity and effectiveness (Hauck and Kroese 2006).  Although law 
enforcement has been significantly strengthened, informal fishing remains an ongoing 
challenge for the fisheries authority.  This highlights the need to understand the 
factors that are driving fishers to behave in the way that they do, and to develop 
appropriate fisheries management arrangements that reflect these.   
 
Thus, a key approach to undertaking this research has been to understand small-scale 
fisheries in South Africa as a ‘system’, which encapsulates the ecological, social, 
economic, political and institutional aspects of the fishery, and how they interrelate 
(Charles 2001).  This will be discussed below, as well as the three other approaches 
that have influenced the conceptualisation and implementation of the research. The 
research methods that were adopted to conduct the research will then be discussed, 
including some important ethical issues. Finally, the chapter will end with a brief 
conclusion, reflecting on the utility of this research and the challenge of balancing 
academia with the realities of policy development and local level change. 
 
2. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The use of different tools and techniques to gather information, as well as the 
conceptualisation of theory, are informed by the researcher’s approach to the research 
itself (Bryman 2004, Seale 2004a). This study draws on the concepts and principles 
underpinning systems thinking, grounded theory and action research, and uses 
qualitative research approaches to gather and analyse empirical data and to understand 
small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa. These different research approaches 
were complimentary in many ways and are discussed below.   
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2.1 A Systems Approach  
 
In the area of natural resource management, there is an increasing realisation that 
traditional, natural science based methods of addressing problems are no longer 
appropriate, and there is a need to look for broader approaches and solutions (Berkes 
et al. 2003).  This is certainly the case in fisheries management, where there is broad 
consensus that many of the world’s fisheries are in crisis, and there is a need to move 
beyond a primary focus on the bio-physical aspects of a fishery (Berkes et al. 2001, 
Castilla and Defeo 2005, Charles 2001, Pauly et al. 2003).  As Defeo et al. (2007) 
clearly state: 
‘The status of the world’s fisheries is worrying and the factors that have led to 
the global decline are biological, social, political and cultural in nature. Marine 
fisheries are in trouble…the trouble has occurred in the context of a well-
developed fisheries science that has largely focused on the resource and the 
biophysical aspects that control them but with less focus on the societal 
aspects of resource management’ (p. 15). 
 
This change in thinking has been influenced by systems thinking, which seeks to 
understand fisheries as complex and integrated natural, social, and management 
systems (Charles 2001, Defeo et al. 2007). Systems thinking emerged as a critique of 
reductionism, which understands phenomenon by breaking them down into parts for 
ease of analysis (Flood 2001).  Systems thinking, however, builds together the 
components of a phenomenon and assesses their interrelatedness, understanding it as a 
whole, rather than breaking it into parts (Flood 2001).  Charles (2001) explains that in 
a fisheries context, fisheries need to be understood ‘as webs of interrelated, interacting 
ecological, biophysical, economic, social and cultural components, not as fish 
separate from the fishers…’ (p. 3).   
 
Historically, people and their social systems were at the periphery of fisheries 
management, and often ignored.  However, particularly from a small-scale fisheries 
perspective, there is an increasing acknowledgement of revised approaches to 
management that aim to achieve sustainability in the broader context (Berkes et al. 
2001, Kooiman et al. 2005, McClanahan and Castilla 2007, Symes 2006).  Berkes et 
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al. (2003) explain that sustainability ‘implies maintaining the capacity of ecological 
systems to support social and economic systems’ (p. 2). The aim, therefore, is to 
secure marine resources at the same time as securing the livelihoods of fishers. This is 
further discussed by Charles (2001), who affirms that the concept of sustainability 
needs to be understood comprehensively, not just in terms of the fish stocks 
themselves.  Rather, sustainability is about maintaining or enhancing ecological, 
socio-economic, community and institutional aspects of a fishery system.   
 
Systems thinking has guided the conceptualisation of this research, and recognises 
that an understanding of fisheries compliance could not focus on one particular aspect 
of the fisheries system. In the past, for example, fisheries compliance was often 
understood and analysed from an economic perspective, exploring the costs and 
benefits of fishers’ actions (Anderson and Lee 1986, Sutinen and Andersen 1985).  
Other studies began to explore compliance more widely, investigating social and 
institutional issues related to morality and legitimacy (Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004, 
Hatcher et al. 2000, Hønneland 2000, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen 
and Mathiesen 2003).  This research, however, took the investigation one step further 
by seeking to understand and assess the different aspects of the fishery system (social, 
economic, political, institutional, historical, biophysical) as a means of understanding 
compliance behaviour of fishers.   
 
A significant point to highlight in this regard is that most fisheries compliance studies 
focus on the behaviour of formal fishers, or those who have legal access to marine 
resources.  This study, on the other hand, also highlights the role and behaviour of 
‘informal’ fishers, or those who do not have legal access, and are therefore considered 
‘illegal’ by the authorities.  This distinction is very important as the research findings 
have indicated that both formal and informal fishers harvest resources, operate under 
certain rules and are affected by, and impact upon, other aspects of the fishery system.  
Therefore, to understand compliance in a fishery system, there needs to be an 
understanding of the informal system that is operating.   
 
A focus on small-scale fisheries further enhanced this understanding of fisheries as a 
system.  As McClanahan et al. (2008) state, ‘an integrated approach that addresses 
multiple needs, that at first appear peripheral to conservation and fisheries 
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management, is essential in poor countries where there are multiple pressing priorities 
for action and a lack of infrastructure to deal with the costs of monitoring, control and 
surveillance of management measures’ (p. 10).  This is again emphasised by Berkes et 
al. (2001), who argue that many small-scale fisheries are exposed to a myriad of 
socio-economic and political issues that may influence their behaviour to comply.  
 
2.2  Grounded Theory 
 
The research approach guiding this study also adopts many of the principles of 
‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967), which seeks to generate theory from the 
data itself rather than begin the research with a predetermined theoretical framework. 
As a result, the researcher embarks on an iterative research process, whereby visits to 
the field to collect data are interspersed with periods of data analysis. In this way, 
there is ‘continual re-examination of data in the light of developing arguments’ (Seale 
2004c: 244). In this research, theoretical development emerged from information 
gathered in the field, which in turn generated new empirical questions.  For example, 
the process of exploring compliance from a systems perspective only emerged as the 
research unfolded and initial ideas were explored in the development of the 
preliminary compliance framework (which will be introduced below and described in 
more detail in Chapter Three).   
 
However, a key criticism of grounded theory is that it is naïve to assume that 
researchers embark on a research question with no preconceived ideas. As Spicer 
(2004) argues, even where theories emerge from data, it is likely that the research is 
based on previous assumptions or ‘hunches’. This is certainly acknowledged in this 
research, where previous information gathered on fisheries compliance in South 
Africa inevitably shaped the approach in this study. Nevertheless, there was a 
conscious effort to build a conceptual framework over time, through engagement with 
the data collected, as a means of questioning and shaping theoretical development. 
 
The key research question itself evolved in important ways during the first phase of 
fieldwork.  Critical assumptions, based on previous research, were being challenged. 
Through the fieldwork, and engagement with local and international colleagues, the 
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fundamental question guiding the research began to evolve.  At the outset, the 
research question was: how can higher levels of compliance be achieved in small-
scale fisheries in South Africa?  It was proposed that this question would be 
investigated through a research process that identified the factors that led to non-
compliance, the key drivers that influenced behaviour over time, and the principles to 
inform an alternative approach to compliance in different circumstances.  Although 
the secondary questions were still relevant, the initial research question inadvertently 
contained an important assumption that rules and laws were legitimate, and that the 
goal was in fact to enhance compliance of these.  This proved to be a critical 
realisation and will be discussed further in Chapter Three.  In acknowledging that 
South Africa’s political history had led to a number of inequitable laws and policies, it 
was important to reframe the research question to: what are the factors that lead 
fishers to comply, or not comply, with formal rules and regulations?  By reframing the 
question, the researcher was better able to investigate all factors influencing fishers’ 
behaviour (including the influence of history and power in defining law) and to 
approach compliance more in terms of a fisheries system, rather than seeing 
‘increased compliance’ as an end in itself.  
 
2.3  Action Research 
 
In many ways, the research question was pragmatic, which reflected the researcher’s 
involvement in government policies and processes, and which is characterised by the 
approach of ‘action research’.  Action research is defined as research that promotes 
change, and seeks to improve practice and understanding (Robson 2002). The 
research engages with a real challenge that fishers, and fisheries authorities, are 
grappling to address, and it was co-funded through the national fisheries directorate 
(Marine and Coastal Management – MCM – within the national Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism - DEAT).  Thus, there were expectations that this 
research would not be an ‘ivory tower’ exercise, but would inform fisheries policy 
and management decision-making in South Africa (see Hauck 2009 for policy 
recommendations).   
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One aspect of action research is ‘policy research’, which aims to inform policymakers 
on a particular challenge or problem that they face to provide action-oriented 
recommendations (Majchrzak 1984). A key objective of this study was to understand 
fisheries non-compliance in all its complexity as a means of understanding the 
problem in such a way that the underlying principles to address compliance in a more 
integrated manner could be identified. It was not the intention of this research to 
develop specific interventions, but rather to develop a conceptual framework that 
would guide government in developing appropriate compliance strategies. This is 
emphasised by Majchrzak (1984), who argues that policy research is, among other 
things, an empirico-inductive approach (in line with grounded theory) that allows 
concepts and theory building to emerge from the data itself, through an iterative 
process that begins with an understanding of the social problem itself. Further, she 
states that policy research is multidimensional, requiring all the complexities of the 
problem to be identified. Caution is expressed, however, that action researchers, and 
policy researchers, need to acknowledge that ‘change is a process, not an event’ 
(Robson 2002: 219). Thus, research may not have immediate impact, but should be 
considered by the decision-makers and should contribute to a change in thinking. 
Reason and Bradbury (2001) emphasise that action research is about creating new 
forms of understanding, and through this understanding (and reflection), new 
solutions to problems can be explored.  
 
Action research can be particularly challenging, however, when research results 
question current paradigms (Majchrzak 1984).  A particular conflict emerged in this 
regard during the latter months of 2007, when the Minister of DEAT announced the 
closure of the commercial abalone fishery (DEAT 2007a).  This decision, which was a 
direct response to non-compliance in the fishery, contradicted the research results of 
this study.  The researcher openly opposed the decision but then conflict emerged 
with MCM, which was the organisation also co-funding the research. These 
conflicting paradigms were acknowledged in the research and it often called for 
careful sharing of information with government. Thus, although the research results 
may not have been supported by decision-makers, interaction with government 
authorities continued during this time of conflict and information was shared as a 
means of trying to shape a new understanding of the problem itself.    
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2.4  Qualitative Approach 
 
To compliment the approaches outlined above, this research also adopted a qualitative 
approach to understanding small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa.  
Qualitative research focuses on phenomenon that occur in natural settings and that 
involve studying and understanding the complexity of the phenomenon (Robson 
2002, Silverman 2001, Seale 2004a).  Thus, qualitative researchers focus on the 
multifaceted nature of what they are studying, including the many dimensions and 
layers (Leedy and Ormrod 2005). This contextual approach was adopted in this 
research as a means of understanding fisheries compliance in its entirety, at the very 
least identifying the complexities of the fishery system. In understanding a complex 
social problem, all elements may not be extensively studied, but all elements should 
be identified and considered in order to understand the multi-dimensional nature of 
the problem (Majchrzak 1984). Further, as Bryman (1988) explains, ‘whatever the 
sphere in which data are being collected, we can understand events only when they 
are situated in the wider social and historical context’ (p. 65).  
 
Although this study did not embark on quantitative research methods, their value is 
acknowledged, and other quantitative research studies were drawn on at various 
stages of the research.  The perceived dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative 
methods is disputed, and it is argued that both can be used in research, and they are 
not mutually exclusive (Bryman 1988, 2004).  Quantitative surveys, for example, used 
in various small-scale fisheries research in South Africa were referred to, particularly 
in relation to socio-economic characteristics of fishers and their livelihood strategies.  
A compliance survey on four South African fisheries was drawn on for the abalone 
case study, and for broader conceptual understanding, but it needed to be 
contextualised within historical, socio-economic and political issues (Hauck et al. 
2005).  The focus of this research, therefore, was less on the determination of facts per 
se, but more on the understanding of fisher behaviour in a particular context.  Thus, 
this study draws on the social constructionist perspective, which recognises that we 
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3  METHODS 
 
This section highlights the different methods that were used to gather information and 
insight on fisheries compliance and small-scale fisher behaviour in South Africa.  Six 
key methods used in this research will be discussed: (1) case studies, (2) literature 
review, (3) fieldwork, (4) participation in meetings, (5) interviews and (6) participant 
observation. All of these methods have been used to conduct and analyse information 
and to rethink existing theory on small-scale fisheries compliance. 
 
Given that a wide array of methods was employed, the process of triangulation was 
adopted in this research as a means of understanding compliance by ‘tackling it’ 
through various angles.  Triangulation is a widely used strategy as ‘it involves the use 
of multiple sources to enhance the rigour of research’ (Robson 2002: 174).  
Triangulation can refer to using more than one method in data collection, as well as 
using more than one theory or approach to plan the research and explain the research 
results.  It is often used to check results for consistency, but should not be assumed to 
deliver a definitive ‘truth’ (Spicer 2004).  Through triangulation, different tools are 
used to approach the same question, or different questions are used to investigate 
something in different ways (Robson 2002).   
 
The methods chosen for this study have also been influenced by the research 
approaches discussed above.  In order to facilitate an understanding of the research 
process, Figure 2.1 outlines this process and the methods that were used.  
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1. Develop research questions 
[literature review] 
2. Select case studies 
 
3. Exploratory fieldwork (Phase 1) 
[Interviews, previous research,  
participant observation] 
 
4. Data Analysis 
 
 
5. Develop preliminary conceptual framework 
 
 
6. Refine conceptual framework and theory development 
 
7. Write-up findings and conclusions  
 
Figure 2.1: Outline of the research process adopted in this study (drawn on from a 
description of qualitative research in Bryman 2004). The dotted lines reflect the 
iterative process between data collection and conceptual and theoretical development. 
 
3.1  Case Studies 
 
Case studies have been identified as a key method to generate theory from empirical 
experience (Eisenhardt 1988). Hagan (1982) defines a case study method as an in-
depth qualitative investigation of a particular phenomenon in an illustrative case.  As 
Mitchell (1984: 239) explains, this does not have to be a ‘typical’ case, but a ‘telling’ 
case, where patterns and relationships between people and events are sufficiently 
illustrated.  The focus of this study was on small-scale fisheries compliance in South 
Africa and two case studies were identified that could provide important information 
on understanding the factors that influence fishers to comply or not.  Some 
researchers have questioned the case study approach because it is difficult to 
generalise findings to other populations (Bryman 2004).  Robson (2002), however, 
argues that it is a misconception to assume that more than one case study is a ‘sample’ 
Collection of further data: 
• Draw on previous research 
• Fieldwork (Phase 2 & 3) 
• Interviews 
• Meetings 
• Participant observation 
• Literature Review 
Tighten research focus 
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of cases whereby broad generalisations can be made (Robson 2002).  Rather, multiple 
case studies can contribute to analytic generalisation, which refers to the development 
of theory that can be understood in different cases (Yin 1994).  For example, as 
Robson (2002) explains, one case will provide evidence that supports a particular 
theoretical view, which may then guide the choice of subsequent cases, and patterns in 
data are analysed to construct generalised theory. The results of the case study 
research were analysed in conjunction with findings gleaned from a review of small-
scale fisheries research in South Africa (Chapter 4), which enabled the researcher to 
highlight general trends that were emerging in South Africa, beyond the case study 
sites. 
 
The abalone and west coast rock lobster (WCRL) fisheries were chosen as the two 
case studies in this research. Although the focus of the research was different in each 
of the cases, they were identified as ‘telling cases’ for a number of important reasons.  
First, both of these fisheries are small-scale fisheries, with long-standing traditional 
use, and with social, economic and cultural significance to many coastal communities.  
Second, both of these fisheries have been considered key in the transformation of 
South African fisheries and the redistribution of rights to previously disadvantaged 
fishers (DEAT 2002). Third, abalone and WCRL are considered ‘high value’ 
resources (Cockroft et al. 2002), which are perceived to entice illegal harvesting and 
trade (Harris et al. 2002b). Fourth, it is well known that an organised informal fishery 
exists for abalone and WCRL (Hauck 1999a, Nel 2005), which has resulted in 
focussed law enforcement interventions, and a high priority focus in terms of 
compliance.  Eisenhardt (1988) emphasises that the selection of case studies is often 
influenced by their relevance to theory development, particularly when one adopts a 
grounded theory approach. 
 
The rationale for choosing the abalone and WCRL fisheries, despite the fact that they 
are both considered high value species by the authorities (Cockroft et al. 2002), needs 
to be highlighted.  First, the researcher was involved in a study that explored fisheries 
compliance issues broadly in South Africa (Hauck et al. 2005). Although not an in-
depth study, the research findings indicated that the most significant issues 
influencing behaviour were the same irrespective of the value of the resources.  
Second, the ‘value’ of resources can be disputed. It is argued that with resources of 
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high economic value, the incentives are greater for fishers to over-harvest (Harris et 
al. 2002b).  However, other research has found that even those resources with low 
economic value are still ‘highly valued’ by the fishers due to high levels of 
dependence for food security or income (Hauck et al. 2005, Isaacs 2003, Kariem 
2005, Sowman 2006).  Finally, the two case studies chosen for this research are 
‘telling’ cases, as outlined above, and in the spirit of action research, are critical 
compliance challenges that government is aiming to address. Further, other South 
African research, including primary research conducted by this researcher, is 
highlighted in Chapter 4 and was drawn on for conceptual and theoretical 
development.  Thus, in developing a new conceptual understanding of small-scale 
fisheries compliance in South Africa, the two case studies were key, but the analysis 
was also informed by broader small-scale fisheries research.   
 
Thus, the abalone and WCRL fishery case studies have been chosen as a means to 
provide rich insight, in a particular context, into the behaviour of small-scale fishers, 
to highlight the complex system that is operating within and between formal and 
informal fisheries, to contribute to theoretical development more broadly and, 
importantly, to contribute to an understanding of two pressing compliance issues in 
South Africa.  The characteristics of each case study will be briefly discussed as well 
as more specific rationale for their importance to this research. 
 
3.1.1  The abalone fishery 
 
The abalone fishery is the most well known fishery in terms of non-compliance in 
South Africa. It has received significant media coverage since ‘protest fishing’ 
became highly visible in the mid-1990s, whereby informal fishers openly harvested 
abalone ‘illegally’ as a means of protesting government for legal access (Hauck 
1999a).  Since this time, state authorities and civil society have embarked on a 
number of initiatives to minimise conflict and limit over-exploitation.  However, the 
informal fishery has grown in size and sophistication, resulting in an informal offtake 
of 12 times that of the formal fishery in the 2006/7 season (ASWG 2007).  In 
February 2008 the commercial fishery was closed due to concern for the state of the 
resource (DEAT 2007a).  
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Of great value to this case study was previous research conducted on the abalone 
fishery in specific communities (Hauck 1997, Hauck 1999a,b, Hauck and Hector 
2003). This in-depth investigation of the informal fishery at a micro-level, which 
began in 1995, was not repeated in this study.  Rather, the focus of this research was 
on a regional perspective, interacting with different stakeholders more broadly.  By 
drawing on over a decade of research, a key objective was to explore how the 
informal fishery had changed over time and the factors that led to its increased levels 
of organisation. Key to understanding the abalone fishery was investigating the 
factors that led it to evolve from a largely traditional fishery to one that is highly 
organised and involved in international illegal trade.   
 
Thus, this case study focussed largely on the area where abalone harvesting was 
historically centred and where both the formal and informal fisheries were 
concentrated (Zones A-D, see Figure 2.2).  It was in this area where most of the 
interviews took place, although some stakeholders were also contacted in the other 
zones (mainly Zone E).  Traditionally, when the abalone resource was stable, over 
90% of the commercial fishery was harvested in Zones A-D (Tarr 2000) and from 
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Figure 2.2: Location of the abalone case study, which largely focussed on Zones A-
D of the commercial fishery (adapted from Tarr 2000) 
 
 
The abalone case study, assessed from a regional perspective, has provided critical 
insights into the underlying factors that have influenced fishers’ behaviour over time.  
It highlights important socio-economic and political issues related to the segregation 
and marginalisation of small-scale fisher communities, it has been influenced by a 
wide array of government interventions that have had little long-term success and it 
has a sophisticated informal fishery that has grown and thrived over time.  Finally, the 
closure of the commercial fishery has largely been attributed to high levels of 
‘poaching’ (DEAT 2007b), and law enforcement has clearly not succeeded in 
preventing the decline of the resource. Thus, the abalone fishery is a critical case 
study to examine in order to understand the factors influencing fisheries compliance. 
  
3.1.2  The West  Coast Rock Lobster  Fishery 
 
Compliance issues and concerns related to the WCRL fishery were first introduced to 
the researcher during in-depth research on the abalone fishery in 1995 (Hauck 1997).  
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Although there were cases of arrests and confiscations related to the lobster fishery 
(Hauck 1997), the focus of law enforcement was on the lucrative abalone fishery.  
Over the years, as the abalone resource became depleted, more and more informal 
fishers turned to the lobster fishery as a source of income and livelihood.  
Interestingly, as will be discussed in the case study chapters, there was an ecological 
phenomenon that saw a southerly migration of lobster to historically important 
abalone areas from the mid-1990s (Tarr et al. 1996).  This had a detrimental impact on 
abalone recruitment, but fishers spoke of a new abundance of lobster.  While initiating 
the research on the abalone fishery for this study, the importance of the informal 
lobster fishery was highlighted and it became evident that this was an important 
fishery that required a deeper understanding.  This relates back to Robson’s (2002) 
assessment that one case study may inform the choice of another. 
 
Particularly interesting at the outset of this research was that many of the issues raised 
by the informal abalone fishers 10 years ago, were now being highlighted by the 
informal lobster fishers.  Further, within management circles, and within the formal 
WCRL fishery, scientists and industry reviewed the decline (and ultimate closure) of 
the abalone fishery as a ‘red flag’ for the lobster fishery. There was a fear that the 
informal lobster fishery was growing in size and organisation and that the WCRL 
fishery was facing the same fate as the abalone fishery.  Thus, there was potential that 
the evolution of the abalone fishery could shed light on the current developments in 
the informal lobster fishery. 
 
Contrary to the regional approach used in the abalone fishery, this case study focussed 
on one traditional fishing community where informal lobster fishing was a key 
livelihood strategy for many fishers.  With no previous in-depth research experience 
on the lobster fishery, it was important to understand the compliance issues from a 
micro-level context, whereby intensive research could be conducted on the methods 
of operation, social relations and patterns of behaviour.  Key to this understanding, as 
was experienced in the initial research on abalone, was the development of important 
relationships and trust with fishers themselves.   
 
The community of Hangberg, which is situated above the Hout Bay harbour and 
located in the Cape Town municipal area, was chosen for this study (see Figure 2.3).  
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In 1950, Hout Bay was zoned as a white residential suburb under the Group Areas Act 
(41 of 1950), while the harbour was reserved for Coloured occupation (Isaacs 2003).  
This harbour community became known as Hangberg, where many of the traditional 
fishers have remained. Considered a traditional fishing community, with historic links 
to the lobster fishery (Van Sittert 1985), it has been identified by the authorities and 
industry as a ‘problem area’ due to perceived high levels of ‘illegal fishing’ or 
‘poaching’ (Branch et al. 2007). This, along with the fact that it is situated adjacent to 
a Marine Protected Area, poses important questions in relation to compliance (see 
Figure 2.3).   
 
 
Figure 2.3: Map highlighting location of Hangberg and the adjacent Table Mountain 
National Park Marine Protected Area (adapted from DEAT 2004c). 
 
This case study has also drawn heavily on the work of van Sittert (1985, 1993, 1994), 
who has provided a rich historical understanding of the development of the 
commercial WCRL fishery from the late 1800s and the emergence of the informal 
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fishery and black market.  This research provided a critical historical context that 
informed the conceptual framework and the theoretical analysis.   
 
Thus, research with fishers in Hangberg has provided important insights into an 
understanding of small-scale fisheries compliance.  It is a marginalised community in 
terms of socio-economic circumstances and access to resources, it has been directly 
affected by fisheries transformation policies, it is located adjacent to a Marine 
Protected Are (MPA), which further limits access, it highlights interesting 
institutional issues (due to the existence of the MPA), it is considered a ‘hot spot’ for 
poaching from the perspective of industry and government and it has an important 
historical lobster fishery.  In addition, valuable research conducted in this area in the 
past provided important background information on social, economic and political 
issues (Isaacs 2003, van Sittert 1985, 1993, 1994). 
 
3.2  Literature Review 
 
An extensive literature review was conducted throughout the research process as a 
means of exploring and developing theoretical concepts that informed the research, as 
well as gathering information to enhance understanding of the case studies. An 
academic review of published literature was instrumental in developing and refining 
the conceptual framework.  Various theoretical ideas have been drawn on for this 
research, including fisheries governance, fisheries compliance, green criminology, 
critical criminology, environmental security and systems thinking.  Terre Blanche and 
Durrheim (1999) explain that as the research process unfolds, the literature review 
becomes more focussed and key concepts more refined.  This is the case in this study, 
whereby concepts and theories have evolved throughout the process of data 
collection, data analysis and ongoing engagement with the literature.   
 
In addition to the academic literature, the empirical research in this study was 
significantly enhanced by drawing on previous research reports and government 
documents related to small-scale fisheries in South Africa, the abalone fishery and the 
WCRL fishery.  Some of these documents were not always easily accessible, and 
were often accessed via consulting work for DEAT or through established 
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relationships within government or other institutions.  All confidential documents 
were either used only as background information or permission was received to refer 
to them.  The government documents, in particular, provided important insight into 
management approaches and decision-making.   
 
Other documentation, such as unpublished research reports, dissertations and policy 
papers, provided important contextual information for both case study sites.  Some of 
this information was integrated into the case study analyses and others were important 
for stimulating new ideas.   
 
3.3  Fieldwork 
 
There were three key phases of fieldwork in this study.  The first was exploratory 
research in each of the case study sites, when key informants were identified and 
critical issues were highlighted.  The second phase was the testing of the conceptual 
framework in the field through refined research questions. The third phase involved 
follow-up fieldwork with key informants as a means of refining the framework and 
developing theory. 
 
The duration of the research process was over a period of 2.5 years, with intensive 
fieldtrips ongoing for two of those years, but interspersed with other data collection 
activities.  It is important to note that the nature of the research was reflexive and not 
rigid in its approach.  Thus, fieldwork trips were often influenced by particular 
activities in the communities, policy decisions that needed to be understood or due to 
other circumstances related to the case study.  Similarly, absences from the field were 
influenced by the timing of policy and management meetings in Cape Town, or the 
heavy presence of law enforcement in certain areas which required a ‘stepping back’ 
from the research.  As a result, although there were three phases of fieldwork, the 
timing of each was influenced by external influences, and fieldtrips varied from 1-10 
consecutive days. In addition, telephone contact was maintained with key informants 
throughout the duration of the research process. 
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For the abalone case study, Zones A-D were visited for 50 days over a two year 
fieldwork period.  Access to this area was gained through previous research contacts, 
which proved highly valuable in terms of trust already being established. These 
historical relationships also saved the researcher time during the fieldwork as many 
key issues were discussed at first meetings, and further informants were introduced 
quickly.  
 
In the Hangberg case study, gaining access to informants took longer to establish, 
although one key informant was identified at the outset and proved to be a key 
roleplayer throughout the research process.  Initial fieldwork was spent walking in the 
streets, chatting informally to people in their gardens or at the shops.  It did not take 
long to hear stories of fishing and to be introduced to fishers ‘who catch lobster over 
the mountain’ (i.e.: informal fishers).  Although people spoke openly about their 
concerns and challenges, it was only months later that some confessed that they had 
suspected that I was a police officer!   
 
Due to the illegal nature of informal fishing, it was important at the outset to develop 
relationships with people in the Hangberg community.  Thus, the strategy that was 
undertaken was to identify one main informal fishing group and develop strong 
contacts as a means of understanding the processes and behaviours close-up.  A 
relationship with a key informant was then established who openly welcomed the 
researcher into his fishing circle of 16 crew.  It was with this group that two years of 
fieldwork was intensively undertaken.  Other informal crews and key informants were 
also contacted and additional information gathered. Seventy days of focussed 
fieldwork was undertaken over this two year period. Time in the field varied from one 
day visits to daily visits over 7-10 days. The researcher was also involved in many 
shorter visits (half day) to meet informal fishers to discuss particular issues or to 
attend meetings and workshops.  More days were spent conducting fieldwork in this 
case study due to a lack of previous research on the WCRL fishery, and due to the 
time it took to establish trust with key informants.  
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3.4  Participation in Meetings 
 
In addition to the fieldwork conducted in both case study areas, important information 
and interaction emanated from formal meetings between the various stakeholder 
groups.  These meetings often related to management issues and policy development 
processes, where the researcher either observed or participated in discussions. All of 
these meetings took place in Cape Town, where many fisheries-related gatherings are 
held due to proximity to the coast and the fact that MCM’s head office is located 
there.  
 
These formal meetings were particularly important for the abalone fishery case study, 
which adopted a regional perspective and explored broader management approaches. 
Opportunities to participate in government-fisher meetings in the abalone case study 
were likely more accessible due to the historical involvement of the researcher in this 
fishery and the relationships that had been developed. Thus, 18 management meetings 
related to the abalone fishery were attended between 2006 and 2008 (see Appendix 1). 
These meetings included those relating to the Abalone Scientific Working Group 
(ASWG), as well as those relating to the broader management of the fishery. The 
ASWG largely focused on scientific issues, specifically relating to the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC), and was also involved in making recommendations 
regarding the closure of the fishery. Broader management meetings were less 
frequent, but were convened to discuss TAC allocations at the beginning of every 
fishing season, permit conditions, compliance and other key issues (such as the 
closure of the fishery). These meetings largely involved representatives of the 
commercial abalone fishers and members of MCM.  They were an important method 
for hearing the perspectives of the different stakeholder groups, observing interaction 
between the different groups, being updated on broader policy developments and 
government decisions and maintaining personal relationships with different people. 
During times of absence from the field, these meetings allowed the researcher to be in 
contact with key informants and remain abreast of key issues.  
 
In the WCRL fishery case study, three compliance-related meetings were attended 
that included rightsholders and MCM.  Although the focus of this case study was 
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more on local level processes and activities, these meetings provided important 
insight and a broader understanding of the fishery as a whole.  Other formal meetings, 
such as those related to the development of the small-scale fisheries policy, were also 
informative and contributed to an understanding of stakeholder perceptions, issues of 
concern and areas of conflict (see Appendix 1 for list of meetings).  As with the 
abalone case, these meetings were also important for facilitating contact and 
interaction with key informants.   
 
3.5  Interviews 
 
Different methods were used in this study to ask questions and elicit information from 
people participating in the research.  These included unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups, all of which entail a level of flexibility, informality and 
openness (Neuman 2006). Semi-structured interviews are commonly used in 
qualitative research to explore facts, behaviour and beliefs or attitudes, as a means of 
seeking to understand what people know, what they do and how they think or feel 
(Bryman 1988, Robson 2002).  They largely use open-ended questions, but are guided 
by the key themes of the researcher. This allows a flexible means with which to 
explore complex issues and to understand people’s experiences, which Byrne (2004) 
argues is particularly valuable when interviewing people whose voices have been 
ignored in the past.  In the abalone case study, there were 55 people who participated 
in semi-structured interviews, which included 38 abalone fishers (both formal and 
informal), eight law enforcement personnel, four fisheries authorities3 and five 
community members that were not directly involved in the fishery.  
 
In the WCRL case study, there were 47 people who participated in semi-structured 
interviews, which included 26 lobster fishers (mostly informal, but some formal), five 
industry representatives, seven law enforcement, six community members and three 
fisheries authorities. In addition, some informants were interviewed that were relevant 
for both case studies, which included government scientists, fisheries managers and 
law enforcement.  In total, for both case studies, 185 interviews were conducted with 
                                                
3 The category ‘fisheries authority’ includes both scientists and managers at MCM 
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102 informants4 (see Appendix 2 for a list of interviews conducted).  Many of the 
participants in the research were interviewed more than once, particularly those who 
became key informants due to their particular knowledge and expertise.   
 
Unstructured (informal) interviews were also used, particularly in the Hangberg case 
study, where opportunities were seized to speak to people in the research setting, often 
during observation, when fishing activities were taking place.  Interviews of this 
nature also took place with government authorities, fishers and other stakeholders 
following meetings, workshops or at other opportunities.  These interactions were not 
documented as ‘interviews’ per se, but were an important means with which to gather 
information and remain updated on key issues. 
 
Focus groups were used to bring together stakeholder groups with similar experiences 
to discuss key issues and debate different concepts and ideas.  A key feature of this 
method is the interactive context of the discussion, and is often highlighted as a 
complementary method to interviewing (Tonkiss 2004). Focus groups were held with 
fishers and with law enforcement officials, sometimes initiated by the author, and 
sometimes initiated by the groups themselves, who wanted to provide input into the 
research (see Appendix 2 for list of focus group meetings).  The size of these groups 
varied, with some comprising 15-30 people, which then required careful facilitation.  
In some cases, these meetings became more like workshops, and participants were 
broken into smaller groups for discussions and other activities.  Focus groups with 
law enforcement officials proved particularly interesting as the different approaches 
of government agencies were debated and smaller group work provided the 
opportunity to engage on specific issues.  For example, two half-day ‘workshops’ 
with the marine law enforcement section of Table Mountain National Park (TMNP) 
provided critical insight into the perceptions, approaches and challenges of this group.  
Important theoretical concepts were debated amongst TMNP staff and provided 
important insight into their activities.  A half day focus group session with fishers in 
Hangberg also provided an opportunity to give the research legitimacy and to initiate 
a relationship with individuals.  This was then a springboard for one-on-one 
                                                
4 In addition to these semi-structured interviews, people also participated in focus group meetings (see 
Appendix 2).  Although there was some overlap with participants, the focus groups also included 
additional people who were not interviewed individually. 
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interviews for many of the fishers that had attended, and who were therefore willing 
to meet. 
 
3.5.1  Sampling 
 
Different methods of identifying informants to be interviewed were used in the field.  
Snowball sampling was undertaken at the outset, in which specific individuals were 
interviewed, and then other fishers and key informants were identified through them.  
Robson (2002) states that this technique is advantageous when you are researching a 
clandestine group, where it can be difficult to reach certain individuals. This was the 
case in that relationships were built with certain key informants in the informal sector, 
who then provided a sense of legitimacy to the research and prompted other informal 
fishers to become involved, who may not have met the researcher otherwise.  In 
addition, in the tradition of grounded theory, purposive sampling was also used, 
whereby specific people were sought out in the research as a means of assisting in the 
generation of theory (Byrne 2004).  For example, organised informal fishers involved 
in syndicates were specifically targeted for interviews in both case studies as a means 
of understanding the evolution of their involvement in informal fishing.  Thus, these 
fishers were selected because they had significant relevance to the research topic 
(Tonkiss 2004). 
 
During the research process, it was also important to reflect on who was being 
interviewed, whether some groups were unwilling to meet and whether new 
approaches needed to be taken to identify research participants (Byrne 2004). Those 
informal fishers, for example, who felt a significant sense of injustice, were more 
willing to meet and talk than those who were more organised, and less enthusiastic 
about discussing their operations. It took a longer time to gain access to the latter 
group, and required frequent informal interaction to build relationships.  Further, 
attempts at reciprocity contributed to gaining trust amongst the fishers.  For example, 
a workshop was initiated in Hangberg and all ‘informal rock lobster fishers’ were 
invited to attend, with invitations being spread by key informants through word of 
mouth.  At the beginning of this workshop, an informal presentation was given to feed 
back to the group on important policy processes that affected them, as well as the 
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details of a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that could provide further 
assistance and information.  This workshop was a catalyst to various activities that 
took place amongst the fishers and they saw this study as an important contribution to 
that process.  Similarly, in the abalone fishery, the researcher’s presence and 
participation in formal meetings between government and fishers increased the 
legitimacy of the research in the eyes of the fishers, and they acknowledged the 
benefit of ‘outside expertise’ in these discussions. 
 
3.6  Participant Observation 
 
Qualitative field data inevitably includes elements of observation, where researchers 
‘pay close attention, watch and listen carefully’ (Neuman 2006: 396).  Ethical issues 
emerge here, which will be discussed below, in terms of gaining access to the 
informants, particularly where ‘illegal’ activities are taking place (Walsh 2004). 
Nevertheless, rapport was built in both case studies as people openly spoke to the 
researcher, met for interviews and allowed observation in meetings and in the field.   
 
Participant observation was used particularly in the Hangberg case study as a means 
of understanding the informal fishing activities: how fishers operate, how they 
perceive law enforcement efforts, how the different groups interact and the level of 
organisation.  Observation provides a good understanding of the context of a situation, 
particularly when studying sensitive issues or illegal activities (Bryman 1988, Hagan 
1982). Information is gathered that may not have been accessible otherwise.  For 
example, on many occasions the researcher observed fishing activity from start to 
finish (why decisions were made to fish, preparing the gear, harvesting and sale), 
which provided an understanding of the fishing system that interviews on their own 
would not have revealed. In some cases this involved up to eight hours of activity, 
often waiting for long periods of time on the mountain or on the rocks. It was during 
these times that informal (unstructured) interviews were conducted with fishers 
involved in different aspects of the fishery system.  Important information was 
collected during this time, which was an accessible means with which to meet people.  
In the abalone case study, due to previous observation-related research and a better 
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understanding of informal fishing operations (Hauck 1997, Hauck and Hector 2003), 
more focus was placed on meeting and interviewing the various stakeholders.   
 
Observation was also used more generally in both case studies, as a means of being 
aware of the social setting, and interactions that take place in it (Neuman 2006, Walsh 
2004).  This included an awareness of how people lived, the way they behave in 
certain circumstances and how they interact with different people, or other 
stakeholder groups. For example, observation was used in interviews, workshops and 
in joint meetings between the stakeholders (particularly government and the fishers), 
where body language was highly informative.  These different aspects of observing, 
therefore, provided important additional information to what emerged directly from 
the interviews. 
 
4. DEVELOPMENT OF A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
As outlined in Figure 2.1, this research involved an iterative process that was guided 
at the beginning by a preliminary conceptual framework. This framework, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter 3, was developed through a literature review and 
through exploratory fieldwork. Further, it drew extensively on the previous 
experience of the researcher, who has conducted empirical research on small-scale 
fisheries in South Africa for over a decade.  This previous experience has been 
important for this study and has provided valuable insights into the conceptual 
framework. The abalone case study, in particular, has the benefit of a longitudinal 
perspective, which has allowed an assessment of the evolution of the fishery and how 
fisher behaviour has changed over time.  In addition, since the initial research was 
conducted with abalone fishers in 1995, the author has been able to maintain good 
relationships with the fishers and with government authorities.  In some cases, this 
presented a privileged position whereby confidential information, government reports 
and law enforcement data were provided, which may have been difficult to access 
otherwise.   
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Although interaction was initiated with stakeholder groups in the region, previous 
studies that focussed on the abalone fishery in specific communities in the area were 
heavily drawn on for the local level context.  This was particularly interesting due to 
the fact that many who were operating informally 8-10 years ago, and who were 
fighting for formal (legal) access, were now rightsholders in the commercial fishery.  
These fishers, some of whom maintained their links with the informal fishery, 
provided a particularly rich account of their transition to the formal sector and the 
decisions that they had made over time.   
 
Further, the researcher’s involvement in other studies related to small-scale fisheries 
in South Africa, as well as direct involvement in fisheries policy processes and 
implementation strategies, provided additional insight into government decision-
making, policy processes and vested interests among different stakeholder groups.  
Participation within these processes also meant that access to government authorities, 
fisher representatives and NGOs was facilitated as previous relationships had been 
developed.  However, although previous research and experience provided significant 
background to this study, and facilitated entry into the research domain, it certainly 
did not provide a ‘clean slate’ with which to embark on grounded theory research.  
Nevertheless, the notion of ‘objective researcher’ has long been challenged, and some 
pre-determined assumptions are more or less considered a ‘given’ in social science 
research (Seale 2004c).   
 
The preliminary conceptual framework was refined through a process of data 
collection and analysis. Robson (2002) states that the development of a conceptual 
framework, which is often a diagrammatic illustration of preliminary thoughts, is 
beneficial for informing research at the outset.  Neuman (2006: 186) explains that 
conceptualisation is an important process during the beginning stages of qualitative 
research.  It is a means with which to identify abstract ideas, work with them and 
refine them throughout the research process.  Theories are then drawn from 
conceptualisation as the research continues to organise and analyse the data in order to 
‘make sense’ of it. The preliminary compliance framework for this study provided 
important guidance in developing the interview schedule for the in-depth fieldwork 
(Bhatt 2004).  Key themes to investigate in the research were highlighted and 
relationships between them needed to be explored. Thus, initial ideas outlined in the 
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conceptual framework were examined in light of the data as a means of theorising 
about them. 
 
5. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The information that emerged from the fieldwork, the interviews and other methods, 
were then coded into themes as a means of identifying patterns in the data (Seale 
2004b).  These themes were drawn from the conceptual framework, and expanded 
where necessary, to clarify key factors that were influencing compliance behaviour.  
All notes emanating from the fieldwork, interviews, meetings and workshops were 
collated for data analysis.  In more formal settings, notes were often taken throughout 
the interaction, but in the field, the researcher opted for ‘jotted notes’, which are 
immediate memory triggers, or no notes at all (Neuman 2006).  Only after the 
interview or field experience were detailed notes written, with an effort to document 
information as soon as possible after it was collected.  Whenever possible direct 
quotes were recorded, some of which were used in the analysis and write-up.   
 
The process of data analysis provides the ‘social context’ of a particular phenomenon, 
creating theory from the information that was being collected (Neuman 2006).  Key to 
this was understanding not only the factors that influence compliance, but 
understanding how, and why, compliance changes over time, and the links that exist 
between the different factors. Thus, the data analysis process was ongoing. It was 
important to constantly reflect on the empirical research, which in turn shaped further 
data collection. 
 
The development of the conceptual framework emerged from the data analysis, 
exploring the concept of a fishery system, the need to integrate disciplines in 
approaching fisheries problems (such as compliance) and the importance of 
understanding the complexities and linkages associated with fisheries crises (Berkes 
et al. 2001, Charles 2001, McClanahan and Castilla 2007).  The case studies, 
therefore, which are the foundation of the empirical research, were studied, and 
described, as fishery systems (Charles 2001).    
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6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Ethical issues are critical to social science research and our interaction with human 
populations.  Fundamental to establishing strong ethics during research are issues 
such as trust, consent and confidentiality (Kelly and Ali 2004).  Three key ethical 
issues were raised during this research.  First, every person that was interviewed was 
granted anonymity, ensuring that the information that they provided would not be 
directly linked to them as an individual.  Many people were open with their 
comments, but some felt at risk (mainly informal fishers) and others feared conflict 
within their communities.  As a result, all names have been removed from the case 
study analyses with each individual given a number linked to the fishery case study.  
As a result, when verbatim statements are provided, the reference is a letter (A for 
abalone fishery and L for lobster (WCRL) fishery) and a number (indicating the 
informant) in order to maintain anonymity (for example: A31). In addition, different 
stakeholder groups were identified that included fishers, fishing industry, community 
members, law enforcement personnel, fishery managers and researchers. References 
to interviews and statements are therefore contextualised to identify the source of the 
statement, and all informants are listed in Appendix 2. 
 
The second ethical issue relates to observing and reporting on illegal activities.  
Although this research was partially funded by the national fisheries authority, at no 
time did fishery compliance staff approach the researcher for information on informal 
fishing on either of the case study sites.  One senior staff member of Table Mountain 
National Park, however, requested a presentation to feed back the research results, not 
to inform them of illegal activities, but to explore possible alternatives to addressing 
the problem. Although there were possible implications of being present during 
informal fishing activities, on two occasions when law enforcement staff saw the 
researcher, they simply waved, knowing the nature of the research.  Nevertheless, it 
was a conscious decision at the outset to set boundaries with the fishers and, in 
principle, all offers of informal lobster or abalone were kindly refused. 
 
The final ethical issue, which proved particularly difficult, was related to raised 
expectations.  This research has been conducted at an important time of transition for 
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both the abalone and WCRL fisheries.  The bulk of the in-depth fieldwork in the 
abalone fishery, for example, was at a time when there were significant reductions in 
the formal TAC, and threats were in place to close the fishery.  To some extent, 
various stakeholders saw this research as a means to ‘voice’ their concerns to 
government about closing the fishery. There were expectations that the research could 
‘help them’ by providing additional pressure to the relevant authorities, through the 
information that was being collected.  Although there was a sense of obligation to 
share the research results at government meetings, the closure of the fishery was 
beyond the influence of this study, and took place anyway.  In the Hangberg case 
study, as the researcher was withdrawing from the fieldwork, an Interim Relief Permit 
was announced for Western Cape fishers, and the informal WCRL fishers saw this as 
an opportunity to gain legal access.  This research was somehow seen to be linked to 
this process, raising expectations that the fishers involved in this study would be 
allocated permits.  This, of course, did not happen and a much more complicated 
process unfolded that resulted in conflict.  Ethical decisions needed to be made in 
terms of the extent to which the researcher could share information and attempt to 
influence the process.   
 
There is no doubt that a sense of reciprocity was an important issue throughout this 
research.  As Hagan (1982) states: ‘the research subjects help the investigator; now 
what is owed to them?’ (p. 118).  The researcher thus emphasised to all stakeholder 
groups that the research results emanating from this study would be fed into the new 
small-scale fisheries policy process.  Further, the researcher agreed to present the 
research process and preliminary results when requested at meetings and workshops 
as a means of sharing the information and encouraging debate. Also, due to the 
researcher’s involvement with various stakeholder groups in each fishery, she was 
also asked at times to facilitate workshops or meetings.  Importantly, due to the fact 
that the study was co-funded by MCM (which had its challenges, as already 
discussed), the researcher had a responsibility to ensure that the research results were 
fed back to managers and decision-makers in a way that would allow them to 
understand compliance differently. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
A number of approaches guided this research and several methods were used to 
collect empirical data and to theorise about small-scale fisheries compliance in South 
Africa.  This diversity reflects the complexity of fisheries management and 
acknowledges the need to broaden our understanding of fisheries challenges beyond 
traditional paradigms (Berkes et al. 2001, Charles 2001, Degnbol et al. 2006, 
Kooiman et al. 2005, McClanahan et al. 2008).  The focus on small-scale fisheries 
generally in South Africa, and then specifically through the two case studies, further 
highlighted the diverse factors influencing fisher behaviour. The case study method 
was particularly relevant as a means to build theory and provide new insights based 
on empirical evidence (Eisenhardt 1988). 
 
Throughout the iterative research process, data collection, analysis and conceptual 
development were intertwined, but the dilemma of balancing academic concepts with 
policy change were increasingly apparent over time.  This was particularly 
challenging due to this study being partially government-funded by the fisheries 
authority, which meant that competing perspectives needed to be acknowledged.  
However, in attempting to understand why fishers complied with formal laws or not, a 
new perspective emerged in terms of conceptualising compliance behaviour.  As 
Silverman (2004) explains, social science research should use its ‘theoretical 
imperatives [to] drive it in a direction that can offer practitioners, managers and policy 
makers new perspectives on their problems’ (p. 61). In this way, the ‘usefulness’ of 
the research can be specifically relevant in the local context, in terms of contributing 
to a new understanding of an ‘old problem’, and informing policy and practice in 
South Africa.  Further, from a broader perspective, it is hoped that the empirical 
research in this study will contribute more widely to an emerging conceptual 
understanding of small-scale fisheries compliance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RETHINKING SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES 
COMPLIANCE: THEORETICAL CONTEXT & 






According to a recent report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, fisheries around the world are in crisis (FAO 2005c).  Hardin (1968) 
would argue that this is so because of a ‘tragedy of the commons’, whereby 
individuals pursue their own self-interest at the expense of the welfare of a group.  
Key to this model is the assumption that individuals act rationally and choose to 
maximise their own welfare over others (Schlager 2002).  The state, therefore, is 
required to intervene to protect and control natural resources and to prevent over-
exploitation.  Traditional compliance strategies also embrace this approach and are 
founded on the assumption that fishers are rational actors and their behaviour is 
influenced by the costs and benefits of their actions (Sutinen et al. 1990).  
 
Over the past three decades, alternative theoretical approaches to Hardin’s model have 
been proposed, which recognise that there are many circumstances in which 
individuals cooperate to manage shared resources (McCay and Acheson 1987, Ostrom 
1990, Schlager 2002).  In Ostrom’s (2000) discussion of collective action and the 
development of rules and norms, she identifies a number of principles that are key to 
successful self-organised resource regimes.  These include the presence of rules and 
the monitoring and sanctioning of free-riders.  Dietz et al. (2003) argue that a key 
aspect of effective commons governance is ensuring rule compliance.  However, 
whether formal or informal strategies are in place to enhance compliance, they argue 
that those who impose the rules must be seen as ‘effective and legitimate’ or 
resistance and evasion will be inevitable (p. 1911).  Jentoft (2000, 2004b) however, 
cautions that rules are more than just a means to influence a fishers’ choice of action, 
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but should in fact reflect the norms and values of the fishers themselves. By doing so, 
a sense of moral obligation to comply with rules is enhanced.  
 
Thus, it is argued in this thesis that a central premise to understanding fisheries 
compliance must relate directly to how rules and laws are developed, and by whom. 
Issues of power, and how those in power determine what is to be considered and 
controlled is central to this understanding.  Drawing on criminology and security 
discourse, this chapter attempts to rethink fisheries compliance by linking the 
objectives of social justice and environmental justice in order to understand how 
‘harm’ is defined, and subsequently how laws are developed. Furthermore, by 
drawing on the experiences of small-scale fisheries in South Africa, it is argued that 
an understanding of compliance should not take law to be a given, but should 
challenge existing laws, especially those that further marginalise small-scale fishers.   
 
2. UNDERSTANDING COMPLIANCE 
 
Compliance is generally understood as the behaviour of people to conform to rules 
that have been developed to influence actions (Tyler 2006).  These rules may exist as 
formal laws or as informal norms, thus being monitored and enforced through either 
formal or informal mechanisms, and sometimes by both.  Studies of compliance have 
been conducted over the past decades by scholars in a range of disciplines, including 
criminology, sociology, psychology, economics, political science and anthropology 
(Gezelius 2003, Tyler 2006, Zaelke et al. 2005a).  In the sphere of the natural 
environment, questions of compliance have largely related to large-scale industrial 
actions such as pollution, transportation of hazardous wastes and destruction of 
natural resources (Zaelke et al. 2005b).   
 
Compliance research has largely been rooted within two schools of thought, which 
have been thoroughly outlined by Gezelius (2003) and will not be discussed in detail 
again here. In brief, one school of thought explores the ‘rationalist’ models of 
deterrence and law enforcement that assume rational actors calculate costs and 
benefits of their actions, and the second explores the ‘normative’ models that 
investigate norms, morality, legitimacy, and social and cultural influences on 
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individuals’ decisions to comply with rules and laws.  These different perspectives to 
understand compliance have also translated into different methods and strategies for 
regulating behaviour.   
 
If one explores the development of fisheries compliance theory, the rationalist 
perspective, which emerged from an economic analysis of non-compliant behaviour, 
dominated its earlier years (Anderson and Lee 1986, Sutinen and Andersen 1985).  
This approach understood non-compliance largely as a result of external influences 
(such as rewards and punishment), resulting in individual fishers acting in their own 
self-interest.  Thus, based on this perspective, fishers will choose to comply (or not) 
based on economic gains and severity of sanctions.  This school of thought has 
significantly influenced fisheries management worldwide (Raakjær-Nielsen 2003), 
and has generally led policymakers to increase deterrence, usually through greater law 
enforcement efforts (Hatcher et al. 2000). 
 
The shortcomings of the above approach, however, have been outlined in the 
literature over the past decade.  Other factors have been identified that help shape 
compliant behaviour.  These include moral and social norms, social pressure, 
perceived legitimacy of management rules and laws, as well as the management 
authority, and fisher involvement in decision-making and management (Gezelius 
2002, 2003, 2004, Hatcher et al. 2000, Hønneland 2000, Jentoft 2000, Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998, Kuperan et al. 1997, McKinlay and Millington 2000, Raakjær-Nielsen 
2003, Raakjær-Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003, Sutinen and Kuperan 1999).  These 
studies have thus explored mechanisms to increase normative support for rules and 
laws, such as informal sanctions and participatory management.   
 
In his extensive review of compliance theory, specifically as it relates to fisheries, 
Gezelius (2003) argues that these two models of understanding behaviour – rational 
choice theory and theory of normative action - are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
elements of both are important and necessary for formulating an integrative theory of 
fisheries compliance.  While combining these schools of thought may arguably be 
fruitful, or even necessary, in order to understand compliance, it is questionable 
whether it is sufficient in order to fully understand it.  
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This chapter, therefore, challenges traditional compliance theories, arguing that a 
conceptual understanding of compliance first requires a critical analysis of how law 
has evolved, its history and the power dynamics that have shaped it (Figure 3.1).  
Thus, the law itself needs to be questioned, including how it is defined, and by whom.  
Although this perspective challenges current compliance theories to think beyond the 
law, it is particularly relevant in a developing country context, where social and 








Figure 3.1: The influence of power and the formation of law in understanding 
fisheries compliance (drawn on from comments by Gezelius, in litt, 2007). 
 
Empirical research for this study is based on case studies from South Africa, a 
relatively young democracy (since 1994), which has experienced a plethora of new 
laws over the past decade and is grappling with a range of social, economic and 
environmental challenges.  In this context, and arguably in relation to fisheries more 
generally, it is proposed that law cannot be taken as a given, and needs to be 
questioned in relation to fisheries compliance discourse. 
 
3. STEPPING BACK: WHERE DOES THE ANALYSIS  
BEGIN? 
 
Criminologists have long been attempting to understand the construction of crime, the 
definition and impact of harm and the responses required to minimise such harm.  In 
the 1970s, the tradition of critical criminology emerged, which developed a political 
economy approach to crime and exposed the role of power in understanding and 
defining crime (Taylor et al. 1973).  Thus, a broader conceptualisation of crime was 
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economic context, that inequalities needed to be recognised and that criminological 
analysis should not be limited to what the state defined as illegal (Barton et al. 2007a).   
 
Similar debates, relevant to the topic of this thesis, occur in the area of environmental 
harm, determining under what conditions an act should be conceived of as an 
environmental ‘crime’, and the resulting strategies to address ‘crime’ that are 
developed based on a particular perspective (White 2003).  The emerging focus over 
the past decade on a wide variety of environmental issues in the discipline of 
criminology has led to what has become known as ‘green criminology’ (Beirne and 
South 2007, Lynch and Stretsky 2003, South 1998).  Although there are debates 
within this growing discourse (Halsey 2004), general principles relate to the strong 
links between human rights and environmental rights (Halsey 1997, Lynch and 
Stretsky 2003), the importance of the role of law in defining environmental ‘harm’ 
(White 1999, 2003) and the necessity to embed an understanding of harm, and 
responses to such harm, in a broader contextual frame (South 1998, 2007).   
 
Key to this discussion is reference to the role of power in determining what 
behaviours become the focus of law and why.  It is argued that environmental crimes 
are socially constructed, are shaped by relations of power, are largely created to 
protect capitalist interests and tend to marginalise the powerless (often recognised by 
class, race and gender hierarchies) (Lynch and Stretsky 2003, White 1999, 2003). 
Thus, environmental harms and social injustices are intertwined (White 2007).  The 
eco-human rights approach to environmental harm, for example, aims to build a 
bridge between the objectives of human rights movements, to attain social justice, and 
the objectives of environmental groups, to attain ecological well-being (Halsey 1997). 
Halsey argues that criminologists need to look for solutions to the environmental 
crisis by understanding the ‘roots’ of harm, particularly the social, political, cultural 
and economic context (Halsey 1997). This is further emphasised by Barton et al. 
(2007a,b), who argue that social harms need to be thought of less in terms of criminal 
justice, and more in terms of social justice. The aim of this chapter is to explore these 
theoretical concepts within the area of small-scale fisheries, and to depart from 
existing compliance literature by critically addressing the role of law in criminalising 
fishers, and understanding more broadly the factors that influence behaviour. 
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4. COMPLEX SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
 
In order to better understand the factors influencing (non)-compliant behaviour and 
thus effectively respond to them, it is necessary to gain a broad understanding about 
the inter-relationships that exist, and the complexities that are evident, in a system 
where people and the environment co-exist.  In criminological discourse, this would 
be about defining and responding to both social harm, and environmental harm, which 
is relevant to critical criminology and encompassed in the eco-human rights 
perspective (Halsey 1997, White 2003).  Ultimately, this is about achieving social and 
environmental justice by addressing the inequities in the current social system whilst 
simultaneously sustaining the ecosystem (Lynch and Stretsky 2003).  As Halsey 
(1997) explains, the connection between the conditions that degrade human beings 
and the conditions that degrade the natural environment need to be acknowledged.   
Thus, the notion of ‘harm’ in this context understands ‘the well-being of nonhuman 
life to be an indispensable prerequisite for human well-being…human rights [are] 
inextricably bound to the well-being of nonhuman life’ (Halsey 1997: 228, italics in 
original).   
 
This recognition of the need to obtain human and environmental rights, and the 
relationship between the two, is also embedded in a new discourse on security.  
Whereas traditional perceptions of security were largely concerned with a state’s 
ability to counter external (largely military) threats, this has been broadened to include 
political, economic, social and environmental threats (Buzan et al. 1998).  The 
concept of human security has received growing attention in recent years and 
emphasises the importance of protecting people’s fundamental rights, such as 
freedom, peace and safety, access to resources and the basic necessities of life and an 
environment that does not threaten health and well-being (Commission on Human 
Security 2004, UNDP 1994).  It is argued that these, in fact, are the greatest security 
risks to states and government.  As Thakur and Newman (2004) state, ‘these issues 
become security concerns when they reach crisis point, when they undermine and 
diminish the survival chances of significant proportions of the citizens of society, and 
when they threaten the stability and integrity of society’ (p.3, italics in original). 
Harm, in this context, relates to the insecurity of people around the world in terms of 
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sustaining basic human rights.  Halsey (1997) explains that ‘criminal conduct [or 
harm] – from a critical human rights position – becomes equated to the actions of 
those agencies, structures, and bastions of power that prevent the universal 
implementation of these rights’ (p. 227). 
 
In terms of the environment, the notion of environmental security gathered 
momentum in the mid-1990s (Myers 2004), with a specific focus on the threat of 
environmental deterioration on human well-being, but increasingly including the 
impact of threats on the ecosystem in and of itself (Buzan et al. 1998).  There is 
widespread recognition in the literature that environmental security encompasses 
many other aspects of security (including political, economic and social) and therefore 
is intertwined with social inequity and injustice, poverty, societal vulnerability, weak 
political structures, population growth, unsustainable economic growth, 
industrialisation and growing demands for resources (Elliott 2001, Haque 2004, 
Myers 2004,  Najam 2004, Thakur and Newman 2004). 
 
In fisheries, however, the connection between the fishers themselves, and the 
resources they harvest, has not always been acknowledged. Traditionally, marine 
resources have largely been allocated and managed through scientific expertise that 
has focussed on national economic objectives rather than the people and livelihoods 
that are affected (ACFR 2003, Degnbol et al. 2006). Thus, fisheries management has 
largely been the responsibility of fisheries biologists and economists, which has 
resulted in the neglect of the experience of traditional fishers (Pauly 2006).  Even 
when there were attempts to ‘develop’ fisheries in developing countries, ‘the goals of 
fisheries development were generally “biological” (high catches, utilisation of all 
resources, etcetera), to the near complete neglect of social goals such as employment, 
community well-being, food security, etcetera’ (Pauly 2006: 9).   
 
However, more recently, the growing role of social sciences in the area of fisheries 
management has highlighted the importance of understanding broader social issues, 
and linking disciplines in order to secure both resources and people (Acheson 2006, 
Degnbol et al. 2006, Johnson 2006, Kooiman et al. 2005).  This is explicitly 
highlighted by Chuenpagdee et al (2005), who state that fisheries challenges need to 
be tackled by acknowledging the ‘interconnectivity of concerns for ecosystem health, 
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social justice, livelihoods and food security and food safety’ (p. 25).  This link, 
between social and ecological systems, is emphasised as being critical to 
understanding, and ultimately achieving, the sustainability of fishery systems (Berkes 
et al. 2001, Berkes et al. 2003, Charles 2001).  It is argued that natural and social 
systems are complex in themselves, and the interactions (and links) between them 
create even more complexity (Acheson 2006, Berkes et al. 2003, Charles 2001). Thus, 
multidisciplinary approaches are required to ‘bridge disciplines and scales, and blend 
theory and practice, if we are to understand these linked complex systems and, on the 
basis of this knowledge, to design more effective systems of governance…’ (Zaelke et 
al. 2005a: 37). 
 
5. UNDERSTANDING FISHERIES COMPLIANCE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa, a country that witnessed its first democratic election in 1994, and has 
undergone a decade of fisheries transformation, is facing a number of challenges in 
terms of small-scale fisheries.  The linkages between social and ecological systems 
are glaring as poverty-stricken coastal communities are increasingly relying on 
diminishing fish stocks (Branch et al. 2002b, Cardoso et al. 2005 Sowman et al. 
2008). However, in South Africa, the inextricable link between human rights and 
environmental rights is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996), which is the point of departure for all law and policy-making in the country.  
Embedded in the Bill of Rights is an environmental clause that guarantees everyone a 
right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being (Witbooi 
2006).  Government is then given the responsibility to take reasonable legislative 
measures to protect the environment, prevent pollution and ecological degradation and 
promote conservation. Further, government laws and policies are expected to secure 
sustainable development, and the use of natural resources, at the same time as 
promoting justifiable economic and social development (Witbooi 2006).  The 
challenge, however, is the development of laws and policies that are put in place at a 
sectoral level, which interpret constitutional provisions in different ways.  In fisheries, 
for example, policies are influenced by the conflicting objectives of national 
frameworks that govern social development and equity, macro-economic policy and 
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principles of environmental sustainability (Van Sittert et al. 2006).  This lack of 
coherence at a national level has led to the ‘subordination’ of the principles of social 
equity and environmental sustainability to the goals of economic efficiency.  As van 
Sittert et al. (2006) state, the effect ‘in terms of fisheries reform has been to sideline 
issues of poverty and food security in pursuit of economic growth, efficiency and 
stability’ (p. 98).  Thus, the marginalisation of small-scale fisheries needs to be 
understood in this current political context, in addition to the broader historical 
context of inequity, which van Sittert (2003) argues has been evident over the past 
century. 
 
Prior to the new democratic fisheries law in 1998, small-scale fishers in South Africa 
were considered ‘illegal’ by the state or operated under the regulations governing 
recreational fishers (Hauck et al. 2005, Sowman 2006).  Thus, subsistence fishing 
activities were either ignored (in areas where law enforcement capacity was low) or 
addressed by law enforcement efforts that resulted in fines or imprisonment.  These 
fishers were considered ‘non-compliant’ in terms of the national and provincial laws 
of the apartheid regime.  More recently, since 1998, small-scale fishers have been 
given the opportunity to formally (legally) obtain access to marine resources.  This 
has been through the allocation of subsistence fishing rights and through ‘limited 
commercial’ rights, which are essentially a small-scale quota allocation5.   
 
In terms of compliance, from government’s perspective, the redistribution of formal 
access rights to fisheries has meant that many more people, operating along a 3000km 
coastline, need to be managed and monitored. Furthermore, with political pressure to 
redistribute economically viable access rights, the need to minimise over-exploitation 
of stocks is particularly critical.  The danger posed by ‘illegal’ fishing, therefore, has 
motivated the fisheries authority to significantly increase its investment in promoting 
fisheries compliance, largely through law enforcement (Hauck and Kroese 2006).  
 
The problems, however, only seem to be exacerbated.  Although there has been a 
significant increase in the number of people who are legally able to harvest marine 
resources in South Africa, many traditional fishers have still been excluded (Isaacs 
                                                
5 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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2006a, Sowman 2006, van Sittert et al. 2006).  It is argued that this is due to 
inequitable policy implementation and the powerful local elites hijacking the 
opportunities of bona fide fishers (Isaacs 2006a).  In addition, the powerful economic 
interests of the state and large capital have marginalised small-scale fishers by 
prioritising their own interests over the socio-economic needs of traditional fishers 
(Croeser et al. 2006, Isaacs et al. 2007, van Sittert et al. 2006).  Inevitably, this 
illegitimacy of the management system has led to ‘protest fishing’, where fishers who 
do not have a legal permit continue to fish because they believe it is their right to do 
so (Hauck 1999a, Hauck and Kroese 2006).  Similarly, in referring to the 
politicisation of fisheries in the mid-1900s, van Sittert (2002) argues that the state 
used its power to create monopolies and to dispossess traditional fishers of their 
rights.  As a result, with a lack of popular legitimacy, ‘the state found itself assailed 
on all sides by acts of social banditry, with endemic ‘poaching’ and the concomitant 
rise of ‘black markets’ in the inshore fisheries…’  (p. 46). 
 
6. POWER AND EVOLUTION OF LAW 
 
The influence of power, and the imbalances that exist, are necessary to understand in 
the context of fisheries compliance. It is not enough to simply ‘address’ those who are 
not complying with laws, but a more in-depth understanding is required that focuses 
on the evolution of those laws in the first place, and their impact on social and 
economic inequities.  Thus, in the South African context, it is first necessary to 
explore the formulation of formal law in determining what is ‘illegal’.   
 
The promise of the new democratic government in 1994 was ‘the upliftment of 
impoverished coastal communities through improved access to marine resources’ 
(ANC 1994: 114).  Thus, a key objective of the three year marine fisheries policy 
process was to develop a fair system of allocating access rights, particularly to those 
who had previously been denied such rights (DEAT 1997).  However, implementation 
of the fisheries policy led to controversy and litigation as there was no detailed 
strategy for the re-allocation process and there was a lack of institutional capacity and 
skills to manage transformation (Britz et al. 2001, Wynberg 2001).  Furthermore, the 
small-scale fisheries sector was neglected due to excessive attention given to the 
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development of a legally robust permit application and allocation procedure for the 
commercial sector (Sowman 2006).  Thus, the process of determining legal access to 
small-scale fisheries in fact excluded many bona fide fishers (Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 
2006). This led to the legal recognition of some fishers, but not all.  Therefore, the 
legitimacy of the allocation of rights, the prioritisation of the large-scale sector and 
the creation of an ‘illegal sector’ that emanated from an exclusionary process, is put 
into question. 
 
The definition of what constitutes an environmental crime, therefore, can be contested 
(White 1999, 2003). For example, some legal industrial activities may in fact be more 
detrimental to the environment than those deemed illegal by the state (Halsey 1997, 
Halsey and White 1998).  In the fisheries context, for example, small-scale fishers 
argue that fishing methods and quantity of catch of highly industrialised fisheries 
(which are legal) far outweigh the negative impacts of the catches of those small-scale 
fishers who are considered illegal by the state (Hauck et al. 2002).  Thus, as is the 
case with environmental management more generally, local stakeholders will find it 
difficult to have their interests recognised alongside the interests of other stakeholders 
who are more powerful and have contrasting goals (Adger et al. 2003).  
 
The definition of ‘crime’ can also be assessed from another perspective, arguing that 
harm can be perpetuated by declaring certain activities to be criminal.  As Scraton and 
Chadwick (1991) explain: ‘criminalization, the application of the criminal label to an 
identifiable social category, is dependent on how certain acts are labelled and who has 
the power to label, and is directly related to the political economy of marginalization’ 
(p. 289, italics in original). This is the case of criminalising indigenous people’s rights 
of access to natural resources (Beirne and South 2007, South 2007).  In South Africa, 
for example, harm is exacerbated by protest fishing, which not only threatens resource 
sustainability, but also leads to conflict (sometimes violent), social unrest in coastal 
communities and animosity between the fishers and the state (Hauck 1999a, Hauck 
and Kroese 2006).  Thus, defining what is legal or not, who determines this, and more 
specifically in the fisheries context, who receives access to resources or not (and the 
resulting rules of exploitation - Acheson 2006), has significant implications for how 
compliance is understood and achieved.   
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The allocation of fisheries rights, therefore, is directly related to issues of social 
justice and power (Chuenpagdee et al. 2005, Jentoft 2000).  However, in South 
Africa, government has ‘adopted a resource-oriented as opposed to a people-centred 
approach to natural resource management. While the principle of sustainability must 
underpin any rights allocation and resource management approach, it must be 
tempered by socio-economic and cultural considerations, and may at times require 
trade offs in favour of social equity’ (Sowman 2006: 68).  At present, however, there 
still exists many small-scale fishers who have been excluded from formal (legal) 
access to resources, and a subsistence, or small-scale fisheries management policy, 
has yet to be finalised by government. In contrast, medium-term rights and long-term 
rights in the commercial fisheries have been implemented since 2001 and 2005 
respectively. This seems to support Dietz et al.’s (2002) recognition of the trade-offs 
that occur in terms of policy, which is frequently dominated by the goal of economic 
efficiency. Capitalist interests, therefore, are often the power behind policy decisions 
and laws (Lynch and Stretsky 2003). As Adger et al. (2003) explain, ‘the powerful in 
society maintain their privileged position by legitimising it through a system of rules, 
conventions and institutions’ (p. 1099). Thus, the complexities of understanding how 
rules and laws are developed, and the power dynamics behind them, are critical to an 
understanding of compliance.  Barton et al. (2007a) argue that an exclusive focus on 
law enforcement often leads to the realisation that crime control efforts are often 
targeted at the criminality of marginalised groups, requiring an analysis of the 
relationship between ‘processes of marginalisation and criminalization’ (p.7).   
 
This directly relates to the need to understand the ‘roots’ of environmental harm, 
particularly in its social, economic, political and institutional contexts (Halsey 1997).  
There is broad acknowledgement that environmental protection and/or degradation are 
influenced by, among others, power, poverty, political structures, governance 
arrangements and economic growth and industrialisation (Beirne and South 2007, 
Elliott 2001, Halsey 1997, Lynch and Stretsky 2003, Najam 2004, White 2003).  
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  56 
7. A PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In understanding fisheries compliance, therefore, there is a need to adopt an integrated 
approach that recognises fisheries as a system, which needs to be governed in its 
entirety (Charles 2001).  As discussed in Chapter Three, a preliminary conceptual 
framework was developed through an iterative research process, as a means of 
guiding data collection and analysis.  Other research studies that have sought to 
understand small-scale fisheries compliance through empirical research have been 
drawn upon (Gezelius 2003, Kuperan et al. 1997), as has reference to Raakjær-
Nielsen’s (2003) analytical framework for understanding industrial fisheries 
compliance in Denmark. Thus, through exploratory fieldwork, coupled with previous 
research experience and a literature review, the diverse factors that seemed to be 
influencing fishers’ compliance behaviour were outlined diagrammatically (see Figure 
3.2).  The development of this framework provided an important tool with which to 
understand the preliminary data, and to further guide and analyse additional 
information gathered during the research process. The framework, therefore, attempts 
to highlight the diverse and complex social, economic, biophysical and institutional 
systems that are operating and interacting with each other in fisheries in South Africa. 
Further, the role of power, and law, in underpinning the fisheries system is 
emphasised. Each of these factors will be discussed further below. 
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Figure 3.2:  Preliminary conceptual framework for understanding small-scale 
fisheries compliance in South Africa 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, power and law are highlighted as the political factors that 
are influencing institutional, social and economic dynamics.  The importance of 
power and law, in the context of South Africa, is directly related to the historical role 
of government, and other powerful elites, in terms of managing fisheries, developing 
laws and establishing socio-economic policies.  Key to this is the recognition that 
South Africa has only recently emerged from an oppressive apartheid state and is 
currently grappling with conflicting policies and laws that directly impact on both 
fisheries governance and social justice (Isaacs et al. 2007, Sowman 2006, van Sittert 
et al. 2006).  Nevertheless, it is recognised that ‘crimes’ and laws are socially 
constructed and are embedded in power differentials in which the criminalised are 
often those who are also socially, economically and politically oppressed (Lynch and 
Stretsky 2003, Scraton and Chadwick 1991).  In the fisheries context, this relates to 
the allocation of rights, and rules to harvest resources, and whether customary 
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practices, food security and poverty relief are incorporated into fisheries laws and 
policies (Chuenpagdee et al. 2005, Hernes et al. 2005).  The marginalisation, and 
exclusion, of small-scale fishers needs to be understood in this context. 
 
The institutional factors relate to the formal and informal rules and norms that govern 
resource use.  Fisheries management is often made up of nested institutions that 
determine the allocation of rights to harvest a resource, the rules related to harvesting 
and the organisational structures established to manage these rules (Acheson 2006, 
Ostrom 2000).  Many of these issues are political (Hoel and Kvalvik 2006) and lead to 
questions of legitimacy (Jentoft 1989).  Management arrangements that explore the 
role of different stakeholders in managing the resource are critical to this 
understanding.  As Chuenpagdee et al. (2005) state: ‘despite the important impact on 
their livelihoods, coastal communities are often excluded from decision-making 
processes and debates on their livelihood options, such as access to the resources they 
depend on’ (p. 33). In her discussion of collective action and the evolution of rules 
and norms, Ostrom (2000) states that empirical field research indicates that ‘when the 
users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of 
their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when 
rules are externally imposed on them’ (p.148).  Nevertheless, the need to monitor 
resource use is also recognised as a necessary element of governance in order to 
minimise ‘free-riding’ and to legitimise the system by reassuring those who are 
complying with rules that others are also conforming (Dietz et al. 2002, Ostrom 2000, 
Schlager 2002).  It is argued, however, that costly monitoring and enforcement can be 
minimised if laws and rules are considered legitimate (FAO 2005a, Jentoft 2000).  
Critical to this legitimacy is the need to ensure that institutions have ‘moral force’, 
thereby reflecting the norms, values and rights of fishers themselves (Jentoft 2004b). 
 
Related to this is the social context of the fishery, which is illustrated in the 
framework as the normative and social influences affecting fishers’ behaviour.  Social 
cohesion needs to be explored in relation to the development and support for rules and 
broader social norms (Acheson 2006, Acheson and Gardner 2004, Ostrom 2000, 
Gezelius 2003). A culture of compliance indicates that there is a general moral 
obligation to obey formal law (Zaelke et al. 2005a). However, formal law may be 
‘overruled by moral requirements which are perceived as more fundamental than the 
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obligation to obey the law whenever the contents of specific laws conflict with certain 
moral norms of civil society’ (Gezelius 2002: 313). This is the case, for example, 
when economic needs are considered more legitimate than formal law, resulting in 
widespread acceptance of informal fishing as a means to support one’s family.  As a 
result, the legitimacy of law rests on it reflecting fishers’ perceived ‘rights’ and values 
(Berkes et al. 2001, FAO 2005a, Gezelius 2002, Jentoft 2000, 2004b). In other words, 
in order for a fisheries system to be legitimate, it must be considered ‘just’ by the 
fishers, or they are likely to resist it (Hernes et al. 2005). 
 
Economic aspects of the framework relate to poverty, livelihoods and the impact of 
the market on global and local trade.  It is widely acknowledged that poverty is rife in 
small-scale fishing communities around the world (Béné 2003, Berkes et al. 2001), 
that fishers live in relatively fragile livelihood conditions with few opportunities for 
alternative employment (Kooiman et al. 2005, Manning 2001) and that they are 
vulnerable to food insecurity (Béné and Heck 2005, Kooiman et al. 2005, Sowman 
and Cardoso in prep).  These conditions can lead to resource overexploitation, as few 
alternatives exist (Béné 2003, Chuenpagdee et al. 2005).  Further, the role of 
globalisation and the international market for fish products has had unprecedented 
impacts on fisheries governance at a local level (Ahmed et al. 2006, Dietz et al. 2003, 
Kooiman et al. 2005).  The impact that this has had on small-scale fisheries, for 
example on resource value and demand, is necessary to understand. 
 
Finally, the biophysical aspects of fisheries resources and the ecosystem with which 
they depend, are also important in understanding fishers’ behaviour.  The accessibility 
of inshore resources, for example, and the seasonal and biological characteristics all 
impact on harvesting strategies (Berkes et al. 2001).  The dynamics of the natural 
system are unpredictable (Charles 2001, Clark 2006a), and even the weather can 
significantly influence the level, and intensity, of harvesting. Further, certain 
ecosystem effects may impact on catch levels and changes to resource abundance, 
which in turn impact on the social and economic circumstances of fishers. The 
impacts of environmental variability, therefore, need to be understood in the context 
of management and how they impact on access to resources and other fisher 
decisions. Although these biophysical factors were not a main focus of this research, it 
has been important to acknowledge the dynamics of the natural system, and the 
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resource constraints, in order to understand the fishery system as a whole, and how 
the factors interrelate.  
 
Although the systems presented in Figure 3.2 are currently illustrated as one-
dimensional, and the links between them are not yet clear, it is a preliminary 
identification of the multiple factors that could influence fisher behaviour.  It has been 
used as a tool to guide compliance research in this study and to highlight the diverse 
issues that need to be explored in order to understand the different systems that are 
operating.  It was clear at the outset, however, that this framework would need to be 
adapted and changed with ongoing empirical research in order to emphasise the 
linkages between the factors and highlight that the systems themselves are dynamic 
(Kooiman et al. 2005).  A revised framework, therefore, based on empirical research 




Research on fisheries compliance has only recently begun to explore the variety of 
relevant variables that influence fishers’ behaviour (Gezelius 2002, Hønneland 2000, 
Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003, Roncin et al. 
2004). These investigations have not only identified the complex interactions taking 
place in fisheries but have begun to highlight a concern for traditional crime control 
strategies that are required to respond to, and address, resource over-exploitation and 
decline. But even these theories of normative action need to be taken a step further to 
analyse the evolution of law and the powerful interests behind it.  Thus, an 
understanding of compliance needs to recognise the linkages that exist between the 
diverse factors that influence harm, and more specifically between issues of social and 
environmental justice, which generally need to be understood in their historical 
context.  Empirical research in this study begins to explore these linkages, and the 
factors that influence fishers’ decisions to comply, or not, with rules and laws. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 







In South Africa, ‘subsistence’ fishers were formally recognised by law for the first 
time in 1998, following the promulgation of the first post-apartheid fisheries 
legislation, the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA 1998).  The definition of small-
scale fisheries in the South African context has been debated (Harris et al. 2002b, 
Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 2006), with rights allocation processes recognising two sectors 
that include ‘subsistence’ fishers and ‘small-scale commercial’ fishers (Branch et al. 
2002a).  In the context of this thesis, however, small-scale fishers in South Africa 
include a continuum of fishers who harvest marine resources for food to those who 
harvest largely to sell.  All of these fishers, however, have a tradition of marine 
resource use, operate with low technology gear, harvest close to where they live and 
are directly involved in harvesting activities.  From this perspective, small-scale 
fishers in South Africa have similar characteristics to those described in other parts of 
the world (Bavinck 2005, Berkes et al. 2003).  For the purpose of this thesis, the term 
‘small-scale fisheries’ will be used, but ‘subsistence’ and ‘small-scale commercial’ 
will be differentiated when necessary to emphasise different management approaches 
that have been used up to now.  It is important to note that South Africa is involved in 
developing a new ‘small-scale fisheries’ policy, which intends to merge the 
previously differentiated sectors, and which will also likely have important 
repercussions for future fisheries management (DEAT 2008d).  
 
This chapter aims to highlight the fisheries management challenges that South Africa 
has faced in the wake of a new democracy in 1994.  The national government 
responsible for the environment, the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism (DEAT), and more specifically the fisheries authority, the Directorate of 
Marine and Coastal Management (MCM), have had an unenviable task of juggling the 
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objectives explicitly outlined in the MLRA: resource sustainability, economic stability 
and social equity.  Thus, the conflicting interests of the scientists, industry and fishers, 
have had to be addressed through policies that aimed to prevent resource over-
exploitation at the same time as meeting the demands of an export-orientated industry 
and the expectations of a vast number of small-scale fishers demanding rights to 
marine resources.  Research tells us that none of the stakeholders are satisfied.  Most 
marine resources, particularly those accessible to small-scale fishers, are over-
exploited (Branch and Clark 2006, Cockroft et al. 2002).  Court litigation has been 
commonplace in the fishing industry as established companies challenge 
government’s rights allocation procedures, and decisions (Witbooi 2006).  From the 
small-scale fishers’ perspective, many of whom are still excluded from formal 
fisheries, feel they are worse off now than they were before (Cardoso et al. 2005, 
Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 2006).   
 
The most comprehensive study on small-scale fishers in South Africa was conducted 
by the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) in 1999 (SFTG 2000).  Following 
the legal recognition of subsistence fishers in the MLRA, this task group was 
appointed by the Minister of DEAT to make recommendations on the management of 
subsistence fisheries. The results of this research, which have been drawn on for this 
chapter, have been documented in a series of papers that outlined the research process, 
the socio-economic and resource-related issues, definitions and management 
recommendations (Branch 2002). 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the status of marine resources accessible to 
small-scale fishers in South Africa, the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of 
small-scale fishers, and the management approaches that have been adopted by 
government to manage this sector.  Reference to the historical context of South 
Africa, and the fisheries transformation process that has been adopted since 1994, will 
be highlighted as particularly relevant in terms of the existence of an informal (i.e.: 
‘illegal’) sector.  This chapter will draw on a number of research projects that have 
specifically been undertaken in the past ten years, following the promulgation of the 
MLRA. The author has personally been involved in many of these projects and 
publications, which has provided additional, and critically important, insight into the 
processes and approaches of various stakeholder groups. Most notably is her 
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involvement in the SFTG (Branch et al. 2002a, Clark et al. 2002, Harris et al. 2002a,b, 
Hauck et al. 2002), in analysing small-scale fisheries co-management arrangements 
(Hauck and Sowman 2001, Hauck and Sowman 2003, Hauck and Sowman 2005), in 
assessing government’s approach to small-scale fisheries compliance (Hauck 2007, 
Hauck 2008, Hauck and Kroese 2006, Hauck et al. 2005) and in assessing South 
Africa’s fisheries transformation process (van Sittert and Hauck 2006). Finally, this 
chapter will provide an overarching context of South Africa’s limitations in terms of 
marine resource availability, socio-economic challenges and management approaches 
that ultimately influence small-scale fisheries compliance.  Thus, this chapter provides 
the necessary background for the two case studies that will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapters. 
 
2. SMALL SCALE FISHERIES RESOURCES 
 
In South Africa, there are significant geographical differences in terms of resource 
abundance and use along the coast.  The west coast is characterised by the cold, 
nutrient-rich waters of the Benguela current, whereas the east coast is characterised by 
the warm, nutrient-deficient waters of the Agulhas current.  As a result, in general 
terms the lucrative resources, and commercial fisheries, are concentrated on the west 
coast, whereas many of the lower value fisheries, used predominately for subsistence 
use, are more prevalent on the east and south coasts (Branch and Clark 2006).  
Although resource abundance varies, small-scale fisheries exist all along the coast, 
sometimes in existence with recreational fisheries and/or commercial fisheries.  
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Figure 4.1: Coastal regions of South Africa 
 
Overall, marine resources in South Africa are viewed fairly optimistically by the 
scientists, who state that although there are some exceptions, most of the major 
commercial fish stocks are being maintained at sustainable levels (Branch and Clark 
2006).  The exceptions, however, are those resources that are also harvested by small 
scale fishers, such as abalone, linefish and West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL).  The 
‘decimation’ of the abalone resource (Branch and Clark 2006) led to a central 
government decision to officially close the abalone fishery indefinitely from February 
2008 (DEAT 2007a).  Linefish are also considered to be in ‘critical condition’, with 
current estimates being that the resource is at 5-10% of pristine levels (Branch and 
Clark 2006).  Although WCRL had a slight recovery of the resource following 
substantial declines in catches in the 1990s (Branch and Clark 2006), concern for the 
resource has resurfaced, as witnessed by an annual 10% decrease in the commercial 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) since 2005 (WCRL Association 2008).  Furthermore, 
resources located along the east coast, such as mussels, limpets and the east coast rock 
lobster, are considered either fully utilised or severely over-utilised in many areas 
(Cockroft et al. 2002). 
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The most comprehensive review of marine resource use by small-scale fishers was the 
resource assessment conducted through the SFTG (Cockroft et al. 2002).  A key 
objective of this review was to determine the resources that would be suitable for four 
fishery sectors: subsistence, small-scale commercial, commercial and recreational.  
Criteria were based on the tool or gear used, habitat, whether the resource was eaten 
or sold, and type of resource (Cockroft et al. 2002). Thus, this study was critical as it 
assessed the status of resources at the same time as determining which resources 
would be allocated to which sectors.  Some controversy has subsequently emanated 
from the SFTG research, particularly in relation to the distinction between the 
different user groups and a reliance on the nature of the resource to determine rights 
allocation (Cardoso et al. 2005, Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 2006).  For example, a key 
recommendation of the SFTG was to allocate low value resources to subsistence users 
and high value resources to small-scale commercial users (Branch et al. 2002a, 
Cockroft et al. 2002, Harris et al. 2002b). It was argued that more lucrative species 
would be better used for income (small-scale commercial) than for consumption 
(subsistence), assuming therefore that fishers could escape the ‘poverty trap’ (Branch 
et al. 2002a, Cockroft et al. 2002).  This resource-oriented approach to allocating 
rights, however, has been highly criticised, particularly because it ignores the diverse 
harvesting strategies that fishers adopt to sustain their livelihoods (Cardoso et al. 
2005, Sowman 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, what is evident from recent assessments of small-scale fish resources in 
South Africa is that resource availability is not compatible with the political 
expectations that have been raised with new fisheries laws.  The precautionary 
approach has been utilised, which has led scientists to warn about cautious rights 
allocation procedures (Cockroft et al. 2002).  However, the SFTG did recognise that 
most resources had already been fully allocated to commercial or recreational 
fisheries, suggesting that ‘re-allocation among sectors will be the only way to 
accommodate subsistence fisheries and small-scale commercial fisheries’ (Harris et 
al. 2002a: 420). Thus, resource assessment has inevitably been linked to management 
decision-making, which has meant a reshuffling of rights amidst a precautionary 
approach to resource management.   
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3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
There is no doubt that the socio-economic system related to small-scale fisheries in 
South Africa has been significantly influenced by the discriminatory laws of the past  
(Hauck and Sowman 2003, Hersoug 2002, Hersoug and Holm 2000).  With 45 years 
of apartheid and more than 300 years of colonial rule, it is inevitable that natural 
resource management in South Africa has been left with a legacy of inequality. The 
various policies and laws of the Colonial era and apartheid regimes effectively denied 
the majority of black South African citizens access to and ownership of vast stretches 
of South Africa's coastline and resources (Hauck and Sowman 2005). Thus, prior to 
1998, small-scale fishers were largely considered ‘informal’ and were perceived by 
the authorities as ‘poachers’, largely being managed through law enforcement (Harris 
et al. 2002a, Harris et al. 2007, Hauck et al. 2002, Sowman 2006). Despite being 
illegal, small-scale fisheries continued to operate, sometimes under the guise of 
recreational fishing.  However, quantities of catch, and the harvesting methods of 
small-scale fishers often did not conform to the conditions of the recreational permits, 
and these fishers could rarely afford permit fees anyway (Harris et al. 2002a).  Thus, 
the MLRA, which aimed to address past inequities in the fishing industry, provided a 
significant opportunity for fishers to gain legal access to marine resources.  A greater 
understanding of small-scale fishers was therefore required in order to adapt 
management strategies accordingly (Harris et al. 2002a). The SFTG research in 1999 
proved instrumental as a first comprehensive ‘take’ on small-scale fisheries in South 
Africa.  Two phases of fieldwork included a first scoping study that aimed to identify 
small-scale fishing communities and collect basic harvesting information (Clark et al. 
2002).  The second phase was a more detailed socio-economic assessment of 20 pilot 
case study communities, which provided important information on resource harvesters 
and livelihood strategies (Branch et al. 2002b). 
 
3.1  Defining small-scale fishers 
  
Although, as alluded to above, the exact legal definition of small-scale fisheries in 
South Africa has been debated, it is widely acknowledged that small-scale fisheries 
were largely considered illegal and informal in the past (Clark et al. 2002, Harris et al. 
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2002a, Sowman 2006).  In recognising these fishers, as a means of legally allocating 
rights to harvest marine resources, the MLRA defined a ‘subsistence’ sector, which 
was later revised by the SFTG (Branch et al. 2002a).  According to this definition, 
subsistence fishers harvest resources mainly for food consumption.  However, the 
SFTG acknowledged that in their research another group of informal fishers was 
identified who sold their catch, and they recommended that this group be called the 
‘small-scale commercial’ sector (Branch et al. 2002a).  The SFTG highlighted that 
this group required separate attention and that the more lucrative species could be 
appropriately allocated to this group (Harris et al. 2002b).  However, the problem with 
segregating these fishery sectors, it turns out, is that it significantly influenced the 
rights allocation process, with one procedure applicable to ‘subsistence’ users, and 
one applicable to ‘small-scale commercial’ users.   
 
In coastal communities, however, fishers rely on a diversity of resources that 
influence their livelihood strategies – some resources they sell, and some they eat 
(Cardoso et al. 2005, Isaacs 2006a, Sowman et al. 2008).  Even in the SFTG research, 
it was acknowledged that a range of fishing activities were adopted and a range of 
resources were harvested, largely due to the seasonal nature of catches and limited 
economic opportunities in coastal areas (Clark et al. 2002).  Further, as will be 
outlined below, although there are regional differences in terms of species harvested, 
and levels of poverty, all small scale fishers depend on fishing activity as an important 
source of food, and/or income, to sustain their livelihoods (Branch et al. 2002b, Isaacs 
2006a, Sowman 2006).  Small scale fishers can be summarised as using low 
technology gear, labour intensive methods, low capital inputs, a range of 
organisational levels and includes activities whereby fishers harvest mainly for food 
or for sale to meet basic needs (Sowman 2006). 
 
3.2  Resource Use 
 
Archaeological evidence suggests that marine resources have been harvested along 
South Africa’s coast for many thousands of years (Clark et al. 2002, Parkington et al. 
1998, van Sittert 1993).  This history has been emphasised by the personal accounts 
and memories of many fishers and their older relatives (Harris et al. 2002b, Hauck et 
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al. 2002, Masifundise 2003). In the first scoping phase of the SFTG research, 147 
fishing communities were identified where subsistence or small-scale commercial 
fishing took place (Clark et al. 2002). Further, this study provided an initial estimate 
of about 29 000 individual, small scale fishers along South Africa’s coast. Most 
small-scale fishers live close to the point of harvest and utilise marine resources for 
personal use, through consumption, bait or sale as a means of meeting basic needs 
(Branch et al. 2002b, Clark et al. 2002).  
 
Harvesting strategies on the east coast are different to the west and south coasts, 
largely attributed to both the biogeographic differences as well as population 
dynamics (Branch and Clark 2006).  On the east coast, for example, intertidal 
harvesting remains the dominant activity, while on the west coast, harvesting of 
nearshore resources, with the use of a boat, are more commonplace (Clark et al. 
2002). While resource harvesting is still largely for food consumption on the east 
coast, resource use patterns on the south and west coasts have been significantly 
influenced by colonisation and the development of industrial fishing by big capital 
(Sowman 2006, van Sittert 2003).  In fact, it is believed that 95% of the commercial 
fisheries are harvested on the Western Cape coast (Hersoug 2002). Small-scale fishers 
are not a homogenous group, but they have nevertheless maintained their fishing 
activities despite the discriminatory laws of the past (Harris et al. 2002a, van Sittert 
1994). 
 
3.3  Socio-economic Characteristics 
 
Phase two of the SFTG socio-economic research highlighted the plight of small-scale 
fishers in South Africa.  In 20 coastal communities, with 488 fisher households 
interviewed, it became clear that poverty was endemic in these communities and few 
economic opportunities were available to fishers (Branch et al. 2002b).  Only half of 
the fisher households interviewed had one occupant with waged employment, the 
average monthly income was R455 (approximately US$44), which was lower on the 
east coast, and higher on the west coast) and there were high levels (53%) of food 
insecurity (whereby >60% of income was spent on food). Households along the east 
coast were identified with the highest poverty rates, while those on the west coast 
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(excluding the Northern Province) were the lowest (Branch et al. 2002b).  
Interestingly, 32% of fisher households relied on government grants (such as pension 
or disability) for income, which confirms other research in South Africa that has 
indicated the critical importance of such grants to household income (Glavovic et al. 
2002). 
 
The average size of each fisher household was 5.3 persons, with size levels being 
highest in rural areas, and on the east coast of the country. Levels of education were 
very low amongst fishers with almost two-thirds of those aged 20 or older had either 
no schooling or had some primary schooling only. In terms of employment, 40.3% of 
respondents were unemployed (compared to national average of 29% - Woolard 2002) 
and only 10% had regular employment.  These figures differed between regions, with 
more unemployment along the east coast and higher levels of seasonal employment 
on the west coast (likely due to seasonal commercial fishing activity, Branch et al. 
2002b).   
 
The statistics outlined above paint a bleak picture of coastal communities and 
highlight a reliance on marine resources for food security and livelihoods.  Other 
studies, following the SFTG research, have further emphasised the marginalisation of 
small-scale fishers.  Some of these have explored case study sites (Hauck and 
Sowman 2003, Sowman et al. 2008), particular provinces (Cardoso et al. 2005, Harris 
et al. 2007, Napier et al. 2005) or general assessments on coastal poverty and 
livelihoods (Glavovic and Boonzaier 2007, Glavovic et al. 2002, Isaacs et al. 2007, 
Sowman et al. 2008, Sunde 2003).  Poverty stricken coastal communities are 
considered highly vulnerable, with few economic opportunities to sustain their 
livelihoods.  Furthermore, they are exposed to a number of other risks such as climate 
change and HIV/AIDS, the latter which is considered the single main cause of death 
in South Africa (Glavovic and Boonzaier 2007).  
 
South Africa’s historical legacy has contributed to coastal poverty through racial 
segregation, land dispossession and unequal distribution of natural resources 
(Glavovic and Boonzaier 2007, Harris et al. 2007, Hauck and Sowman 2005, Hersoug 
2002).  The ‘homelands’ policy, for example, which was an instrument of the 
apartheid government to force ‘black’ Africans to live in designated rural areas, 
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increased their reliance on natural resources with little or no economic alternatives.  
Protected areas in South Africa were frequently proclaimed by forcibly removing 
people from their land or denying them access to resources that they had traditionally 
harvested (Hauck and Sowman 2005, Sunde and Isaacs 2008).  With regard to marine 
resources, black ethnic groups6 were effectively excluded from gaining legal rights to 
harvest, process or market these resources (which will be discussed further below; 
Hersoug 2002, Payne and Cochrane 1995).  As van Sittert (2003) has highlighted, on 
the west coast small-scale fishers were exploited by big industry as cheap labour.  
With free housing and food, fishers became asset and capital poor, minimising their 
ability to secure employment outside of the fishing season, and thus contributing to 
their vulnerable livelihoods. 
 
Thus, historical experiences and current socio-economic characteristics emphasise the 
fragile livelihoods of small-scale fishers.  A recent assessment of three coastal 
communities in South Africa indicated that fishing activities were an important, if not 
primary, source of income for fisher households (Sowman et al. 2008).  Further, 
livelihoods are affected by fishers’ exclusion from resources (both land and marine) 
and over-exploitation and degradation of resources, all of which are evident in coastal 
communities (Glavovic et al. 2002).  A study by Cardoso et al. (2005) indicated that 
the socio-economic status of small-scale fishers on the west coast of South Africa has 
not changed since 2000, when the SFTG conducted its research.  They highlight that 
poverty remains prevalent along the coast, food insecurity remains high, there are few 
alternative sources of income for fishers, and fishing is an important livelihood 
strategy.  This, therefore, puts into question the management strategies that have been 
adopted by government to formalise small-scale fishers in South Africa, and to 
address the inequities of the past.   
 
4. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
Government recognised its inadequate knowledge of the small-scale sector (i.e.: 
‘subsistence fishers’) by appointing the SFTG to gather the necessary research and 
make recommendations to guide the formalisation and appropriate management of 
                                                
6 Black ethnic groups, in the South African context, are those groups identified by apartheid policy as 
‘Indian’, African’ or ‘Coloured’. 
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  71 
this newly defined sector.  Although the SFTG’s recommendations (SFTG 2000) were 
adopted by MCM, implementation has been slow and a broader paradigm shift at 
national level still needs to take place (Harris et al. 2007, Sowman 2006).  
Furthermore, small-scale fishers remain dissatisfied with access to, and management 
of, marine resources (Isaacs 2006a, Masifundise 2003, 2007).  Five key management 
approaches will be highlighted below to outline the processes and repercussions that 
have emanated from government strategies to manage the small-scale sector. 
 
4.1  Legal Reform 
 
Following the democratic elections of 1994, South Africa embarked on a radical legal 
and policy reform process in all sectors of society (Glazewski 2000).  This legal order 
was framed by South Africa’s new Constitution in 1996, which introduced a human-
rights based dispensation as outlined by the Bill of Rights (Witbooi 2006).  The 
Constitution emphasises the link between environmental rights and human rights, 
promoting sustainable development, and the use of natural resources, at the same time 
as promoting justifiable economic and social development (Witbooi 2006).  This 
framework, therefore, influenced the development of new fisheries legislation, a 
process which began in 1995.   
 
The fisheries policy process, which has been reviewed elsewhere (Hersoug 2002, 
Martin and Raakjær-Nielsen 1997), attempted to consult widely as a means of 
incorporating the views and concerns of a diverse group of stakeholders.  Although 
many problems arose, a key emphasis was on addressing the inequitable access to 
marine resources. It was widely acknowledged that history had left its legacy in the 
fishing sector with radical disparity between the white and black population in terms 
of access to marine resources, a skewed distribution of resources between the small-
scale and large-scale fishing operations and a fisheries management authority that was 
dominated by white administrators that had little legitimacy amongst the largely black 
coastal population (Hauck and Sowman 2005, Hersoug 2002).  In 1994, 0.75% of 
TAC-regulated species were allocated to blacks, 7% of commercial registered vessels 
were owned by blacks and 6% of the 4000 fishing permits were issued to blacks 
(Hersoug 2002: 20).  Furthermore, there was an oligopoly in the fishing industry, 
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whereby a small number of large companies had majority access to resources (Croeser 
et al. 2006). 
 
The promise of the new government, therefore, was ‘the upliftment of impoverished 
coastal communities through improved access to marine resources’ (ANC 1994: 104).  
This was reiterated by a special task team, appointed during the fisheries policy 
process to investigate access rights, which recognised that ‘with political changes 
there are expectations that access rights should be broadened, particularly to 
redistribute access to those people previously denied rights because of political 
considerations’ (ARTC 1996: 5). A key objective, therefore, of the MLRA was to 
restructure the fishing industry in order to address historical imbalances. Thus, in 
addition to ensuring the long-term sustainable use of marine living resources, the Act 
also seeks to promote equitable access to marine resources, transform the fishing 
industry and promote socio-economic benefits for coastal communities (Hauck and 
Sowman 2005). 
 
However, the implementation of the MLRA has proven problematic due to the 
conflicting objectives of sustainability, stability and equity, which were not 
adequately defined or prioritised in the Act (Witbooi 2006, van Sittert et al. 2006). 
Further, these objectives are influenced by broader national policies, which exacerbate 
the conflicts at sectoral level.  For example, the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), which governs social development and equity, was seen as the 
African National Congress’ manifesto for socio-economic reform in South Africa. 
The RDP emphasised the importance of poverty alleviation, the redress of past 
injustices and the importance of access to and sustainable use of natural resources as a 
means of achieving socio-economic goals (van Sittert et al. 2006). The objectives of 
the macro-economic policy of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
(GEAR), however, focussed on stimulating economic growth and foreign investment 
by reducing state control and promoting privatisation (van Sittert et al. 2006).  Isaacs 
et al. (2007) argue that GEAR’s neo-liberal policy abandoned many of the underlying 
principles of the RDP, promoting a market-driven approach rather than more direct 
interventions in terms of poverty alleviation.  Furthermore, van Sittert et al. (2006) 
state that fisheries reform has effectively ‘sidelined issues of poverty and food-
security in pursuit of economic growth, efficiency and stability’ (p. 98).  
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  73 
These policy conflicts, therefore, have significantly impacted on small-scale fishers, 
particularly in relation to their ability to access marine resources (which will be 
discussed below).  Although the MLRA aimed to acknowledge the rights of small-
scale fishers by formalising the ‘subsistence’ sector, the interests of the commercial 
sector remained a priority of government (Isaacs et al. 2007. Sowman 2006).  Thus, 
although ‘transformation’ was one of the key drivers to policy development in South 
African fisheries (Kleinschmidt et al. 2003), the mechanism with which to ‘transform’ 
the fishing industry was never agreed upon, nor was it defined in the MLRA (Witbooi 
2006).  As a result, despite new legislation to address the inequitable access to marine 
resources, there remains significant unrest in the fishing industry, which is evident 
through ongoing court litigation by big industry and ongoing informal (or ‘illegal’) 
fishing by the small-scale sector (Hersoug 2002, Isaacs 2006a, Witbooi 2006). 
 
4.2  Redistribution of Access Rights 
 
As highlighted above, a key strategy to ‘transform’ the fishing industry was the 
redistribution of rights to harvest marine resources.  Witbooi (2006) explained that 
this entailed including new entrants into the industry, allocating quotas to small-scale 
fishers (particularly historically disadvantaged individuals), and promoting internal 
transformation of existing industry through Black Economic Empowerment.  
However, despite a radical reallocation of rights from 0.75% black ownership in 1994 
to 62% black ownership in 2004 (Branch and Clark 2006), small-scale fishers remain 
marginalised.  Van sittert et al. (2006) argue that although the fishing industry in 
South Africa has ‘blackened’, genuine redistribution of rights to traditional small-
scale fishers remains problematic, which has led to little change on the ground 
(Cardoso et al. 2005). As one Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), which works 
closely with small-scale fishers explains: 
‘Whilst the 2001 allocation process thus did give extensive access to new 
entrants, it also did not substantially alter power that the big companies had, 
ostensibly because it did not want to disrupt a potentially lucrative export trade 
and incur the possibility of job loss.  In addition, the big companies and trade 
unions had lobbied hard to retain the status quo’ (Masifundise 2003: 9). 
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Croeser et al. (2006) argue that the interests of big capital remain aligned to the state, 
which in effect does not leave room for small capital interests.  They argue that the 
economic policies of GEAR emphasised competition on the global market place, 
which ‘neutralised the threats of nationalisation or radical redistribution on large 
industry’ (p. 21).  Thus, internal transformation, through increased black ownership 
within companies, has been favoured by big capital as a means to minimise disruption 
in its export orientated focus.  These companies argue that resource sustainability and 
international recognition are key to stabilising the fishing industry, as opposed to 
radical redistribution of quotas (Croeser et al. 2006).  As a result, export orientation 
has in fact maximised profits for both the state and big capital at the expense of 
broader populist demands for transformation.  Interestingly, despite the fact that big 
capital has been unwilling to give up much of their historical rights to accommodate 
new entrants, a ‘fragile peace’ has emerged in the fishing industry as a result of 
currency devaluation (Croeser et al. 2006).  With a depreciated Rand, big companies 
were still able to generate profit with lower quotas, thus allowing some re-allocation 
of fishing rights without significant repercussions to industry (Raakjær-Nielsen and 
Hara 2006). Thus, Isaacs et al. (2005) state that ‘the introduction of neo-liberal macro-
economic policy enhanced the position of established companies by providing them 
with the argument that their ability to change the way they do business was limited 
because stability is vital for them to remain internationally competitive…’ (p. 5).  It is 
argued, therefore, that this process has simply led to a new elite, rather than addressed 
issues of social justice and poverty alleviation (Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006). 
 
For small-scale fishers, therefore, the only real mechanism to gain formal access was 
through subsistence permits and small-scale quotas.  This approach was considered 
critical to redressing the equity imbalances in the fishing industry, but it was 
emphasised that this must be done within the limits of the resources (Cockroft et al. 
2002).  The success of addressing historical imbalances in the fisheries sector was 
therefore reliant on the resources that were made available to the small-scale sector. 
Sowman (2006) argues that the commercial and recreational fisheries were prioritised, 
and although there may be valid economic arguments in terms of the multiplier effects 
of recreational fisheries, this must be balanced with the Constitutional rights of 
poverty alleviation and food security.  The perceptions of small-scale fishers, which 
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emerged from SFTG research, strongly indicated that their greatest concern was 
ongoing exclusion from formally accessing resources.  Access rights were considered 
inequitable, highlighting the fact that commercial and recreational fishers were 
harvesting resources in their areas, but they were denied the right to do so (Hauck et 
al. 2002). Fishers felt strongly that ‘they should be given priority access to resources 
in their area and should not be marginalised by recreational and commercial fishers 
from outside their community’ (Hauck et al. 2002: 467).  
 
In terms of subsistence fishery rights, Sowman’s (2006) review indicates that except 
for an interim relief measure to allocate subsistence fishing rights in the abalone and 
WCRL sectors (1998-2000), no other subsistence fishing permits have been allocated.  
Instead, subsistence fishers have been allocated annual ‘exemptions’ in the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) provinces, which is done so under Section 81(1) of 
the MRLA. This clause exempts persons from any provision in the Act on the basis of 
‘sound reasons’.  Although some level of access has been achieved in these areas, the 
combination of annual permits with extremely delayed allocations (of up to four 
months or longer), has led to high levels of frustration and insecurity on the side of 
subsistence fishers (Small-scale fisher workshop 10-14 March 2008). Furthermore, 
fishers are being fined for ‘old permits’ as compliance officers are not informed that 
the permits have been ‘rolled over’ until new ones are issued. 
 
In addition, on the west and south coasts, no subsistence fishers have been recognised 
as a result of the resource recommendations of the SFTG, despite high levels of food 
insecurity that have been found in these regions (Cardoso et al. 2005, Sowman 2006).  
Rather, an emphasis has been placed on the small-scale commercial sector, through 
access to abalone, WCRL and linefish quotas.  Although the SFTG emphasised the 
potential for micro-scale enterprises linked to these high-valued resources as a means 
of encouraging subsistence fishers to move out of the ‘poverty trap’ (Branch et al. 
2002a), there have been significant problems with these allocations.  Isaacs et al. 
(2005) argue that in fact many bona fide fishers still do not have formal access to 
resources, those who did receive rights do not always have an economically viable 
allocation and many new entrants do not have the financial or technical capacity to 
establish viable businesses. Thus, they state that ‘the government has largely missed 
its opportunity to ensure [that] the restructuring of the industry was managed in such a 
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  76 
way as to achieve broader societal goals such as the alleviation of poverty and 
upliftment of fishing communities’ (Isaacs et al. 2005: 1).  Thus, whilst a significant 
number of historically disadvantaged individuals have gained access to the fishing 
industry, the reality is that many of these are local elites, who have the money, 
knowledge and/or political connections to benefit (Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 2006).  
Many of the traditional fishers, on the other hand, remain overlooked and 
marginalised (Isaacs 2006a, Isaacs et al. 2007, Masifundise 2005, 2007, van Sittert et 
al. 2006). 
 
Thus, the transformation of fisheries in South Africa, as a means of creating greater 
equity in the industry, has been fraught with conflict.  There is no doubt that both 
internal transformation, which involved transformation of existing fishing companies 
in terms of black ownership, and external transformation, which included the 
broadening of access to new rights holders, have significantly increased the 
participation of historically disadvantaged individuals in the fishing industry (van 
Sittert et al. 2006).  However, the extent to which this has achieved social justice on 
the ground is questionable (Isaacs 2006b, Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006, Sowman 
2006, van Sittert et al. 2006).   
 
Research continues to indicate that small-scale fishers are excluded from accessing 
marine resources legally, with many claiming that they are forced to harvest illegally 
(Cardoso et al. 2005, Hauck 2007, Isaacs 2006a, Masifundise 2003, Sowman 2006).  
This sense of injustice was highlighted at the Fisher Peoples Human Rights Hearings 
on 13 and 14 August 2003, facilitated by the fisher NGO Masifundise, as a means to 
allow fisher communities to voice their concerns (Masifundise 2003). This 
information culminated in the initiation of a court case in 2004 by marginalised 
traditional fishers. Supported by Masifundise, and a legal resource centre, fishers who 
believed they had a legitimate right to access marine resources challenged the 
Minister of DEAT. This case, Kenneth George and Others vs. the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (10512/04), which focussed on the fishers’ right 
to secure a livelihood, as outlined in the Constitution and the Equality Act (2004), was 
resolved in an out of court settlement in May 2007.  In this settlement, the Minister 
agreed to embark on a new and participatory process for developing a small-scale 
fisheries policy for South Africa. Further, he agreed on an ‘Interim Relief Permit’ for 
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traditional fishers, particularly on the south and west coasts, who have been excluded 
from previous rights allocation procedures.  This interim relief permit stipulated 
specific regulations for harvesting WCRL and linefish.   
 
Since this agreement, two phases of the interim relief permits have been allocated to 
approximately 1200 small-scale fishers on the west and south coasts.  In addition, a 
small-scale fisheries policy process is underway, with the first national summit 
convened in November 2007.  At this summit, DEAT acknowledged openly that 
small-scale fishers had been marginalised and that they were committed to addressing 
the needs of this sector, specifically highlighting the government’s willingness to 
explore a number of new management approaches (DEAT 2007c). A small-scale 
fisheries policy task team, representing various stakeholder groups, and a technical 
committee, have been appointed and have been working together to draft a new 
policy.  Although the policy process, and the interim relief permits, have had their 
problems and challenges, most stakeholders acknowledge that these recent 
developments have been positive. 
 
One of the greatest challenges, however, remains the need to address historical 
imbalances, and fisher expectations, within the limits of resource sustainability 
(Cockroft et al. 2002).  In addition to the objectives of resource management, it will 
be important to recognise the human rights of small-scale fishers, including their 
social and economic sustainability.  If this approach is not adopted, it is likely that 
fishers will remain disenchanted and they will ‘vigorously defend perceived 
traditional rights’, even if it is illegal to do so (Cardoso et al. 2005: 35). 
 
4.3  Resource-oriented Approach 
 
Marine science research in South Africa, based within MCM as well as at universities, 
has been considered world class, despite the isolation during the apartheid boycott 
years (Hersoug 2002).  Branch and Clark (2006) argue that this is reflected in the 
relatively stable condition of the larger commercial fish species.  With relatively few 
stakeholders, MCM worked closely with big industry to maintain fish stocks in the 
interests of sustaining both commercial and recreational interests.  However, with new 
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fisheries legislation, and the need to acknowledge small-scale fisheries, it has been 
necessary to move from a resource-oriented approach to management to more people-
centred approaches, which incorporate the concepts of sustainable livelihoods and 
poverty alleviation (Isaacs 2006b).  However, such a shift has not effectively taken 
place, which has led to the prioritisation of resource sustainability with little 
acknowledgement, nor institutional capacity, to achieve broader social objectives. 
 
This is particularly reflected in the SFTG distinction between subsistence and small-
scale commercial sectors, which is considered a resource-centred classification that 
does not adequately reflect the socio-economic circumstances of fishers, their poverty 
levels or their socio-cultural fishing practices (Isaacs 2006a,b, Sowman 2006).  
Rather, the classification is based on government’s characterisation of the resource: 
‘This classification system creates problems because fishers from poor coastal 
communities seldom fall neatly into one or other category because they employ a 
range of livelihood strategies to survive’ (Cardoso et al. 2005: 33). Thus, although 
there is a rationale for using high value resources as a means of escaping a cycle of 
poverty, resources should be allocated in such a way as to ensure that the socio-
economic and cultural characteristics of fishers are also considered.   
 
The current rights allocation system has failed to acknowledge the diverse range of 
livelihood strategies that are adopted by small-scale fishers (Isaacs et al. 2005, 
Sowman 2006).  Fishers may engage in other income-generating activities during 
certain seasons, during times of resource shortages, or when new opportunities arise. 
This is undermined through some of the rights allocation criteria that limit other forms 
of employment, or access to other fishing sectors (DEAT 2003, 2005).  Furthermore, 
the ‘forced commercialisation’ of informal fishing has led to a highly competitive 
environment with inadequate financial support and business training from government 
(Cardoso et al. 2005, Isaacs et al. 2005).  By treating fisheries management as a 
scientific issue, rather than a socio-economic one (Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006), 
government ultimately allocated non-viable quotas in many of the limited commercial 
fisheries. 
 
Thus, the allocation of resources, largely based on ensuring resource sustainability, 
has meant that other important interventions that sustain fishers’ livelihoods are not 
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adopted, or recognised as a function of the fisheries authority.  The importance of 
addressing poverty and food security in coastal communities, for example, is not 
considered by MCM as a core responsibility (Isaacs 2006b). The objectives of the 
MLRA, however, will not be achieved through a resource-oriented approach that 
ignores the broader socio-economic and cultural characteristics of small-scale fishers 
(Sowman 2006).   
 
4.4  Law Enforcement 
 
Law enforcement has been a key strategy of MCM to monitor and regulate fisheries.  
The capacity and effectiveness of this law enforcement approach, however, has varied 
over the years, and has varied between the coastal provinces.  For example, the ability 
of the state to effectively enforce fisheries regulations was severely affected by the 
transfer of fishery compliance functions between national and provincial 
governments. In 1987, these functions were devolved to the provinces and the “staff 
and budget severely trimmed” (van Sittert 2003). The provinces were therefore 
responsible for law enforcement at sea and within marine protected areas. In 1994, the 
fisheries compliance function was reclaimed by MCM. This created a myriad of 
problems. Firstly, the number of fishery compliance staff declined by more than two-
thirds in a decade, from 420 in 1986 to 126 in 1995. Secondly, the operational budget 
was not transferred from provincial to national government, requiring DEAT to find a 
compliance budget of R15 million in 1995 by rationalising other departmental 
programmes. The compliance budget fluctuated between R11 and 15 million per 
annum until the resources of the Marine Living Resources Fund (as stipulated in the 
MLRA, section 10) could be accessed (see Fig. 9, Croeser et al. 2006). The loss of 
staff and budget in the mid-1990s severely depleted fisheries compliance capacity and 
effectiveness, resulting in almost all of the inspectorate’s time being spent on quota 
monitoring and harbour management and very little on coastal patrolling.  This 
coincided with a time of political transition, ‘protest fishing’ and the development of a 
new fisheries policy. 
 
As a result, the presence of law enforcement along the coast was inconsistent.  Small-
scale fishers continued to harvest marine resources even though it was considered 
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‘illegal’ by the state.  Although some would harvest through the use of recreational 
permits, daily bag limits were often exceeded as the stipulated limits were not meeting 
basic needs (Hauck et al. 2002).  When interaction with law enforcement did occur, it 
often resulted in conflict, and sometimes violence, with fines and imprisonment a 
common outcome.  Fishers explained that they often felt harassed and threatened by 
fisheries authorities, and were angry with the methods of policing that were adopted 
to prevent them from harvesting resources (Hauck et al. 2002).  Interestingly, 
however, in the province of KZN in the mid-1990s, where the provincial conservation 
authority was making an active attempt to engage with subsistence fishers, these 
fishers expressed an improvement in their relationship with the authorities and 
observed a less heavy-handed approach to management (Hauck et al. 2002, Napier et 
al. 2005).   
 
Thus, in order to encourage more regional and local level compliance initiatives, some 
delegation of compliance authority took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  It is 
argued that by allowing decision making at a local level, rather than in distant national 
offices, a more integrated approach to compliance, and management, can be 
implemented more effectively (Sowman et al. 2003).  As a result, compliance 
responsibilities were transferred to other government departments, such as Ezemvelo 
KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife (EKZN Wildlife: the conservation authority in KZN) and 
South African National Parks.  In addition, for the first time, such functions were 
delegated to a local municipality in 2003. This Overberg municipality, located on the 
south coast, embarked on a pilot project to visibly patrol and coordinate fisheries law 
enforcement activities in its area.  This was an area where there were high levels of 
informal abalone fishing and this was an attempt by MCM to enhance capacity at the 
same time as engaging with local communities.  With a change in senior compliance 
personnel in 2005, however, this programme in the Overberg municipality was 
terminated.   
 
Although the delegation of compliance authority is important in principle, fisheries 
management decision-making remains centralised with MCM.  Delegated authorities 
are therefore required to enforce the rules that are developed at national level.  As a 
result, they are not directly involved in decision-making and do not have the authority 
to allocate fishing rights, which is the most controversial issue that they are faced 
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with.  Many compliance personnel express significant frustration with this approach, 
arguing that their law enforcement efforts are short-term, but they are divorced from 
long-term strategic planning about compliance and management in general (A46, 
A49, A50, L6, L7, L9, EEU 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, following the promulgation of the MRLA in 1998, the state has 
heightened its interest in ensuring fisheries compliance. With pressure to broaden 
access to marine resources, in the interests of social equity, the importance of ensuring 
compliance to sustain stocks is increasingly considered critical by MCM (Hauck and 
Kroese 2006). This is reflected in the increase in the compliance budget from R15 
million in 1995 to R60 million in 2004.  As a result, there has been a focus on 
enhancing law enforcement capacity through the development of a specialised 
investigation unit, joint investigations with other law enforcement agencies, and the 
procurement of four offshore patrol vessels.  Although effort has been placed on this 
policing approach, it has done little to impact the small-scale fisheries sector.   
 
Despite investigations and special operations targeted at organised commercial 
‘poachers’, the lack of coastal visibility, coupled with a lack of integration with local 
level issues, has led to little law enforcement impact on the ground (Hauck and Hector 
2000, Steinberg 2005).  Instead, fishers perceive law enforcement as the state’s 
strategy to prevent them from accessing marine resources, which in essence threatens 
their livelihoods (Cardoso et al. 2005, Hauck et al. 2002).  Without legitimacy, the 
fishers continue to contravene rules and laws that they consider ‘unjust’. With no 
moral obligation to comply, draconian law enforcement would be required to police 
the coast (Jentoft 2004b).  Politically undesirable, and expensive, alternative strategies 
have been highlighted by fishers that include more participatory, and legitimate, 
approaches to management. 
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4.5  Institutional  Arrangements 
 
Although South Africa has largely engaged in a centralised fisheries management 
system, some important attempts have been made by government to initiate more 
participatory approaches to governance.  In the past, partnerships were formed 
between established industry and government to manage commercial fisheries.  These 
forums, which have played some role in management since 1934, were established to 
exchange information and facilitate discussion between the commercial sector and the 
fisheries authority (Hutton 2003, Hutton and Pitcher 1998). In some circumstances, 
these forums played a significant role in management, which was largely attributed to 
the fact that there were few roleplayers with which to engage (Hutton and Pitcher 
1998; Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006).  However, following the redistribution of 
rights in the commercial sector, many of these participatory forums collapsed.  
Whereas in the past there were a small number of industry stakeholders, with high 
levels of investment and security in the fisheries, the fisheries transformation process 
introduced many new rightsholders, which also led to uncertainty in terms of access, 
and conflict and mistrust towards government (Hutton 2003; Raakjær-Nielsen and 
Hara 2006). 
 
In terms of the small-scale fishers, those who have small commercial quotas are 
peripherally involved in the new government-industry structures that have been 
established through the MLRA.  Every fishing sector is to establish a Scientific 
Working Group and a Resource Management Working Group.  The former is to 
oversee the biological research for the fishery and to make recommendations on the 
TAC. MCM scientists reside on this committee with representatives of rightsholders 
invited as ‘observers’, in order to establish a consultative forum.  Although 
recommendations from this working group are made, the Minister retains the right to 
make the final decision on all matters (Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006).  Resource 
Management Working Groups were envisioned to provide recommendations to the 
Minister on rights allocation and facilitation of transformation in the industry. The 
reality, however, is that many of these forums are not working effectively, or at all, 
and small-scale fishers continue to feel sidelined by the interests, and domination, of 
established industry (Raakjær-Nielsen and Hara 2006).   
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The need, however, for such participatory management structures is widely 
acknowledged in South Africa’s legal and policy framework.  The Constitution, and 
other laws governing resource management, emphasise equitable and sustainable 
access to natural resources, and the involvement of resource users in management 
decision-making (Hauck and Sowman 2003; Hauck and Sowman 2005). Known as 
co-management, a number of partnership arrangements in South Africa have emerged 
between government authorities and resource users to share responsibilities and 
manage fisheries resources (Harris et al. 2007, Hauck and Sowman 2003).  The 
principle of co-management was highly recommended by the SFTG, which outlined a 
multi-tiered institutional structure that spanned national, provincial and local levels.   
There was a particular emphasis on the devolution of management responsibilities to 
provincial level, and where capacity was lacking, a programme was promoted to build 
the necessary personnel and skills (Harris et al. 2002b).   
 
The most established small-scale fisheries co-management arrangements are those in 
the province of KZN.  A catalytic case study was initiated in this province in 1995 
that aimed to address the illegal and over-harvesting of the mussel resource, the lack 
of access by traditional harvesters, and the endemic conflict between harvesters and 
the provincial conservation authority (Harris et al. 2003). This initiative, which 
heralded many positive outcomes, led to a rollout of the co-management approach to 
the rest of the province (Harris et al. 2007).  The province of KZN is unique in this 
regard as it has a long established, and well capacitated, provincial conservation 
authority.  MCM, therefore, devolved authority to EKZN Wildlife in 2000 to manage 
subsistence fisheries in this province. This has resulted in the implementation of co-
management arrangements in 19 communities for 43 individual fishery groups, which 
implement the process of allocating and managing small-scale fishing rights (Harris et 
al. 2007).   
 
In other coastal communities, however, where partnerships have been attempted with 
MCM, co-management initiatives have faced many challenges, largely attributed to a 
lack of government commitment (Hauck and Sowman 2003).  Although the SFTG 
had recommended a Subsistence Fisheries Management Unit within MCM, which 
would be assisted by regional fieldworkers in the provinces, the implementation of 
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such a Unit was slow to take place.  It currently exists, but is understaffed, has high 
turnover, and has limited support (if any) at provincial level.  Van Sittert et al (2006) 
argue that this is a reflection of MCM’s broader institutional problems, which include 
high levels of staff attrition, significant understaffing with one-third of posts not 
filled, and professional staff that is largely dominated by natural scientists, who do not 
have the skills, or necessarily the interest, to engage with fishers on the ground. 
 
Historically, other than through law enforcement, MCM had very little interaction 
with small-scale fishers, which led to mistrust and animosity towards the authorities.  
The SFTG research clearly highlighted the frustration of fishers who remained 
excluded from accessing resources and who were not consulted regarding fisheries 
decision-making (Hauck et al. 2002).  This widespread mistrust has eroded the 
legitimacy of the state and has made ‘poaching all the more reasonable and acceptable 
at the grassroots level’ (Hersoug and Holm 2000:225).  Despite the legal framework 
to ensure fisher involvement in management, MCM’s understanding and commitment 
to this concept is weak (Sowman et al. 2003).  It is argued that there is a need to 
embrace the principles of co-management within MCM by devolving authority to the 
provinces (such as KZN), building capacity at local level to genuinely engage with 
fishers, actively supporting pilot studies along the coast and harmonising the 
objectives and activities of the directorates involved in fisheries and coastal 
management (Sowman et al. 2003). As van Sittert et al. (2006) strongly argue: ‘the 
combination of poverty, dependence, large numbers of users and easy access to the 
resources means that management of subsistence [small-scale] fishers is doomed 
without co-operation from the fishers’ (p. 108). 
 
Finally, co-management arrangements in South Africa have largely focussed on 
resource conservation rather than integrating concepts of economic development and 
poverty alleviation (Hara and Raakjær-Nielsen 2003, Hauck and Sowman 2003). 
Although it is recognised that the sustainability of the resource is fundamental to 
securing fisher livelihoods (Isaacs 2006b, Sowman 2006), diversification of these 
livelihoods, and broader poverty alleviation, is not adequately explored through co-
management processes.  This was also highlighted in a recent review of the KZN co-
management arrangements, which stated that many fishers still had high expectations 
that were not being met. Thus, it was recommended that a core focus of the fisheries 
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management strategy should be the development of alternative livelihoods for coastal 
communities (Clark 2006b).  This was reiterated by van Sittert et al. (2006), who 
argued that it was necessary to streamline institutional structures within MCM, and 
through co-management, to develop supplementary livelihoods with fishers to 
decrease poverty, increase food security and minimise pressure on limited marine 
resources (see also Sowman et al. 2008).  
 
5. FACTORS INFLUENCING COMPLIANCE 
 
Evident from the overview in this chapter, small-scale fishers are influenced by a 
variety of factors that impact their behaviour in different ways.  Key, however, are the 
historical and current laws and policies that have marginalised fishers from formally 
(i.e. legally) accessing marine resources.  As a result, many fishers have continued to 
undertake customary fishing practices, or have turned to the sea as an important 
livelihood strategy, and are then labelled as ‘poachers’ and addressed through law 
enforcement.  Even with a new fisheries law (MLRA), which aims to address the past 
imbalances in the fishing industry, the commercial sector has been prioritised in terms 
of policy development and rights allocation.  Further, in order to ensure economic 
stability in the commercial fisheries, and not to jeopardise the international export 
market, ‘transformation’ has largely been internal, increasing black ownership and 
management in the companies.  However, this has had little impact on social justice 
and poverty relief in coastal communities.  The recognition of small-scale fishers’ 
traditional use and reliance on marine resources, therefore, has not been adequately 
acknowledged, respected, nor protected by law. 
 
Further, the institutional arrangements governing small-scale fisheries need to be 
challenged, particularly due to the resource-orientated and centralised approach of 
fisheries management.  At present, the needs and values of fishers are often not 
incorporated into management decision-making.  Although some formal institutional 
structures are in place to engage with commercial fisheries, the implementation of co-
management arrangements in coastal communities has been slow and has been 
plagued with difficulties.  The delegation of authority to EKZN Wildlife, however, 
has been a positive development in that the conservation authority has actively 
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initiated co-operative agreements with small-scale fishers.  The challenges that remain 
are the fragmentation of decision-making, the allocation of resources and the need to 
broaden fisheries governance to include ensuring the socio-economic sustainability of 
fishers’ livelihoods.  A reliance on law enforcement to ‘protect’ the resources has 
largely exacerbated conflict and ignored the underlying drivers of fisher behaviour. 
 
The social dynamics highlighted in this chapter largely relate to the cultural links to 
resource use and the perceived illegitimacy of the management system.  From the 
fishers’ perspective, their ‘rights’ are not being protected by the state, which has 
engendered mistrust and fuelled disrespect for the fisheries authority.  Thus, there is 
little obligation to obey current laws, and a culture of non-compliance is accepted.  
From an economic perspective, many small-scale fishers have few alternative 
opportunities to meet basic needs.  Even with seasonal employment, fisheries are an 
important livelihood strategy to supplement income and/or food.  Resource 
harvesting, therefore, is an important and often primary livelihood strategy for small-
scale fishers – whether they have a formal permit to fish or not. 
 
The biophysical aspects of the fishery system are also important to understand and 
have been briefly highlighted in this chapter.  The accessibility of resources, their 
seasonal characteristics, and in many cases their sedentary nature, influence 
harvesting strategies.  Livelihoods are affected by the availability of resources, as well 
as by the competition and conflict for resources with other sectors (such as 
recreational and commercial).  Thus, changes in the natural system also impact on 
fisher behaviour. 
 
The factors summarised above highlight the complexity in understanding the 
determinants of compliance behaviour.  They also provide the context and 
background to a more detailed discussion of the two case studies discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The development of post-apartheid fisheries legislation was guided by an 
acknowledgement of South Africa’s unjust past, and a recognition of the inequities in 
the fisheries sector.  The promulgation of the MLRA in 1998, therefore, set out to 
achieve transformation in the fishing industry and formally recognised small-scale 
fishers (i.e. subsistence) for the first time in the country’s history.  The recognition of 
this sector, however, through the allocation of rights, proved more complex than 
MCM had anticipated.  With three conflicting objectives in the MRLA – 
sustainability, stability and equity – priorities had favoured the first two over the last 
(van Sittert et al. 2006).  The challenge of achieving the balance between these 
objectives was highlighted by Branch and Clark (2006): ‘equity could be addressed by 
throwing fisheries open to all, but this would be a recipe for disaster in terms of 
sustainability and economic efficiency. Conversely, failure to develop equitable 
access for people previously denied these rights will be equally disastrous, provoking 
unbridled poaching’ (p. 3).   
 
It is recognised that ‘illegal fishing’ was historically a vital source of food security 
and income for many small-scale fishers (Harris et al. 2002a, Hauck et al. 2002, 
Sowman 2006). However, strict limits on resource use, as well as the recent attempts 
to reallocate fishing rights, left many fishers with no formal rights, despite the fact 
that they continued to fish anyway. They claim that government laws turned ‘us into 
criminals’ or ‘poachers’ (Branch et al. 2007, Hauck et al. 2002).  This sense of 
injustice was exacerbated by raised hopes and expectations that emerged from the 
fisheries policy process and the MLRA, but which never materialised for many of the 
bona fide fishers (Isaacs 2006a). Disillusionment and mistrust towards MCM led to 
retaliatory action, and in some instances, violence (Faasen and Watts 2007, Hauck 
2007, Hersoug 2002).  
 
Although attempts were made by MCM to achieve equity, through its various 
mechanisms to broaden access to previously disadvantaged individuals, it was ill-
prepared for the onslaught of rights applications amidst limited institutional capacity 
(Isaacs 2006a, Kleinschmidt et al. 2003).  While some argue that fisheries 
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transformation has been ‘remarkable’ (Branch and Clark 2006), others have 
highlighted that many traditional fishers remain excluded from formally accessing 
marine resources (Cardoso et al. 2005, Harris et al. 2007, Hauck 2008, Johnston 2007, 
Masifundise 2007).  The state’s task has not been an easy one and it must be 
recognised that attempts at legal reform, the redistribution of fishing rights and the 
initiation of consultative bodies were a means with which to tackle the transformation 
of South Africa’s fisheries.  Broader consideration, however, to issues of poverty, 
food security and customary rights were beyond the capability of government 
institutions that had traditionally focussed on resource objectives and law 
enforcement.  The challenges were therefore immense, and there was insufficient 
transformation within the institution itself, and perhaps a lack of political will, to 
address these broader issues.  
 
Thus, as South Africa embarks on a new small-scale fisheries policy, it will be 
important to recognise the socio-economic circumstances of traditional fishers, and to 
move away from a resource-oriented approach to management. As Sowman (2006) 
emphasises, ‘while the principle of sustainability must underpin any rights allocation 
and resource management approach, it must be tempered by socio-economic and 
cultural considerations, and may at times require trade offs in favour of social equity 
(Sowman 2006: 68).  Many small-scale fishers in South Africa have a long history of 
resource use and are living in conditions of abject poverty, with few economic 
alternatives.  As a result, a reliance on law enforcement will do little to address these 
underlying factors that influence fisher behaviour. By drawing on a historical and 
political context, it is important to understand the social, economic, institutional and 
biophysical factors that drive fishers to fish, whether it is legal or not, otherwise it is 
unlikely that South Africa’s new fisheries policy will be considered legitimate on the 
ground. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ABALONE FISHERY: 






The abalone fishery in South Africa has been identified as one of the most difficult 
fisheries to manage (Branch and Clark 2006).  This is a result of a combination of 
factors, but largely refers to the significant rise in the organised illegal trade of 
abalone since the mid-1990s and the growing impact of ecological factors that have 
resulted in the increased predation of juvenile abalone (Tarr 2000). The combined 
impact of these phenomena have led to the ‘abalone crisis’, which saw an 88% 
decrease in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of the fishery from 615t in the 1995/6 
season to 75t in the 2007/08 season, and complete closure of the fishery in 2008.  The 
high profile of this fishery began in 1994 with what was known as the ‘abalone war’ – 
violent confrontations between the police, coastal communities, informal fishers and 
commercial abalone divers (Hauck 1999a). 
 
The heightened concern over more than a decade about both the sustainability of the 
abalone fishery and endemic conflict between the stakeholders has spurred a suite of 
diverse responses, largely aimed at crippling the illegal trade (Hauck 2000, Hauck and 
Kroese 2006). In order to do so, the primary strategy of government has been to 
enhance law enforcement, effectively increasing its overall compliance budget by 
300% (from 1995-2004) in order to create a greater presence along the coast and to 
target organised syndicates (Hauck and Kroese 2006). However, despite this focus on 
law enforcement, the battle to save the abalone fishery has effectively been lost.  The 
Minister of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) 
announced the closure of the abalone fishery effective from February 2008 (DEAT 
2007a). This decision, together with an estimated informal trade of 900 tons (ASWG 
2007), which is almost 12 times that of the 2007/08 formal commercial fishery, 
indicates that the future of the fishery looks bleak.  
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In order to effectively understand small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa a 
thorough understanding of the abalone fishery is key.  A focus on enhancing law 
enforcement budgets, at the same time as closing the commercial fishery, has 
highlighted the need to question current management decision-making, assess the 
impact of compliance approaches and explore the possible drivers of the informal 
trade. Thus, this chapter documents how the abalone fishery has evolved over the past 
decade and explores the key factors that have influenced the informal trade. It will 
begin by outlining the natural system, including the resource characteristics, 
ecosystem changes and the decline in the resource that led to the closure of the 
commercial fishery.  The socio-economic characteristics of the fishery will also be 
described, including the dynamics of the formal and informal fisheries, how they 
interact and how they have changed over time.  The key management strategies that 
have been implemented to address the illegal trade and sustain the fishery will then be 
outlined and assessed. Finally, the chapter will end with a brief discussion of the 
underlying factors that have influenced fishers’ compliance behaviour, and the key 
issues that need to be considered in the wake of the official closure of the commercial 
fishery. 
 
2. THE NATURAL SYSTEM 
 
Scientists have been warning of the potential commercial collapse of the abalone 
resource for a number of years (Tarr 2000). High levels of informal fishing, combined 
with the ecological consequences of an influx of rock lobster to abalone-rich areas, 
have led to a dramatic decrease in the TAC for the abalone fishery between 1996 and 
2007 (see Fig. 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Annual commercial landings and TAC of abalone in South Africa 
(Raemaekers et al. in prep.) 
 
It is believed that more than 60% of informally-caught abalone are below minimum 
legal size, indicating that they are being harvested before they are able to reproduce 
(ASWG 2007). Abalone are slow growing and only reach maturity after seven years, 
while attaining minimum legal size (for the formal fishery) after 8-9 years.  Abalone 
are largely distributed inshore with the highest densities in waters of less than five 
metres (Tarr 2000).  This makes the resource highly accessible to shore-based divers.  
Furthermore, abalone are broadcast spawners, requiring close-proximity for 
reproduction.  Thus, with a decline in abalone density, there is concern that the 
resource will be too sparsely populated to reproduce effectively, particularly in the 
zones with high lobster migration (see below, ASWG 2007). 
 
In the early 1990s an ecological problem emerged due to the large-scale movement of 
rock lobster into the same areas where abalone have been most prevalent. This has 
resulted in the high predation of sea urchins, which provide shelter for juvenile 
abalone (Tarr et al. 1996). Recruitment of juvenile abalone has been severely affected, 
particularly in historically rich abalone areas.  Thus, scientists indicate that even under 
optimistic assumptions, the abalone resource in these areas will take at least a decade 
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  92 
to recover as a result of the changes to the ecosystem (with very low levels of 
recruitment), coupled with the impact of high levels of informal fishing in the early 
1990s (ASWG 2007). 
 
Fishery Independent Abalone Surveys (FIAS) have been conducted by MCM since 
1995 to assess the inshore status of the abalone resource. All abalone above 100mm 
shell length are surveyed in 20 transects per fishing zone. Results over the past decade 
indicate significant declines in all major zones (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).  As a result 
of resource over-exploitation, scientists have called for revised management 
strategies, with some supporting the closure of the commercial fishery (ASWG 2007, 
DEAT 2007d, Maharaj 2006). 
 
         
Figure 5.2: Results of FIAS (number of abalone per 30m x 2m transects)  
(Maharaj 2006) 
 
                    
Figure 5.3: Percentage of FIAS survey quadrats showing zero abalone 
(Maharaj 2006) 
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3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
This section will provide an overview of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
abalone fishery, including a description of the formal and informal fisheries. This 
overview is drawn from previous research conducted since 1995 (Hauck 1997, 
1999a,b), and is enhanced through more recent interviews, focus groups meetings and 
workshops conducted since 2005 (see Appendix 2).  
 
3.1  The South African Abalone Fishery  
 
Up until the fishery closed, the South African abalone fishery consisted of two main 
fisheries. One was the formal fishery, known as the ‘legal fishery’, which was 
recognised by the state and regulated through state structures, laws and regulations. 
The second, which is the informal fishery, and which continues to operate, is 
considered illegal by the state but is recognised and regulated through non-state 
structures and rules.  Both of these fisheries operated simultaneously, with significant 
overlap between the two sectors. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, the informal fishery 
was considered larger than the formal fishery and there were estimates that up to 80% 
of the formal fishers were also involved in the informal fishery (A1, A5, A9, A15, 
A16, A19, A31, A34, A45, A46, A54)7.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Composition of the South African abalone fishery, highlighting the 
overlap between the formal and informal fisheries 
 
                                                
7 This figure of 80% is of course anecdotal – but it was very interesting to note that many respondents 
(both law enforcement and fishers) specifically stated this percentage, indicating that many formal 
fishers were involved in the informal trade. 
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The formal abalone fishery began as an open access fishery, was first regulated in 
terms of catch limits in 1968, and evolved to include commercial, recreational, 
subsistence and limited commercial sectors.  A traditional fishery has existed for 
decades, but an informal fishery (i.e. considered ‘illegal’ by the state) emerged in the 
late 1960s when increased government regulations were put in place to limit 
harvesting (A1, A35, A38). The informal fishery became significantly more organised 
and lucrative in the early-1990s.  It has evolved to include traditional fishers, many of 
whom were unsuccessful in receiving a formal right to fish, as well as opportunists, 
who turned to this fishery for high economic gain.  Figure 5.5 outlines the different 
sectors that are, and have been, operating in the abalone fishery.  Each of these sectors 




Figure 5.5: Sectors of the formal and informal abalone fisheries. Dotted lines  
highlight those sectors that are no longer allocated rights. 
 
 
3.2  The Market 
 
South Africa exports 100% of its abalone catch, with most of this destined for Hong 
Kong, which is the key import centre for the world trade in abalone (Bürgener 2006).  
Following economic growth in China since the late 1990s, demand for seafood has 
been increasing (To et al. 2006).  Abalone, specifically dried abalone, is an expensive 
delicacy in China, which is used for special celebrations and banquets (To et al. 
2006).  Consumer demand for abalone in China dates as far back as the Zhou Dynasty 
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(1122 to 256 BC), when abalone was recorded as being a regular part of the emperor’s 
diet (To et al. 2006).  In more contemporary society, the most valued abalone product 
is dried, and has particular significance in terms of wealth and social status.   
 
In a study by To et al. (2006), on the trade in dried abalone in Hong Kong, it was 
revealed that South Africa was the leading exporter of dried abalone from 1998-2002.  
Interestingly, in studying the Hong Kong import data, it also indicated that there were 
statistics of the importation of dried abalone from other African countries (including 
three landlocked countries).  However, abalone (Haliotis midae) only occurs off the 
shores of South Africa and is not formally exported to other African countries.  Thus, 
Bürgener (2006) concludes that ‘it is almost certain that all of this abalone was 
illegally harvested in South Africa and laundered through neighbouring countries’ (p. 
2).  In their study, To et al (2006) estimate the price of dried abalone from South 
Africa (and other African countries) to range from US$342-$1239/kg, which is the 
second most valuable ‘brand’ after Japan. 
 
The strong market for abalone has also had significant implications for government.  
Sales of confiscated abalone have led to major injections into the Marine Living 
Resources Fund (MLRF), which is used for MCM’s operating budget. Confiscations 
between 2002 and 2004, for example, had contributed R90 million (approximately 
US$14 million) to the MLRF. In 2004, it was believed that R120 million 
(approximately US$19 million) was earned for the MLRF from the sale of confiscated 
abalone (DEAT 2004b), which was about one-third of its overall expenditure in 2005 
(Hara et al. 2005).  This profit, from the informal fishery to government, has led to 
strong allegations that it is in MCM’s interest to maintain the informal trade. 
Interestingly, through the sale of large consignments of confiscated abalone, MCM 
becomes the greatest competitor to the formal industry.  In recognising these 
allegations, one MCM report reads: ‘It is unfortunate that reference is increasingly 
being made that the ineffectiveness of [law enforcement operations] to prevent the 
removal of abalone is directly subsidising the Department’s operations.’ (DEAT 
2004b). Further, with the commercial fishery closed, DEAT will be the only 
marketing agent left who is exporting wild abalone (which is confiscated from the 
informal market).  Thus, through the ban, government is creating a monopoly for the 
sale of abalone, which subsequently contributes to its operating costs. 
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Economic incentives linked to the strong abalone market have not been adequately 
explored at both a national and international level.  Some stakeholders believe that 
consumer dynamics related to ‘buyer monopolies’ in the Far East should also be 
investigated, which influence both the formal and informal trade (F9, 35). At present 
there is no indication that the demand for South Africa’s wild abalone will diminish, 
indicating that the influence of the market on abalone management needs to be taken 
seriously. 
 
3.3  The Formal Abalone Fishery 
 
The abalone fishery in South Africa is reliant on a single commercially exploited 
species, Haliotis midae.  The commercial fishery extends along the south-west coast 
from Cape Columbine to Quoin Point (see Figure 5.6), which was divided into seven 
fishing zones in 1986, each designated its own Total Allowable Catch (TAC) based 
on scientific stock assessments (Sauer et al. 2003, Tarr 1992).   
 
 
Figure 5.6: The commercial Haliotis midae fishing zones A-G on the southwestern 
Cape coast (adapted from Tarr 2000).  The insert also highlights the area of the 
commercial fishery as well as the broader distribution of the species. 
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The commercial fishery began in 1949 in the community of Gansbaai (Zone B) with 
an open access fishery. Elderly residents of the area recall how they used to wade up 
to their ankles and pluck abalone from the rocks (C3, Hauck 1997). Licenses were 
required from 1954, but there were no limits on harvesting, which was largely 
influenced by demand. The commercial fishery was supplying a growing export 
market, particularly to Japan and South East Asia (Diemont Commission 1986). The 
peak of the industry was in 1965, when 2800t of abalone was harvested, with 14 
processing plants and 112 divers operating in the fishery (Sauer et al. 2003). Due to a 
concern over the declining resource, the first catch regulations were put in place in 
1968, with quota limits applied to the fishery from 1970 (refer to Figure 5.1).  This 
decision by the state to limit harvesting resulted in a production quota allocated to six 
factories, based on past performance in the industry (Sauer et al. 2003).  Many small-
scale fishers lost their permits during this time, while others continued to work for the 
factories, but for a small fee per kilogram of abalone delivered.  
 
Many abalone divers were aggrieved with their situation, earning only 50 cents per 
kilogram whole mass (abalone in the shell), while the quota holders were receiving 
significant profits (Diemont Commission 1986). However, it is argued that the 
circumstances of the abalone divers changed in the early 1980s when they formed a 
company and were given their own quota, as well as ‘entrenched diving rights’ 
(Diemont Commission 1986).  Thus, up until 1998, when major transformation took 
place in the fishery following the promulgation of the Marine Living Resources Act 
(MLRA 1998), there were two key components of the commercial fishery. The first 
was the abalone divers (about 50), who had the right to dive and transport a fixed 
percentage of the annual quota to a processing company. The second was the ‘quota 
holders’ (five) who had the receiving, processing and marketing rights to a fixed 
percentage of the TAC (Tarr 2000).  
 
Historically, the highest density of abalone, and hence the most intensively fished 
areas, had been zones A-D.  These were considered the four major zones of the 
fishery, which had traditionally yielded over 90% of the TAC (Tarr 2000). Zones E 
and G supported small TACs and were closed in the early 1990s due to rapidly 
declining catch rates but were reopened in 1997 as experimental TACs, following the 
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requests of rightsholders (Tarr 2000). Dyer Island (in Zone A) was closed in 2003 as a 
protected area, and Robben Island (Zone F) is limited to a restricted fishing period as 
it is partially protected.   
 
It has been argued that up to the early 1990s, the management measures in place 
appeared to be successful with divers reporting improved catches and new divers 
buying into the industry due to the strong possibility of increased TACs in the future 
(Tarr 2000).  However, in the mid-1990s some changes took place, largely due to 
political pressure to extend access to the fishery to previously disadvantaged groups. 
A 10t community quota (1.6% of the TAC) was allocated to a group of fishers in 
Hawston (Zone C) and a further 10% of the TAC, ranging from 2t – 10t was allocated 
to ten new quota holders. The problem, however, was that the TAC had not increased 
with these allocations, resulting in resistance from the original ‘large’ quota holders 
who believed they had long term rights (Sauer et al. 2003). This conflict continued in 
the 1996/7 season as the TAC decreased while an additional six quotas were 
allocated, resulting in a further reduction for existing quota holders.  The allocation 
process, following the MLRA, continued to be controversial and will be discussed 
further under management approaches. 
 
It is important to note that although the highest density of abalone, and therefore the 
commercially harvested population, occurs in the southwestern Cape, the species also 
occurs in a ‘discontinuous distribution pattern’ east of Cape Agulhas, and extends as 
far as the former Transkei region (Tarr 2000, see Figure 5.6).  An experimental quota 
of 3t was allocated in 1992 to community based subsistence harvesters in the Eastern 
Cape, and two other communities in this province were allocated experimental rights 
in 2001 and 2003 respectively (Britz et al. 2007, Tarr 2000).  At present, however, no 
abalone rights are allocated in the Eastern Cape province. Although a 30t 
experimental quota was explored for the eastern Cape coast in the late 1990s, and 
applications were invited, this was abolished due to an increase in informal fishing 
and concerns that law enforcement was inadequate (Tarr 2000).  This chapter focuses 
on the abalone fishery in the southwestern Cape, where the commercial fishery is 
centred.  However, it is acknowledged that the abalone fishery, in its entirety, needs to 
be understood for future management possibilities and findings from the studies 
conducted on the fishery in the Eastern Cape (Britz et al. 2007, Godfrey et al. 2004, 
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Raemaekers et al. 2007, Raemaekers and Britz in prep) need to be dovetailed with the 
research outlined below.   
 
3.3.1  Harvesting and Production 
 
The formal abalone fishery usually involves a crew of 4-6 persons, comprising a diver 
who is assisted by a skipper and usually two assistants.  The crew operate from 4-6m 
fibre-glass skiboats, with the diver using a ‘hookah’ system, which is an onboard 
surface-supply compressor system (Sauer et al. 2003).  Divers usually only operate 
during calm sea conditions, which results in fishing only occurring on average 3-5 
days per month during the fishing season (Sauer et al. 2003). 
 
In the final 2007/08 season, there were 302 rights holders in the abalone fishery, 
which comprised of 262 individual divers and 40 legal entities (companies). The 
Abalone Processing Factories (APFs) were also allocated quotas in the past, but this 
was phased out in 2006 in order to encourage diversification by the factories and, 
ideally, to then reallocate this quota to other rightsholders.   
 
In terms of production, prior to 1991, the abalone industry primarily exported canned 
and frozen products, with live abalone being exported to the Far East for the first time 
in 1991.  The abalone fishery diversified further by processing and exporting dried 
abalone, which is considered greater value in the consumer market.  Abalone fetches 
the highest unit price of any South African fishery and the overall value of the fishery 
was approximately R60 million (approximately US$8.9 million) in 2006 (based on a 
223t TAC for a canned product – Maharaj 2006). 
 
3.3.2  Recreational Fishery 
 
The recreational fishery also began as an open access fishery, with regulations on 
daily bag limit and size of shell.  In 1983, recreational fishers were required to 
purchase permits and additional management measures were put in place, such as 
closed seasons.   
 











Figure 5.7: Annual recreational landings compared to commercial landings of the 
abalone resource (Maharaj 2006) 
 
Steady increases in catches (based on government telephone surveys) reached a peak 
in 1993-1994, when it was estimated that 750t of abalone were harvested by 
recreational fishers (Sauer et al. 2003).  This catch, which was 122% of the 
commercial TAC at the time, led to additional management measures as a means of 
decreasing further expansion of the fishery.  It is suspected that this increase in 
recreational catch was linked to the informal fishery, with abalone being caught and 
sold for the black market. As a result, the Minister decreased the recreational fishing 
season and limited harvesting to weekends only as a means of reducing effort (Tarr 
2000).  In 2003, however, the recreational fishery was closed.  The Abalone Policy of 
2003 stated that the recreational fishery would be suspended ‘until such time as the 
commercial abalone fishery is no longer under threat of closure’ (DEAT 2003: 6).  
During the 2001-2002 season, the recreational harvest was 100t, which was one-third 
of the commercial TAC.  Thus, MCM argued that it could not justify a recreational 
fishery whilst the commercial fishery, which sustained important jobs, was under 
threat (DEAT 2003). 
 
3.3.3  Subsistence Fishery 
 
In 1998, small-scale fishers were legally recognised for the first time in South Africa 
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government to recognise the traditional rights of subsistence fishers to formally 
harvest marine resources (Sowman 2006). Informal abalone fishers, for example, 
argued that they had a historical right to harvest a resource that they lived adjacent to 
(Hauck 1997).  As a result, the Minister – for the first time - allocated just over 10% 
of the overall abalone TAC to a subsistence fishery in 1998.  Thus, for the 1998-1999 
fishing season, 236 subsistence permits were allocated in the Western Cape (Sauer et 
al. 2003) to harvest 85t of abalone (DEAT 2004a).  Subsistence permits were then 
decreased for the 1999/20008 and 2000/2001 seasons and were eventually replaced by 
the allocation of limited commercial rights in 2001. There were a number of 
allegations from the authorities that the subsistence fishery was a conduit for the 
illegal fishery, in which the subsistence permits and tags were being used for illegally 
caught abalone (Sauer et al. 2003). 
 
3.3.4  Limited Commercial Fishery 
 
A limited commercial fishery was established in 2001, which was MCM’s attempt at 
allocating small quotas to previously disadvantaged fishers. In acknowledging the 
management problems encountered by the subsistence permits, and adopting the 
recommendations of the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG 2000), small-scale 
commercial rightsholders were identified for the abalone fishery.  In 2002, of the 271 
rights in the abalone fishery, 228 of these were ‘limited commercial’ (84%), with 202 
quotas of 430kg and 26 quotas of 200kg (DEAT 2004a).  Ninety-five percent of the 
limited commercial allocations were allocated to individuals. The original five large 
quota holders had 49.5% of the total commercial allocation in 2002, as opposed to 
100% in 1992.  Thus, limited commercial rights were a means for government to 
reallocate the abalone resource from established large companies to individual fishers 
who were demanding legitimate access to the abalone fishery. This was a key 
mechanism for informal fishers to enter the formal fishery. In 2003 long-term 
commercial rights were allocated, following the implementation of the new abalone 
policy (DEAT 2003).   
                                                
8 For the 1999-2000 season, 53 permits were granted to fish 45t of abalone, but statistics have not been 
found for the 2000-2001 season. 
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3.4  The Informal Abalone Fishery 
 
Historically, a traditional fishery has existed for decades in South Africa (Hauck 
1997, Martin 1995).  Prior to the allocation of quotas in the 1970s, harvesting of 
abalone was open to anyone.  Even when stricter rules were in place in the 1980s, 
people remember harvesting and selling abalone on a small-scale to neighbours and 
tourists as a means of making pocket money, paying varsity fees or saving for school 
holidays (Hauck 1997).  Fishers stated that they received only R1 per abalone in the 
1960s (F35), while this increased to about R20-R25/kg for abalone in the early 1980s 
(F28, F34). Although there were limitations on daily bag limit (5 per day) and size 
limit (114mm shell breadth), the introduction of recreational permits in 1983 led to 
more significant monitoring and control of this sector.  
 
However, in the 1990s, and more specifically in the mid-1990s, the overseas market 
for abalone opened up significantly, attributed to the growing middle class in China 
(To et al. 2006).  The formal abalone divers were receiving R44/kg in the 1991/1992 
season, and this increased to R148/kg in the 1996/1997 season (Sauer et al. 2003).  
Similarly, increased opportunities arose for the growth of the informal fishery, with 
foreign Chinese buyers entering coastal communities to establish markets for export 
to Hong Kong (Gastrow 1998).  With South Africa’s border opening up in the 1990s, 
following the end of Apartheid, opportunities grew to build a black market trade in 
abalone from South Africa to Asia.  With an insatiable demand for South African 
abalone in the Far East, the informal fishery grew in size and level of organisation.  
Figure 5.8 highlights the number of abalone that have been confiscated by law 
enforcement agencies since 1994, but the actual number of abalone harvested 
informally is estimated to be much higher (ASWG 2007)9. A combination of focused 
law enforcement operations targeting the fishery since 1999, and the sheer increase in 
informal fishers, have both contributed to the increase in confiscations. In the 
2006/2007 season, the Abalone Scientific Working Group estimated that the informal 
catch (936.4t) was almost nine times that of the commercial TAC at the time (125t; 
ASWG 2007). 
                                                
9 When modelling the informal catch for the TAC recommendation in 2007, it was assumed that only 
17% of abalone traded on the black market were confiscated, which is based on qualitative input from 
rightsholders as well as quantitative assessments of policing effort (Plagányi 2007b). 
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Figure 5.8: Number of abalone confiscated within the southern African region annually 
(2007 data are incomplete - ASWG 2007) 
 
The two sectors that have emerged in the informal fishery are outlined below and 
highlight how the fishery has evolved from a largely socio-politically driven activity, 
to one of organised crime whereby gangs and drugs are increasingly involved.  These 
two sectors, however, have become less distinct over time, with syndicates now 
dominating harvesting activities at a large scale.   
 
3.4.1  Harvesting and Production 
 
The modus operandi of the informal fishery was described in Hauck (1997), and since 
that time the operations are similar but more organised.  Figure 5.9 outlines the basic 
relationship between the key roleplayers, with the local middleman being a significant 
figure in terms of organisation (logistics and money).  This person is often responsible 
for organising the buyers, purchasing equipment (especially boats), organising 
transport and ensuring payment.  The divers interact with the middlemen and are then 
responsible for their own assistants, decoys and local transporters.  Lookouts and 
decoys at all levels are required to avert law enforcement officials, sometimes 
utilising three or more decoy vehicles as distractions for one shipment (L6).  The 
types of operations vary between the roleplayers but the figure below highlights the 
hierarchal system that is operating. 
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Figure 5.9: Modus operandi of informal abalone fishery in South Africa 
 
Various trade routes are used to transport the abalone from where it is harvested to the 
market.  From the harvesting area, the abalone is sent to various collection points, 
largely in the Cape Metropolitan area, Eastern Cape or Gauteng provinces.  Private 
vehicles are used or rented to move the abalone, and cases have been reported where 
police patrol vehicles, and ambulances, are used for transporting abalone (Anon 2004, 
Hauck 1997, A45, A49, A52).  In addition, Chinese fishing vessels have been 
identified with South African abalone, picking up shipments offshore.   
 
Cross-border trade routes have also been identified, and this is verified through Hong 
Kong trade records that indicate an importation of abalone from other African 
countries (To et al. 2006). Exporting abalone to Hong Kong, via other African 
countries, ‘legalises’ the product as there is no restriction on the movement of abalone 
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in these other countries (Anon 2004).  Exporting abalone in this way is through 
private airstrips, boat or by land and the product is often disguised in packaging as 
dried fruit or flowers. It is argued that these trade routes are facilitated through corrupt 
Customs officials (Anon 2004). 
 
Most abalone is exported in dry form as it is very light in weight, can be stored 
indefinitely, and is easily concealed.  Dried abalone is then rehydrated in consumer 
countries for use.  Drying factories have been found throughout South Africa, often 
located in obscure rural areas and farms (A1, A45).  
 
3.4.2  Traditional f ishers in  the informal f ishery 
 
The informal abalone fishery became increasingly controversial, and grew in 
organisation, in the community of Hawston (Zone C – see Figure 5.6), located along 
the southwest coast, in the early 1990s.  This was historically a traditional fishing 
community that had been relocated under Apartheid policy, through the Group Areas 
Act (41 of 1950).  Thus, in 1972, Hawston was declared a ‘Coloured Area’, while the 
town of Hermanus (12km away), was declared a ‘White Area’ (Hauck 1997). These 
forced removals resulted in segregated communities where poverty was rife and basic 
services were often not provided.  In Hawston, for example, the research by Schutte in 
1993 indicated that 74 percent of the 89 respondents that he interviewed did not have 
access to a flush toilet in their homes and 70 percent stated that they only had access 
to cold water.  Further, the Provincial Development Council in 1995 stated that in the 
Overberg region (where Hawston, and other abalone-rich communities are located), 
almost half of the population did not have a standard six education (Grade 8), 35 
percent used wood or gas/paraffin as the major source of energy for cooking and they 
identified this region (within the province) as the one which suffered the greatest in 
terms of lack of health facilities.   
 
As a result, in the traditional fishing communities of the area (Zones A-D), fishers had 
harvested abalone for the pot, but also sold it when the opportunity arose to meet 
basic needs (Hauck 1997). When the black market trade in abalone became more 
organised in the late-1980s and early 1990s, it provided much-needed income to local 
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households in impoverished communities.  Thus, a growing international market for 
abalone in the 1990s was welcomed by communities who lived adjacent to a rich 
abalone resource.   
 
Coinciding with this growing market was a time of political transition in South Africa.  
Following the democratic elections of 1994, the country immersed itself in legal 
reform, including a process of developing a new fisheries policy and law.  This had 
significant implications and potential opportunities for small-scale fishers who had 
been marginalised in the past (Hauck and Sowman 2003).  In the abalone fishery, 
‘protest fishing’ emerged which involved traditional fishers openly ‘poaching’ as a 
means of protesting government for legal rights to the fishery.  They argued that 
broadening access to the abalone fishery would ‘legalise’ their activities and recognise 
them as legitimate fishers, not as ‘criminals’ (Hauck 1997).  This sentiment was 
reinforced during the fisheries policy process when a special committee, appointed by 
the Minister to investigate access rights, acknowledged that certain sectors had been 
excluded in the past and there was a need to reconsider the current allocation of 
fishing rights (ARTC 1996). 
 
Although a redistribution of rights did take place in the abalone fishery, resulting in 
271 rights holders in 2003 compared to just five in 1992, the process of allocation was 
problematic.  Fishers argued that some of the wrong people received access, still 
excluding large numbers of traditional fishers from the formal fishery (Isaacs 2006a).  
As a result, even though some fishers were allocated formal rights, others did not, 
resulting in those being denied access still continuing to fish.  In 2007, informal 
fishers still argued that government had denied them a formal right to fish, despite a 
number of applications to do so (as explained by both formal and informal fishers).  
As a result, they argued that they will continue to harvest abalone until their historic 
rights are recognised.  In 2003, when the new abalone fishery policy was put in place 
to allocate ten year rights, over 1300 applications were submitted to MCM but only 
294 diver and diver entities were allocated rights (Maharaj et al. 2005).  As a result, 
over 1000 applicants were excluded. 
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3.4.3  Syndicates in the informal fishery 
 
Allegations of the involvement of Chinese Triads in the illegal abalone trade began in 
the mid-1990s (Hermanus Crime Intelligence Unit 1998, PICOC 1998).  With the 
opening up of South Africa’s borders, following democracy in 1994, Chinese 
syndicates targeted coastal communities to supply the large demand for abalone in the 
Far East (Gastrow 1998).  Although the relationship between Chinese buyers and 
abalone divers began with an exchange of money, fishers became increasingly reliant 
on syndicates for other commodities, such as vehicles and drugs.  Abalone became a 
highly sought after commodity by other illegal groups as well, such as the Cape Flats 
gangs, largely based in the Western Cape province (Steinberg 2005).  Abalone was a 
lucrative resource to trade.  In 1995, abalone divers claimed to earn R200 per 
kilogram on the black market, which resulted in about R8000 for a 40kg dive in two 
hours.  This equated to four times the average monthly income in the Hawston 
community, where the informal trade centred at the time (Hauck 1997).  One buyer on 
the black market, for example, claimed to make R50 000 (approximately US$7000) a 
day in 2000 as he took a cut from each diver and then organised shipment to 
international buyers (A1).  The significant profits that could be made through abalone, 
and the low perceived risk of getting caught, attracted other roleplayers, including 
those involved in the drug trade (Steinberg 2005). 
 
In an assessment of the organised abalone trade in South Africa, Steinberg (2005) 
contextualises this trade with other illegal economies in South Africa, arguing that 
there were dramatic increases in the export of various contraband in the 1990s.  He 
argues that high value (dollar driven) products that are exported from a weak currency 
area (like South Africa), generate significant profits by trading these for high value 
products that are imported.  In this way, he explains the link between abalone and 
drugs, whereby vast quantities of cheaply acquired drugs from East Asia are imported 
into South Africa and then traded for high-value abalone (which is acquired cheaply 
in South Africa).  Thus, in the mid-1990s the drug trade became infiltrated in the 
abalone trade as access to cheap drugs for gang leaders was through harvesting of 
abalone (Anon 2004, Steinberg 2005).  As explained by a law enforcement 
investigation: ‘abalone is a commodity to organised crime groups with which they 
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could acquire other forms of illegal goods…it provides a lucrative resource easily 
liquidated which provides immense financial resources to criminal 
groupings…abalone is per unit value more profitable than producing heroin and 
carries far less risk’ (Anon 2004: 37). 
 
Properties along the coast, where abalone was being harvested, were bought by well 
known drug merchants and gang leaders and communities were being immersed into 
drug culture (with traditional fishers having to pay protection money, for example) 
(Hauck 1997, Redpath 2001, Steinberg 2005).  As one community informant 
explained, ‘gangs were buying rugby jerseys for school teams and providing loans to 
local residents – they weren’t necessarily perceived negatively’ (A35). This was 
reaffirmed by a senior police detective who was explaining the role of gang leaders in 
the Western Cape: ‘the crime bosses are often the hand that feeds a particular 
community. These kingpins buy patronage and large sections of certain communities 
rely on their goodwill, job opportunities and handouts’ (quoted in Joubert 2007). 
 
Thus, with the onset of organised criminal groups in the abalone trade in the mid-
1990s, exploitation of the abalone resource expanded to roleplayers outside of the 
traditional fishery.  Divers included gang members as well as regular people looking 
for a quick buck, many of whom left formal employment as a means of ‘making big 
money’ (A9).  Although attempts were made by some of the traditional fishers, in 
2001 specifically (ARHA 2001), to keep these newcomers out of the fishery, this soon 
became impossible due to a lack of political will within government (to be discussed 
further below).  Thus, large groups of informal fishers began operating in the late 
1990s, moving along the coast at the same time as operating further out to sea.  
Modus operandi changed from shore-based diving, with the use of snorkelling 
equipment, to large boats accommodating up to 16 divers at one time, many using 
SCUBA gear to access the deeper waters.  
 
From the early 2000s, there have been reports of large scale diving to supply the black 
market, including groups of 40-60 divers and assistants operating from the same area 
(L1, L6).  For example, Dyer Island, a protected area near Gansbaai, reportedly sees 
up to 16 boats at one time operating at night and for the informal fishery (Raemaekers 
et al. in prep).  Many of the fishers interviewed stated that increased technology in the 
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mid-1990s (some of which was supplied by the syndicates themselves) contributed to 
their efficient operations.  The onslaught of cellphones, for example, facilitated 
communication between lookouts, buyers and divers (who used their cellphones 
underwater in condoms).  This minimised their risk of getting caught.  In addition, the 
use of GPS equipment allowed divers to shuck their abalone under the sea and to hide 
it in bags, recording the GPS coordinates for later pick-up.  Each of these measures 
has significantly contributed to the ease in which the informal fishery could operate 
without sanctions.  The size of these operations, and the level of their sophistication, 
has increased significantly over the past decade. 
 
3.5  Interaction Between Formal and Informal Fisheries 
 
As highlighted in Figure 5.4 above, there is significant interaction between the 
stakeholders involved in both the formal and informal abalone fisheries.  Interviews 
with a wide range of stakeholders estimate that up to 80% of the formal abalone 
fishery is connected in some way to the black market trade.  This includes the 
commercial divers who over-harvest and sell their extra catch to informal buyers, and 
the factories that process and export both legal and illegal catch.  The divers largely 
operate by diving legitimately during the day under the auspices of their formal 
permit, but leave undeclared catch under the water, to be retrieved by carriers in the 
night (with the use of GPS).  Other methods also include off-loading abalone on to 
other vessels in the sea, to be shipped to pre-determined destinations for pickup (A45, 
A46). Factories, set up for the legal trade in abalone, have also been implicated with 
undeclared and under-sized abalone, likely bought for the black market from the 
undeclared catch of formal abalone divers.  Informal fishers also claim to sell their 
catch to established factories involved in both legal and illegal trade (A14, A35).   
 
Although historically (in the mid-1990s) there was significant conflict, sometimes 
violent confrontations, between the formal and informal fishers, this no longer takes 
place.  Some informants have explained that the mid-1990s was a time when formal 
abalone divers had invested significantly in the industry (by buying rights) and the 
sustainability of the fishery looked promising (Tarr 2000).  These divers felt 
threatened by the so-called ‘poachers’, who were jeopardizing their livelihoods 
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(Hauck 1997).  More recently, however, with the reallocation of abalone rights to 
many more roleplayers, and with the consistent cuts in the annual TAC, the financial 
viability of abalone rights, coupled with an uncertain future in the fishery, led to an 
eroding sense of ownership.  Former self-proclaimed ‘poachers’, who received 
abalone quotas in the new dispensation, explained that with a declining quota every 
year, they were ‘forced’ to return to ‘poaching’ as a means of sustaining their 
livelihoods (A1, A16).  One abalone rightsholder, who in 1995 had been a key 
informal diver fighting for access to the resource, explained his sentiments:  
‘When I received my quota for the first time, I hung up my poaching gear for 
good.  I was happy – this is what I wanted. The next year they [MCM] 
decreased my quota and then the next year they did the same.  My heart was 
sore.  My chance was gone – I couldn’t live on what they were giving me.  I 
am angry and now I am poaching again.  My wife doesn’t know but I have to 
do it.  I don’t have a choice’ (A15). 
 
These divers perceived the informal fishery as an ally against government, a means to 
compensate for a perceived illegitimate annual decrease in their quotas.  In addition, 
the ongoing impunity of the organised informal fishers further undermined the 
incentive of formal fishers to comply. One rightsholder explained that there was no 
sense of ownership in the fishery: ‘when the TAC continues to decrease, and people 
are poaching all around you, what you lose other people gain.  It drives us to poach – 
there is no incentive’ (A14). Thus, many of the formal abalone divers were benefiting 
from their historical connections to the black market trade. 
 
4. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
The past twelve years has witnessed a suite of diverse responses by both government 
and civil society organisations to improve compliance and sustain the abalone fishery 
(Hauck 2000). Although these interventions have been varied, and have involved a 
wide number of stakeholders, none have had long-term success. Four key 
management strategies that were implemented following the promulgation of the 
MLRA will be discussed. These strategies were important as a means of achieving the 
new Act’s objectives and in response to a concern for the growing illegal abalone 
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trade.  The first strategy, in line with the objectives of the MLRA and similar 
processes in other fisheries, was to achieve greater equity in the abalone fishery by 
redistributing rights from existing rightsholders to previously disadvantaged 
individuals with historic links to the resource.  This was to specifically address the 
unjust allocation of marine resources in the past.  The other key strategies were aimed 
directly at the abalone fishery. The second was to respond to over-exploitation by 
establishing a TURF (Territorial User-Rights Fishery) system.  This policy, initiated 
in 2003, was an option proposed by government as a means to avoid complete closure 
of the fishery. A third strategy was aimed at the international market by listing South 
African abalone on Appendix III of CITES (the Convention on the International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora). Fourth, which was a key focus of MCM, 
was increased law enforcement effort to target the illicit trade in abalone. In addition, 
the broad management approach taken by DEAT will be discussed, particularly in 
relation to the decision to close the formal fishery. 
 
4.1  Broadening rights of  access to  the abalone fishery 
 
A key objective of the MLRA was to achieve more equitable access to marine 
resources. Consequently, the abalone fishery embarked on a process of 
transformation. The broadening of the TAC included not only the commercial sector, 
but subsistence, recreational and limited commercial users as well (see Table 5.1). To 
account for the increased number of rightsholders, the commercial quota allocations 
in 2002 decreased from an average of 120t (between 36t and 192t) to just 5.2t 
(between 1.6t and 38t). The limited commercial allocation was divided into 202 
quotas of 430kg each and 26 quotas of 200kg each (DEAT 2004a). 
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Table 5.1: A timeline of formal rights in the different sectors of the abalone fishery, 
highlighting the redistribution of rights following the MLRA in 1998 
 
 
Fishing rights were broadened throughout the medium term (2001-2002) and long-
term (from 2003) rights allocation processes.  The limited commercial sector was 
amalgamated into the commercial sector from 2003. The increasing number of 
rightsholders, alongside a decreasing TAC, is depicted in Table 5.2.  
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Season Sector No. of 
Permits/ 
Rightsholders 
TAC (t) Source 
1992/3 Commercial 5 605 DEAT 2004a 
 Subsistence * *  
 Recreational 34 532 664 Sauer et al. 2003 
1998/99 Commercial 5 515 Sauer et al. 2003;  
Tarr 2000 
 Subsistence 236 85 DEAT 2004a; 
Sauer et al. 2003 
 Recreational 14 368 220 DEAT 2004a; 
Sauer et al. 2003 
2001/2 Commercial 41 314 DEAT 2002 
 Limited Commercial 232 62.5 DEAT 2002;  
Sauer et al. 2003 
 Subsistence * *  





302 75 A. Mackenzie in litt. 
 Subsistence * *  
 Recreational ** **  
*Subsistence rights were only allocated for three years during the 1998/99, 1999/2000 
and 2000/2001 abalone fishing seasons.  In 2001 these rights were changed to limited 
commercial small-scale quotas. 
**Recreational permits were suspended from 2003 following the implementation of 
the new abalone policy (DEAT 2003). 
 
Table 5.2:  Evolution of rights allocation in the abalone fishery 
(When data from different sources was not consistent, official government 
publications were used as the primary source) 
 
 
Although there is no doubt that a greater number of people had been included in the 
formal abalone fishery, the redistribution of rights had been jeopardised by a number 
of factors. These included a long and cumbersome application process, community 
elites often benefiting at the expense of traditional fishers and the allocation of 
economically unviable quotas in the TAC fisheries (Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 2006). 
Thus, the legitimacy of the rights allocation process had been questioned by 
traditional fishers. 
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Further, many abalone fishers argued that alternative tenure arrangements existed, 
with some explaining a process that was initiated by the Abalone Rights Holders 
Association (ARHA) in 2001.  An abalone management proposal, which was 
developed over several weeks with extensive collaboration between both formal and 
informal fishers, came at a time when all stakeholders recognised the need to come 
together for the mutual interest of sustaining the abalone resource (A38).  The crux of 
this proposal was recognising that the informal fishery was driven to a large degree by 
the socio-economic circumstances of coastal communities, and by the fact that many 
fishers claimed they were not given an adequate opportunity to access the fishery 
(ARHA 2001). Thus, the ARHA proposed that a percentage of the estimated poaching 
catch (50%) be legitimised and allocated to new entrants, who could actively assist in 
protecting the abalone resource.  In theory, this would not decrease the TAC of 
current rightsholders, yet it would increase the participation of new entrants at the 
same time as decreasing the overall TAC (which included illicit catch).  As they state: 
‘this approach should address the issue of transformation as well as remedy the 
alienation from the formal economy by poor black coastal communities, and, above 
all, place the management of the abalone resource on a sound basis’ (ARHA 2001: 2).   
 
Although this proposal was groundbreaking in its approach to negotiate between the 
informal and formal fisheries, it did explicitly state that the success of the proposal 
was dependent on new entrants ‘renouncing all involvement in illegal harvesting’ and 
actively participating in the protection of the resource (ARHA 2001: 6).  It recognised 
the need to bring on board informal fishers with a stake in the resource at the same 
time as alienating, and actively eliminating, the role of gangs and organised crime.  
There was a strong sense at the time, amongst formal and informal fishers, that the 
means were in place to make this happen (Hauck 2000). Unfortunately, however, 
there was no response to this proposal from MCM, resulting in the collapse of 
negotiations and fuelling animosity towards government.  Reflecting on this proposal 
six years on, many stakeholders involved in the process expressed significant 
frustration.  As one abalone rightsholder explained: ‘things could have turned out so 
differently. I have a quota but many people I know don’t.  The 2001 proposal had all 
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the key people on board and that was our chance to turn things around and give 
people ownership’ (A19). 
 
4.2  The Abalone Policy of 2003 and its Implementation 
 
The abalone policy of 2003 (DEAT 2003), which established the parameters for the 
‘long-term’ (10 year) rights allocation, proposed a new management plan for the 
abalone fishery that was considered a ‘radical shift’ forward (DEAT 2003: 3). It 
clearly stated that current management strategies had ‘failed to effectively curb 
poaching’ and that the abalone resource ‘has been seriously overfished and it has 
collapsed’ (DEAT 2003: 3).  Indeed, this policy was a progressive way forward as it 
introduced the concept of co-management, recognised ecosystem impacts (the 
importance of managing the migration of west coast rock lobster into key abalone 
areas), suspended the recreational fishery in the interests of sustaining commercial 
livelihoods, established a system of ten year rights and initiated a TURF system.  
 
Underpinning these policy decisions were the key objectives of instilling a sense of 
ownership amongst rights holders, ensuring cooperative management of the abalone 
resource, ensuring the long term viability of the fishery and sustaining employment 
(DEAT 2003). The possibility of closing the fishery was highlighted in the policy and 
this was identified as one of three management options to be considered.  The other 
two options included maintaining the status quo or implementing a TURF system, 
whereby the abalone harvesting area would be divided into zones and allocated to 
adjacent rightsholders (see Figure 5.10).  This TURF concept has been implemented 
successfully in Chile since the early-1990s, whereby local fisher organisations were 
allocated specific geographical areas to fish.  It is argued that this approach created a 
sense of ‘ownership’ over the fishing area and encouraged the concept of co-
management, where fishers, independent scientists and government collaborated 
together to manage and protect the fishery resources (Gallardo 2008, Castilla et al. 
2007, Morenzo et al. 2007; Gelcich et al. 2005). 
 
Although MCM adopted the third option of the TURF system, the policy clearly 
highlighted concern for the future of the fishery and advocated the need to sustain 
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fishers’ livelihoods.  Closure of the recreational fishery, for example, was justified in 
the policy by stating that it was more important to sustain the commercial fishery at a 
time when the resource was being overexploited and people’s livelihoods were under 
threat (DEAT 2003).  Further, the policy indicated that the Abalone Processing 
Factories’ (APF’s) rights would expire after three years. MCM had attempted to 
maintain the APFs interests in the abalone fishery through the processing and 
marketing of abalone at the same time as potentially reallocating this TAC (225t) to 
other rightsholders.  Furthermore, this policy explicitly stated that a co-management 
process would be initiated with rightsholders in each TURF in order to manage the 
resource cooperatively. 
 
                      




Although this policy embraced a number of principles that ought to have enhanced the 
management of the abalone fishery, there are significant obstacles that minimised the 
effectiveness of the policy. One key issue has been the ineffective implementation of 
the TURF system due to the sharing of some zones between rightsholders, instead of 
ensuring exclusive use by those living adjacent to the zone.  From the very start, the 
zone with the largest number of rightsholders (Zone C with 152 divers and 14 diver 
entities) had only an 8t TAC in the 2003/4 season.  Zone D, on the other hand, was 
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also allocated 8t, but had only 15 divers and three diver entities and Zone B was 
allocated 145t with 28 divers, five diver entities and five APFs.  As a result, it was 
necessary to ‘share’ zones, in order for rightsholders (particularly in Zone C) to 
benefit by diving in adjacent secondary zones.  However, the non-exclusivity of the 
secondary zones removed the most important objective of the management strategy – 
a sense of ownership.  Although MCM supported the policy on paper, they were in an 
unenviable position whereby the largest number of abalone fishers (both historical and 
informal) were concentrated in Zone C, but this was the very area where informal 
fishing was concentrated and where the resource was over-exploited.  In 1998 there 
was already a 90% cut in the TAC allocation to Zone C, with current resource 
modelling indicating low recruitment levels (less than 5%) in this area (ASWG 2007).  
Thus, the policy was initiated at a time when the resource was already in a state of 
crisis. 
 
A second key concern was the lack of consultation and engagement with the 
stakeholders in the abalone fishery in order to develop meaningful co-management 
arrangements.  A jointly agreed strategy to implement the TURF system (with the 
identified stakeholders) was never put in place and there was minimal budget and 
capacity within MCM to establish co-management.  This lack of consultation with the 
fishers, coupled with annual cuts in the TAC, further alienated them from 
management, despite a progressive policy on paper. 
 
Finally, the underlying principles of the abalone policy were further questioned when 
drastic measures were taken to officially close the abalone fishery.  The Minister 
announced the immediate closure of the abalone fishery in October 2007, but due to 
significant protests by a wide diversity of stakeholders, agreed to reopen the fishery 
for a final season, but with a significantly reduced TAC (75t, as opposed to 125t the 
previous year).  The reduction in the TAC was targeted specifically at Zones A and B, 
with no reduction in Zones E and G (see Figure 5.10). Immediate conflict in the 
industry emerged as rightsholders debated the allocation of this TAC.  At a meeting in 
November 2007, MCM encouraged an equitable cut in the TAC of all rightsholders in 
order to sustain employment for the vast majority of those living in Zones A to D.  
However, the rightsholders in Zones E and G argued that this decision contradicted 
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the TURF policy. They claimed that ownership over their zone, and the fact that they 
had managed it sustainably, would be compromised by now reallocating areas of their 
zone to other rightsholders.  Furthermore, they argued that the incentive has now been 
removed from them to protect their area, as not only has their individual quota been 
reduced, but their zone is no longer allocated solely to adjacent rightsholders 
(Industry-MCM meeting 27 November 2007).  Thus, despite a potential ‘radical shift 
forward’ in the abalone policy of 2003, implementation challenges proved 
complicated from the beginning to the end. 
 
4.3  CITES 
 
The international demand for abalone and its impact on South African trade has not 
been adequately researched or understood over the years.  Preliminary attempts to do 
so have been undertaken by TRAFFIC-Southern Africa, a wildlife trade monitoring 
network, which has identified some interesting trade dynamics.  These have included 
an assessment of Hong Kong import data, which has indicated a far greater import of 
South African abalone as opposed to that indicated by South African export data 
(indicating a significant illicit trade), a greater understanding of the role of farmed 
abalone on the trade in wild abalone (which has less of an effect than was anticipated 
due to the different taste) and an analysis of abalone trade routes, which have 
highlighted the role of other southern African countries in laundering South African 
abalone (pers comm. M. Bürgener, TRAFFIC-Southern Africa 2007).   
 
This information has led to the increased realisation of the need to incorporate trade 
and market information into governance arrangements for the fishery and has led to 
the listing of South African abalone (haliotis midae) on Appendix III of CITES.  As 
Willock et al. (2004) explain: ‘with trade in perlemoen [abalone] being almost entirely 
international it has accordingly become necessary to explore the use of tools that 
would involve the assistance of consumer States in tackling illegal trade in the 
species’ (p. 30). Through CITES, which is an international agreement between 
governments to ensure that species are not threatened by international trade, controls 
are put in place, trade is authorised through a permitting system and species are listed 
on one of three Appendices depending on the level of protection that is required 
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(Willock et al. 2004). The listing of abalone on Appendix III, the least stringent 
Appendix, took place in May 2007.  
 
Although no formal evaluation of the impact of the CITES listing has yet been 
conducted, concerns are highlighted by assessing Hong Kong import data. This 
information indicates that even after abalone was listed on CITES there were abalone 
imports from Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, none of which are abalone-
producing countries (Raemaekers et al. in prep; pers comm. M. Bürgener, TRAFFIC). 
Further, there is speculation that abalone CITES permits are being ‘recycled’ due to 
permits not being properly endorsed by DEAT before exporting (pers comm. M. 
Bürgener, TRAFFIC).  As a result, there are a number of administrative procedures 
within the South African authorities that need to be addressed, as well as increased 
awareness of the abalone CITES listing in importing countries. 
 
4.4  Law Enforcement in the Abalone Fishery 
 
From the outset, a key strategy of government to address the informal fishery has been 
to increase law enforcement. This focus on law enforcement has intensified in 
response to the increasingly organised informal fishing network, with MCM directing 
efforts to increase its capacity in terms of investigation, establish partnerships with 
other law enforcement agencies, devolve compliance responsibility to the local level 
and second specialised prosecutors to focus on serious marine offences (like abalone).  
 
The presence and/or absence of law enforcement authorities has been a critical issue 
discussed by all stakeholders in this research.  Irrespective of each individual’s 
standpoint, there is overwhelming recognition of the important and necessary role of 
effective law enforcement in governing the abalone fishery and influencing the 
behaviour of both formal and informal fishers.  Methods of achieving effectiveness, 
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4.4.1  Operation Neptune 
 
A focussed law enforcement strategy targeted specifically at the abalone fishery began 
in 1999.  With the increased pressure on fishery control officers at MCM to address 
marine poaching, and with the realisation that they did not have the capacity to 
intervene in criminal networks, a co-operative policing venture was initiated with the 
South African Police Service (SAPS). This venture, known as Operation Neptune, 
was initiated as a means to curtail abalone poaching on the southwest coast, and also 
included partnerships with the navy. Operation Neptune was implemented as a direct 
response to outcries from coastal communities, environmental organisations and 
community policing forums along the southwest coast that blatant poaching in their 
areas needed to be addressed. Thus, the operation was initially implemented for six 
months but was then extended, off and on, until early 2005. 
With a budget that began at approximately R1.5 million in 1999 (Hauck and Hector 
2000), it increased to R4.5 million in 2004/5 (Hara et al. 2005) and focussed on two 
key objectives over this time. The first, which was the priority focus, was to engage in 
proactive policing that increased law enforcement visibility along the coast and 
deterred informal fishers from entering the sea. This was a direct attempt to protect 
the marine resources from further decimation. The second was to react to known 
informal fishing by making the necessary arrests and seizures and by gathering 
effective intelligence.  A preliminary evaluation of Operation Neptune in 2000 
indicated some positive spin-offs, such as greater law enforcement visibility along the 
coast, increased sense of security within coastal communities and increased 
coordination between law enforcement agencies (Hauck and Hector 2000).  However, 
some key concerns were also identified that included corruption, insufficient 
interaction with broader stakeholder groups (such as fishers) and the lack of a long-
term strategy that linked with broader management interventions.  Further, evidence 
seemed to indicate that although Operation Neptune disrupted some poaching activity, 
the informal fishery simply changed its modus operandi and moved to new areas 
(Hauck and Hector 2000).  
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4.4.2  Delegation of compliance authority  
In addition to Operation Neptune, MCM made a significant decision in 2003 to 
delegate compliance authority (largely related to the abalone fishery) to a local 
municipality where the informal trade was flourishing, and where an important 
Marine Protected Area was located.  In recognising their inability to address the 
informal fishery, and the potential effectiveness of local level decision-making, MCM 
agreed to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Overstrand 
Municipality to implement a pilot project. The Overstrand municipality was unique in 
having a well capacitated conservation department, as well as a committed NGO, 
Seawatch, which had been operational for many years. The municipality initiated the 
Management Action for Resources of Inshore and Nearshore Environments 
(MARINEs) and embarked on an agreement with MCM to become the service 
provider for fisheries compliance and awareness in its area.  
Following a successful one year pilot programme, a three year contract was signed, 
financed from the MLRF. As a result, the MARINEs grew from a staff contingent of 
eight in 2003 to 45 in 2005 and a budget from R900 000 in 2003 to R4.5 million in 
2005 (Hauck and Kroese 2006). According to their contract with MCM, they were 
responsible for compliance within the boundaries of the Overstrand municipality 
(largely encapsulating commercial abalone zones A-D), and their activities included 
24 hour visibility, patrols and rapid response, slipway control, follow-up of cases, 
awareness-raising, liaison with schools and communities and co-ordination with other 
departments and organisations (such as Seawatch and the SAPS).  Further devolution 
of authority was given to South African National Parks, through Table Mountain 
National Park in the Cape Peninsula, to assist with fisheries compliance in this area. 
These initiatives coincided with the development of a special investigative unit within 
MCM, to focus on serious marine offences and to strategically collaborate with other 
law enforcement agencies such as the South African National Defence Force, 
particularly the navy and air force, the Department of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Unit 
and Directorate Special Operations (known as the Scorpions). This led to increased 
capacity and effort being placed into law enforcement efforts within MCM (Hauck 
and Kroese 2006). 
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A further attempt, in 2004, to enhance law enforcement even more in the abalone 
harvesting area of the Western Cape, was through the proposed implementation of 
Operation Trident (MCM 2004).  This was part of an ‘Abalone Protection Plan’, 
which took a broader approach to the abalone fishery but particularly emphasised the 
need to establish more effective law enforcement strategies (MCM 2004).  The budget 
for Operation Trident included ongoing support for the MARINES (with a team of 45-
50 members) and was estimated at approximately R28.5 million (MCM 2004).  In 
2006, however, MCM terminated the MOU with the MARINES (which was seen as 
highly controversial), arguing that personnel would be amalgamated into MCM 
structures.  This had significant repercussions, particularly in terms of a loss in the 
number of personnel, due to officers being widely distributed to MCM compliance 
stations, as well as a disintegration of the co-ordination that had existed between the 
regions (A45, A46, A47, A49, A59).   
4.4.3  Environmental Court 
 
A further key development related to law enforcement was the establishment of South 
Africa’s first environmental court in February 2003, co-funded by DEAT and the 
Department of Justice, created primarily to target abalone-related offences (Snijman 
2005). A special court was justified on the grounds that abalone cases had a low 
priority in the justice system, the conviction rate was very low (estimated at 10%) and 
sentences were generally lenient (Snijman 2005). It was argued that effective 
prosecution and punishment of offenders was important to support the efforts of law 
enforcement agencies to improve deterrence (Snijman 2005). With two specialist 
prosecutors employed by MCM, knowledge of marine offences was high and 
challenges were made to loopholes in legislation. In its first 18 months, the court 
finalised 166 cases, effectively disposing of the previous backlog, with a conviction 
rate of 75%, achieved through a process of plea bargaining where appropriate.  This 
court, however, was closed in 2006.  The national Department of Justice had taken a 
decision to close a number of specialist courts in order to streamline costs.  Although 
this decision was not widely supported by personnel in DEAT, MCM retained its own 
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4.4.4  Law Enforcement Challenges 
The closure of the environmental court, the amalgamation of the MARINES into 
MCM, and the growth of the informal fishery led to high levels of despondency and 
frustration amongst the formal fishery, coastal communities and law enforcement 
authorities.  The overall assessment of law enforcement over the past decade is that it 
has been inadequate and ineffective.  All stakeholders outside of the informal fishery 
argue that a key factor to the growing illicit trade is ad hoc law enforcement, which 
has resulted in insufficient risk of detection.  Although law enforcement strategies 
have evolved over the years, particularly in relation to intelligence-based 
investigations, informal fishing continues on a regular basis along the coast.   
As one respondent stated: 
‘I called in MCM because there was poaching in the marine reserve.  They 
arrived but didn’t have access to a boat…so the poachers basically waved at us 
and carried on with what they were doing’ (Formal abalone fisher A37). 
The consensus is that the informal abalone trade is ‘easy money’ because the risks are 
low.  It is estimated that about 17% of illicit activity is detected (Plagányi 2007b), and 
the costs incurred by arrests and confiscations are the ‘costs of doing business’ (A35).   
 
Many law enforcement authorities argue that there is a lack of capacity to implement 
law enforcement effectively, which translates to not enough personnel and equipment. 
Although a focus has been on strengthening investigative capacity to target organised 
middlemen and utilising legal instruments to prosecute money laundering offences 
(Hauck and Kroese 2006), the informal fishery has adapted and continued to grow 
over time.  In his assessment of the challenges of combating the illicit trade of abalone 
in South Africa, Steinberg (2005) states that ‘if there is a single lesson to be learned 
from current experience, it is that the key to any enforcement strategy is to keep the 
resource in the water’ (p. 12). 
 
This objective, to deter informal fishers from entering the water, was considered key 
to both Operation Neptune and the Overstrand MARINES (DEAT 2004b). The 
MARINEs, for example, created a 24-hour presence through shift work, and one of 
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their indicators for success was the number of divers they deterred from entering the 
water.  Although it was impossible for them to be everywhere, all of the time, they 
claim to have significantly decreased poaching incidents from previous months and 
years (MARINEs 2003, 2004).  In a survey conducted in 2005, respondents living in 
the MARINEs area stated that the risk of getting caught was ‘high’ as opposed to 
other areas, where respondents stated that the risk was low (Hauck et al. 2005). 
 
However, interviews with informal fishers indicate that increased law enforcement 
will never eradicate the illicit trade.  Key to this argument is corruption.  Many stories 
abound about corrupt law enforcement agents, with informal fishers arguing that they 
could not work without it.  One key informant explained that in some organised 
fishing operations, divers are expected to pay R1000 each to law enforcement officers 
in order to ‘turn a blind eye’ (A34). This easily equates to a month’s salary in one 
night.  Similar rewards are offered for transporting abalone in official vehicles, which 
is particularly attractive to station-level personnel who are paid poorly (Anon 2004).  
Although law enforcement agencies are aware of the allegations, they claim that it is 
difficult to identify witnesses to testify in court (A45).  Nevertheless, some high 
profile cases of corruption have been uncovered (Hauck and Kroese 2006), including 
three MARINEs, who were arrested with abalone in their possession and 
consequently suspended. The MARINEs then instituted a lie detector test for future 
applicants, which resulted in 8 of 30 applicants in 2003 withdrawing their applications 
(A46). 
 
One key informant, who is currently a right holder but who had historically been 
actively involved in the informal trade, explained in great detail the role of corruption 
at high levels in government.  He stated that many of the informal fishers in the 1990s 
had a military background, which meant that they had contacts in high places.  He was 
personally involved in a number of transactions involving hundreds of thousands of 
Rand that enabled them to continue to trade on the black market.  He clearly stated 
that there was no political will to disable the informal trade because ‘too many people, 
at high levels in government, are benefiting from illegal abalone’ (A28). Thus, 
corruption has a significant crippling effect on law enforcement strategies. 
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Interestingly, despite all the challenges that were highlighted in terms of law 
enforcement, there was still recognition that law enforcement was needed.  Key to this 
statement, however, was the need to ensure that law enforcement was implemented in 
conjunction with other strategies that created incentives to comply. The perceived 
illegitimacy of access rights and management decisions (to be discussed below) 
weakened potential partnerships that could have developed between the fishers and 
government.  An expectation of government was that formal fishers would ‘protect’ 
their areas from informal fishing, following the allocation of long-term rights (DEAT 
2003).  However, ongoing decreases in the TAC have largely removed the incentive 
for formal fishers to comply as quotas became economically unviable and the future 
of the fishery was uncertain.  Even for those who argue that fishers should still protect 
what they have, it is difficult to do so when the informal fishery grows with little 
mitigation from government.   
 
In communities where people fished together historically in the informal fishery, and 
where some now have quotas and others don’t, there is the sentiment that ‘we don’t 
pimp’ (A28). Even when rightsholders acknowledge the negative impact of the illicit 
trade on the formal fishery, they explain their lack of cooperation with law 
enforcement through four key responses: (1) everyone knows each other and/or are 
related so it is difficult to go to the police; (2) there is empathy with the socio-
economic circumstances of some of the informal fishers; (3) there is no trust in law 
enforcement authorities due to corruption; and (4) there are high levels of fear due to 
the involvement of gangs and organised crime.  As a result, by expecting formal 
fishers to cooperate with law enforcement, without addressing some of the 
fundamental issues relating to the fishery, is considered unrealistic: ‘you need 
everyone involved around the table to make this fishery viable. Law enforcement is 
just one aspect of it’ (A28).  
 
4.5  Analysis  of Management Approach and Consultation 
The management of the abalone fishery has been described by most stakeholders as a 
‘failure’.  This is largely due to the perceived growth of the informal fishery over the 
past decade and the inadequate strategic focus of MCM to manage the fishery.  One 
assessment of the fishery in 2003 clearly stated that ‘the current management system 
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is inefficient; it is reactive rather than proactive, over-stretched and inadequate’ 
(Cederrand 2003). More recently, frustration with the management of the fishery has 
escalated due to the announcement in October 2007 to ban the commercial fishery 
with effect from February 2008 (DEAT 2007a). 
 
The most significant concern related to all aspects of management over the years has 
been the alienation of broad stakeholder groups (including the formal fishery) in 
management decision-making.  This has resulted in a top-down approach that has 
engendered mistrust and outright animosity towards MCM by the various 
stakeholders.  This was already discussed in relation to the rights allocation process 
and the abalone policy of 2003.  Although attempts were made to legitimise informal 
fishers through the subsistence and limited commercial rights allocation process, the 
approach, and means with which this was done, was problematic and resulted in bona 
fide fishers still being excluded from the fishery. Similarly, although the abalone 
policy was progressive in its attempt to institute co-management and a TURF system, 
its implementation had largely excluded the key stakeholder groups.  Fishers received 
little assistance from MCM to establish local institutional structures nor to coordinate 
the policy with law enforcement strategies.  Although some meetings took place every 
year to discuss new permit conditions, and the allocation of a decreasing TAC, the 
sentiment was that this was a far cry from cooperatively managing the resource.   
 
Further frustration relating to participation and consultation has emerged due to the 
fishers’ involvement in the Abalone Scientific Working Group (ASWG). Although 
acknowledging the importance of this consultation, the fishers’ frustration peaked at 
the end of 2006 when a jointly agreed recommendation for the 2006/7 abalone TAC 
was overturned by other scientists at MCM.  The ‘revised’ recommendation was 
submitted to the Minister under the auspices of the Abalone Scientific Working 
Group, with the closure of key commercial zones.  This led to an outcry by the formal 
fishery that questioned the process of consultation and decision-making, highlighting 
themselves as ‘tokens’ to make a process seem consultative when it really wasn’t.   
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To fuel the animosity in the formal fishery, the same process happened again for the 
TAC recommendations for the 2007/8 season, which were particularly controversial 
due to the threat of closure of the fishery.  In this case, although a separate document 
was submitted to the Minister from MCM scientists, it was identical to the report of 
the ASWG, except for very important deletions of key sentences and paragraphs 
relating to the socio-economic issues of the formal fishers, and the feasibility of a 
viable fishery if the informal trade was decreased. In fact, one of the sentences that 
was deleted in the final report to the Minister was: ‘Closure of the commercial fishery, 
in the absence of a revised compliance approach and community buy-in, cannot result 
in resource recovery, and could worsen poaching’ (ASWG 2007: 14).  These two 
reports served as evidence for a court case initiated by the formal fishers to challenge 
the closure of the fishery, and to highlight the lack of consultation related to this 
decision (Anon 2007).   
 
Fourth, in addition to top-down decision-making, another key issue related to 
management is that of institutional arrangements.  Related to the issue above was the 
lack of local, regional and national institutional structures to facilitate the cooperative 
management of the fishery.  Even though compliance functions were delegated to 
local institutions (Overberg Municipality and Table Mountain National Park), these 
activities were separated from management responsibilities and decision-making, 
which led to a fragmented approach to the management of the fishery (A46, A50).  
Law enforcement authorities in both of these institutions highlighted the obstacles 
related to enforcing rules and regulations that were not considered legitimate by the 
stakeholders, but yet they were not in a position to influence decision-making.  
Further, despite the co-management objectives of the Abalone Policy of 2003, there 
were no institutional changes in MCM to facilitate the implementation of extension 
officers and social research, both of which are considered key to initiating co-
management arrangements (Hauck and Sowman 2003). In fact, an examination of 
MCM’s budget at the time indicates that there were no funds directly allocated to the 
implementation of the policy, which required extensive institutional change and 
strategic development at both zonal and regional levels (Hauck et al. 2005).   
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4.5.1  The Closure of the Commercial Fishery 
It is necessary to discuss the rationale behind government’s decision to close the 
commercial fishery as it clearly highlights problems with the approach to management 
that has been adopted by MCM.  Closure of the fishery has been discussed for many 
years, with researchers highlighting the critical state of the resource and fear of 
commercial collapse as far back as 2000 (Tarr 2000).  Even the Abalone Policy of 
2003 highlighted total closure of the fishery as one of three options for management.  
In 2006 the Minister requested a legal assessment of the potential closure of the 
fishery (Daniels et al. 2006) as well as an internal department review of the abalone 
fishery to assess the status of the fishery (DEAT 2006).  During these assessments, 
although the formal fishery was aware of the threat, there were no active attempts by 
MCM to engage with fishers to strategically plan for the future of the fishery.  Even in 
mid-2007, when the threat of closure was imminent, there had not been one abalone 
management meeting between the rightsholders and MCM.  Further, the formal 
fishers were notified of the ban through the national media, and not through a direct 
consultation. 
 
The rationale given by MCM for the ban on commercial fishing is highly 
controversial.  Independent scientists, who are involved in stock assessments for the 
abalone scientific working group, indicate through their models that a sustainable 
abalone fishery is still possible if the informal offtake was reduced (ASWG 2007). 
The size of the informal fishery, as opposed to the commercial fishery, is highlighted 
in Table 5.4 below: 
Zone A B C D E F G Total 
Recommended TAC for 
2007/08 
0 75 0 0 12 20 18 125 
Last TAC (2006/07) 0 75 0 0 12 20 18 125 
Poaching Est imates 
(2006/07) 
578 248 0 101 1.4 Unknown 8 936.4 
 
Table 5.3:  Recommendations for the Total Allowable Catches (in tons) for each 
zone for the 2007/8 season. The previous season's figures are given in the middle row 
and estimates for current levels of poaching in the last row (ASWG 2007): 
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In their report to the Minister, for the 2007/08 TAC recommendations, the ASWG 
explicitly state:  
‘…were it possible to immediately reduce current estimated [poaching] levels 
by half, then commercial catches of 25t in Zone A and 100t in Zone B are 
estimated to be sustainable. Note further than should poaching be reduced 
immediately to zero, then it is estimated that commercial catches of 400t and 
300t would be sustainable for Zones A and B, respectively…’ (ASWG 2007: 8 
– sentence deleted from second report).  
 
Thus, there are questions about the rationale of alienating the formal fishery (and 
jeopardising legitimate livelihoods) as opposed to strategically assessing a means to 
minimise the informal fishery.  It is argued by members of the formal fishery that the 
decision to close commercial harvesting due to an over-exploited resource is 
illegitimate when an informal fishery continues to thrive.  As one rightsholder stated: 
‘they are closing us down in order to provide more abalone for the poachers!’ (A39).   
 
Working group meetings consistently highlighted the rightsholders’ concerns about 
MCM’s approach to managing the abalone fishery.  As one zonal representative 
clearly stated: ‘we shouldn’t be assuming that poaching will stay the same, and 
therefore we must decrease the legal TAC. We are tackling this problem from the 
wrong angle. We should be asking, “how much does poaching need to decrease in 
order to have a sustainable fishery?” Then we make a plan’ (A23, ASWG meeting 20 
August 2007). Interestingly, this similar sentiment was discussed in a document 
developed by DEAT in 2004 entitled ‘Abalone Protection Plan’, which states that 
‘closure of the abalone fishery would not ensure the recovery of the abalone stock, 
because illegal exploitation will not stop’ (p. 2).  Further, it recognises that the 
commercial fishery can only be sustained if poaching is reduced by half, therefore 
requiring law enforcement to be trebled, which then outlines the rationale for 
Operation Trident.  However, as discussed earlier, Operation Trident and the 
MARINEs were disbanded in 2005.  Ironically, the Minister stated in his press release 
that they would increase law enforcement in order to effectively enforce the ban 
(DEAT 2007a).  This again caused an outcry from the formal fishers, who questioned 
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why law enforcement had not been increased earlier, with the aim to protect and 
sustain the livelihoods of commercial fishers.  Thus, the decision by the Minister to 
ban the commercial fishery clearly highlights the centralised approach that has been 
taken by government to manage this fishery, which has alienated the majority of 
stakeholders from taking management responsibility. 
 
5. KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING COMPLIANCE IN THE 
ABALONE FISHERY 
Non-compliance in the abalone fishery has highlighted the complexity of fisheries 
management, as well as the diversity of factors that influence behaviour, how they 
interrelate and how they change over time.  By drawing on the preliminary conceptual 
framework introduced in Chapter Three (Figure 3.2), this section will provide an 
overview of the key factors that are influencing compliance behaviour. Critical to an 
understanding of the evolution of the informal abalone fishery are the political and 
historical factors, which are encapsulated in the preliminary conceptual framework as 
power and law.  Originating as a small-scale fishery in coastal communities, there is a 
history of abalone harvesting as a source of food and basic income.  As an 
international market emerged, and with catches reaching a peak in the mid-1960s, 
increased state regulations were put in place to limit harvesting.  As a result, small-
scale fishers were increasingly marginalised from this fishery.  Although some 
abalone fishers remained as divers for the five big companies, they argued that they 
were exploited (Hauck 1997), and fought for their own individual rights during the 
fisheries transformation process in the mid-1990s.   
 
From an institutional perspective, the policies and laws that were put in place to 
allocate rights, and manage the fishery, held little legitimacy in the eyes of the 
traditional fishers.  Even though some of these policies adopted a more integrated 
approach to management, and led to important developments such as the reallocation 
of rights and the initiation of a TURF system, many small-scale fishers remained 
excluded. Further, with an increased concern over declining stocks, broader 
approaches to management were abandoned in favour of stricter and harsher law 
enforcement.  Figure 5.11, compiled by Raemaekers et al. (in prep), glaringly makes 
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this point.  Despite the rationale by the state to close the abalone fishery (ignoring the 
social, political and economic repercussions), and arguing that the resource can no 
longer sustain a commercial fishery, the fact remains that an informal fishery 
continues to harvest large quantities of abalone. 
 
Figure 5.11: ‘Legal and illegal abalone fisheries landings. All data is represented as 
whole mass abalone. Legal take is the sum of commercial, subsistence, limited 
commercial and estimated recreational landings. Illegal take is the combination of 
modelling estimates by Plagányi and Butterworth (in prep.) and Raemaekers and Britz 
(in prep.) for the Western and Eastern Cape respectively. ‘Asian data’ represents 
available abalone import data (live, fresh or chilled; frozen, dried and canned; all 
weights were converted to whole mass) into Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Mainland 
China from South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe for the period 2000 
to August 2007. This represents only the available data. Estimates of illegal take for 
the zones E –G in the Western Cape were not included, as well as the abalone 
aquaculture production which was 104 tons in 2000 and steadily increased to 900 tons 
in 2007’ (Raemaekers et al. in prep) 
 
 
The fact that the informal traditional fishery had never been effectively formalised in 
the late 1990s, and that strong institutional structures were not adequately put in place 
to jointly manage the fishery (despite supportive policies), many small-scale fishers 
continued to be alienated.  Further, despite increased attempts at law enforcement, 
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these initiatives received very little social support.  The decision to close the fishery, 
particularly in light of the graph above, further heightened the animosity towards the 
state, and fuelled ongoing informal harvesting. 
 
Inequitable laws, the failure of institutional structures and economic incentives, were 
all key drivers of the informal syndicates.  The international market for abalone 
significantly injected financial rewards into abalone harvesting.  In the early 1990s, 
when most traditional fishers did not have access to the abalone fishery, the informal 
trade became a lucrative economic opportunity.  Outsiders were also attracted to this 
easy money, and they perceived the abalone trade as largely risk-free.  Although there 
was no local support for people entering the fishery as a means to ‘get rich’, or to 
contribute to other criminal activities, there was little trust in law enforcement. 
Further, this expansion of the informal fishery to include gangs, drug merchants and 
other opportunists led to a situation whereby weak social controls had little impact. 
 
Thus, it is also critical to understand the social factors in the context of this fishery.  
The informal traditional fishery emerged as a highly accepted livelihood strategy 
within coastal communities, due to the perceived exclusion and marginalisation of 
traditional fishers.  As a result, fishers and the broader community did not engage in 
informal controls or sanctions to mitigate these activities.  Although there was some 
conflict in the mid-1990s with those abalone divers working with the big companies 
(who likely perceived some incentive to protect the resource), this conflict became 
minimal as everyone equally fought for legal access during the rights allocation 
process.  Further, even after rights were re-distributed, many people were still 
excluded, which caused divisions in the communities and made it difficult for fishers 
to sanction people that they knew.  These social conflicts were significant, and were 
not adequately recognised by the state, which expected the abalone rightsholders to 
‘defend’ their TURF after the 2003 policy was implemented.  Further, with high 
levels of corruption, and the intrusion of ‘outsiders’ into the communities as a means 
to gain access to this lucrative trade, local fishers and fisher families found it 
increasingly difficult to ‘protect’ their zones from informal fishers.  This expectation 
of the state, however, further exacerbated already high levels of animosity as 
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rightsholders felt that they were not receiving the support that they needed to ensure 
the sustainability of the fishery. 
 
Finally, the biophysical aspects of the abalone fishery need to be mentioned.  
Although the underlying drivers of non-compliance are not directly related to the 
natural system, it is an important aspect of management that needs to be recognised, 
particularly in terms of how it affects fisher behaviour.  For example, the migration of 
the rock lobster resource to key abalone areas (Zones C and D) has exacerbated the 
poor recruitment of abalone and negatively impacted on the TAC in these areas.  This 
was problematic for the abalone policy of 2003 as the TURF for Zone C had the 
largest number of rightsholders despite the fact that the resource was in a state of 
crisis.  This contributed to the ‘sharing’ of zones in the implementation of the policy, 
as well as the migration of the informal fishery to other areas.  Thus, the natural 
processes affecting the fishery need to be incorporated into a broader understanding of 
why fishers are adopting particular harvesting strategies. 
 
The factors highlighted above have significantly influenced the transition of the 
abalone fishery to one which is controlled and driven by an illicit market.  The fact 
that the fishery has been commercially closed, despite evidence of a thriving informal 
trade, indicates that the current management approach is flawed.  By focussing on law 
enforcement to ‘solve’ the informal trade not only ignores the underlying drivers, but 
exacerbates divisions between the state and coastal communities.  As a result, despite 
the closure, the underlying factors that are fuelling the informal fishery remain. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The abalone fishery has evolved from a traditional, politically-driven informal fishery 
to a highly organised fishery dominated by a lucrative illicit international trade. This 
is a complex fishery to manage, and MCM has not been faced with easy decisions, 
particularly amidst a rapidly declining resource. Attempts to manage the fishery have 
been varied and some progressive policies on paper have emerged, which have 
adopted more integrated approaches to management.  For example, the Abalone 
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Policy (DEAT 2003) and Abalone Protection Plan (DEAT 2004b) clearly highlighted 
the need to enhance strategic law enforcement in conjunction with the TURF system, 
with particular emphasis on sustaining employment in the fishery and building local 
level co-management institutions. Even in DEAT’s assessment of the fishery, prior to 
the decision to ban the commercial fishery, emphasis was placed on the development 
of a comprehensive strategy to build co-operation in the areas of resource 
management, socio-economic development and law enforcement (DEAT 2006).  
However, the process (including institutional support and budget) to develop and 
implement such a strategy with all key stakeholder groups had never materialised.   
 
The most recent, and critical, decision by MCM to close the commercial fishery, 
however, highlights a more centralised approach to management. MCM holds the 
power to make decisions, and does so in isolation of the involvement of those who 
depend on the fishery.  Although the abalone fishery is an extreme example of a high 
value fishery, embroiled in organised crime, it brings to light key drivers of 
compliance that need to be considered.  All key informants in the research clearly 
stated the missed opportunity in the late 1990s for government to engage with both 
formal and informal fishers, a time when the future of the fishery could have taken a 
radically different turn.  Although impossible to predict, the approach by fishers to 
explore alternative management strategies during that time clearly highlighted the 
need to embrace a wide diversity of factors that were influencing the fishery.  
 
A key factor in the evolution of this fishery has been the perceived illegitimacy of 
MCM, and its decisions.  As a result, the formal fishery has not been effectively 
managed while the informal fishery has not been effectively recognised, resulting in 
inappropriate strategies to address non-compliance.  Key to this has been the 
reluctance on the side of MCM to engage and understand the informal traditional 
fishers as a legitimate stakeholder group.  As a result, both the formal and informal 
fishers have been alienated from management, with incentives to comply consistently 
eroded over time.  This chaotic state of affairs has led to the autocratic decision to 
close the fishery, despite historical claims to the abalone resource and legitimate 
livelihoods.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER FISHERY: 







West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) is one of four lobster species in South Africa, and 
one of two commercial species. The WCRL fishery targets the species Jasus lalandii, 
which is distributed close to shore (<200m depth) and was historically located largely 
on the west coast (from Namibia to the Cape of Good Hope – see Figure 6.1).  
Commercial exploitation began in 1875 with the establishment of a Cape Town 
processing factory, but archaeological evidence suggests that there is a long history of 
resource use dating back to pre-Colonial times (Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005). 
While the European export market began to develop in the late 1800s, rock lobster 
was locally considered ‘a food for the poor’, and was an important source of protein 
for poor coastal communities (van Sittert 1994, Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005).  
Further, WCRL was used as bait for other fishing activities and was thus harvested 
prolifically.  A high local demand for WCRL, for both consumption and bait, led to a 
thriving customary, or traditional, fishery (van Sittert 1994). 
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Figure 6.1: The historical distribution of the WCRL (Jasus lalandii) fishery in South 
Africa, prior to the southerly migration of the species in the early 1990s  
(adapted from Johnston and Butterworth 2005) 
 
The growing export trade, however, led to increased pressure on the resource with 
catches peaking in the 1950s, but witnessing overall declines in catch rates and Total 
Allowable Catches (TACs) since the 1960s.  The WCRL resource is now said to be 
‘heavily depleted’ (Sauer et al. 2003).  This is largely attributed to the unsustainable 
catches in the first half of the 20th Century, coupled with a significant reduction in the 
growth rate of lobsters since the late 1980s, high levels of non-compliance and 
changes in the distribution of the resource (Cockroft 2007, Cockroft et al. 2008, 
Cockroft and Payne 1999, Sauer et al. 2003).  Concern for the resource led to a state-
driven stock rebuilding strategy in the mid-1990s and an operational management 
procedure (OMP) was implemented from 1997 (Johnston and Butterworth 2005).  
 
However, ongoing political pressure to transform the WCRL fishery, in line with the 
objectives of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA of 1998), has contributed to 
the instability and insecurity in the formal fishery at the same time as facilitating a 
thriving informal trade.  Although the informal lobster fishery has yet to reach the 
sophistication and size of the informal abalone fishery, it is an organised fishery 
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estimated to harvest about 500t per year (Branch et al. 2007), which was 
approximately 22% of the commercial TAC for the 2007/2008 season. With concerns 
over the sustainability of the resource, and annual cuts in the commercial TAC since 
2005, the sentiment is that a crisis is looming.   
 
The WCRL fishery is an important small-scale fishery in South Africa. It is 
considered a ‘high value’ resource (Cockroft et al. 2002, Shannon et al. 2006), which 
has obvious implications in terms of economic development and livelihoods for 
coastal communities, but it also has important customary value due to historical 
resource use.  Thus, this case study clearly highlights the complexity of managing a 
small-scale fishery in which economic incentives to harvest the resource are high, 
historical rights of access are legitimate and formal access rights are limited.  In terms 
of compliance, this is a fishery that has a growing informal trade, exacerbated by 
government’s failed attempts to collaborate fairly with the different fisher groups.  
Furthermore, the collapse of the commercial abalone fishery has resulted in more 
fishers turning to the rock lobster resource as a viable source of income.  Now at a 
critical turning point, an understanding of the overall fishery is necessary to thwart the 
same fate that befell the abalone fishery.   
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the WCRL fishery system, including a 
description of the natural characteristics, socio-economic conditions and management 
arrangements that are operating within the fishery as a whole.  A review of the 
literature, as well as interviews with key informants, provided important information 
and insight into some of the broader issues in the fishery.  More specific data, related 
to the WCRL informal fishery, and the factors that influence compliance, were 
explored through in-depth fieldwork in the coastal community of Hangberg.  Figure 
6.2 highlights the location of Hangberg, which is a traditional fishing community 
located in the greater Cape Town area.  Considered a ‘hot spot’ for lobster ‘poaching’ 
(Branch et al. 2007), this case study provided rich information related to the socio-
economic, political, cultural and institutional factors that influence fisher behaviour.  
This detailed information will be drawn on throughout the chapter to contribute to the 
description of the fishery.  The discussion will then highlight the key factors 
influencing compliance behaviour in the WCRL fishery, focussing on both the 
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broader aspects of the fishery as well as specific issues identified through the 
Hangberg case study site.   
 
Figure 6.2: Map highlighting location of case study site of Hangberg 
 
2. THE NATURAL SYSTEM 
 
The WCRL resource is considered to be under extreme pressure (Cockroft 2007), 
particularly relative to historical catch rates.  The fishery peaked in the early 1950s, 
with catch rates reaching almost 17 000t (Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005).  With 
catches over the past two decades only reaching 10-15% of these peak historical 
landings (see Figure 6.3), scientists are debating the possible causes for these declines. 
In addition to assumptions of over-exploitation and high levels of non-compliance 
(Branch et al. 2007, Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005, Shannon et al. 2006), there 
are a number of ecological issues impacting on the resource. 
 















































































































Figure 6.3: WCRL landings per year up to 2006 (DEAT 2008b) 
 
 
Due to steady declines in catch rates, a TAC was introduced in 1983 and levels of 
harvesting in the 1980s became sustainable at around 3500-4000t, with scientists 
arguing that ‘management measures in place at the time were therefore quite 
obviously adequate and the approach to management seemingly successful’ (Cockroft 
and Payne 1999: 590).  However, after 1989, the stability in the fishery ended, largely 
attributed to significant declines in growth rates, but also affected by the red tides.  
Red tides on the west coast have resulted in mass ‘walkouts’ of lobster due to low-
oxygen water conditions and/or harmful algal blooms, which have led to mass lobster 
mortalities (Shannon et al. 2006). Examples include 60t of lobster being washed 
ashore in 1994 and a staggering 2000t stranded in 1997 (Cockroft and Payne 1999). 
The decrease in resource productivity is argued to be a result of some large scale 
environmental change (Shannon et al. 2006), which also likely led to decreased 
catches.   
 
Another significant ecological change impacting on the WCRL fishery is the 
southward shift in distribution of the resource.  Since the early 1990s, there has been 
an unprecedented migration of lobsters from the west coast to the south coast, which 
has led to the introduction of a new commercial fishery East of Cape Hangklip (Zone 
G) in 2003. Figure 6.4 highlights the change in lobster landings between the different 
zones over time. The major shift that took place in the resource is evident when one 
compares the contribution of the different regions to commercial landings from the 
late-1980s/early-1990s to 2000, the beginning of relative stability: ‘the contribution of 
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the west coast region to total lobster landings declined from about 60% to <10%, 
whereas that of the southern region increased from around 18% to around 60% over 
















































































































Figure 6.4: Percentage contribution of the West Coast, Area 7 and the southern 
coast to the total WCRL landings (Cockroft et al. 2008) 
 
 
The changes in zonal catch rates can be attributed to a gradual shift of WCRL from 
their traditional west coast areas to a more south-easterly distribution (Cockroft et al. 
2008, Shannon et al. 2006).  The reasons for this shift are largely unknown, but are 
thought to be due to environmental factors (such as climate change) rather than 
fishing effort (Shannon et al. 2006).  This shift has also had important socio-economic 
impacts (Cockroft et al. 2008), such as the closure of a WCRL processing factory in 
the west coast community of Doringbaai in 2006, resulting in significant job losses 
(Sowman et al. 2008), while a nearshore fishery East of Hangklip on the south coast 
was introduced in 2003, leading to 274 new rightsholders (230t) (DEAT 2004a, 
Shannon et al. 2006).  The southerly shift in WCRL has also had a significant 
ecological impact whereby lobsters are moving into historically rich abalone areas 
(Cockroft et al. 2008). This has resulted in a dramatic decrease in abalone abundance 
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due to lobster predation on sea urchins. Sea urchins provide an important refuge to 
juvenile abalone, and the influx of lobster has led to the virtual disappearance of sea 
urchins, which in turn has negatively affected abalone recruitment (Tarr et al. 1996, 
Tarr 2000).   
 
The future of the WCRL fishery is considered uncertain (Melville-Smith and van 
Sittert 2005).  Since the 1990s, catch rates and TACs fluctuated, with a perceived 
recovery in the fishery in 2004, when the TAC increased to 3527t (DEAT 2005).  
However, the resource has shown signs of decline, which has resulted in three annual 
reductions in the commercial TAC since long-term rights were allocated in 2005.  The 
result is a commercial TAC of 2571t for the 2007/8 season (WCRL Association 
2008a). These reductions, coupled with political decision-making in 2007 to broaden 
small-scale access to the WCRL resource (through poverty relief permits), have 
contributed to instability in the formal fishery.  These socio-economic and 
institutional issues will be discussed further below, but need to be understood within 
this context of resource decline. 
 
3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
This section will provide an overview of the socio-economic dimensions of the 
WCRL fishery in South Africa, including the formal and informal fisheries.  Although 
there is limited socio-economic data on the fishery as a whole, extensive primary data 
on the Hangberg case study was gathered to gain insight on the factors influencing 
compliance behaviour. This discussion will be embedded in an important historical 
context, which emanates from the rich material compiled by van Sittert (1993, 1994, 
2001).   
 
3.1  The South African WCRL Fishery 
 
The WCRL fishery, as with other small-scale fisheries in South Africa, consists of 
both a formal and informal fishery.  Although the informal fishery has grown over the 
past decade, it has not reached the level of sophistication of the abalone fishery in 
terms of organisation and size.  Research indicates that there is overlap and interaction 
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  142 
between the formal and informal WCRL fisheries (see Figure 6.5).  The extent of this 
overlap is uncertain, but both fisheries operate simultaneously, sometimes in 
cooperation.  The estimates of the size of the informal sector, in terms of harvesting 
levels, are less than the abalone fishery.  In the WCRL fishery it was estimated that 
the informal catch was 22% (500t) that of the 2007/8 commercial TAC (2314t).  
Although still a significant informal fishery, its size is smaller than the formal fishery, 




Figure 6.5: Composition of the South African WCRL fishery – highlighting the 
overlap between the formal and informal fisheries 
 
 
Harvesting of WCRL has existed for centuries with strong customary use rights 
evolving from the 19th Century (van Sittert 1993, 1994).  Commercial exploitation 
began in 1875, with an established export market by the early 1920s (van Sittert 
1993). With an industry-state export orientation in the early 1900s, which favoured 
the economic interests of big capital, regulations were increasingly put in place to 
limit public access to the lobster resource (van Sittert 1994).  Although a more 
detailed historical perspective will be provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.2 below, it is 
important to highlight here that an informal (i.e. ‘illegal’) WCRL fishery emerged as 
traditional fishing practices became restricted through exclusionary laws that favoured 
the formal export industry. 
 
Figure 6.6 outlines the different sectors that have been operating in the formal and 
informal fisheries. These sectors have changed over time, largely in response to state 
policies and laws that have either restricted customary practices, or have attempted to 
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‘reform’ the fishery in response to political change. Prior to the MLRA (1998), the 
formal fishery had only included the commercial and recreational sectors. However, 
in order to broaden access to the fishery, the limited commercial, subsistence and 
Interim Relief fisheries were introduced. However, as can be seen from the figure, the 
latter two are no longer allocated rights, with the Interim Relief permit being legally 
challenged by the WCRL Association in 2008. The informal fishery, on the other 
hand, consists of traditional fishers who continue to fish despite increased state 
regulations that emanated from the early 1900s. In addition, a more organised group 
of opportunists became involved, who saw the growing local lobster trade as a viable 
source of income (van Sittert 1994). Each of these sectors operating in the formal and 




Figure 6.6: Sectors of the formal and informal WCRL fisheries. Dotted lines 
highlight those sectors that are no longer allocated rights. 
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3.2  The Formal WCRL Fishery 
 
People living along South Africa’s coast in the 19th and 20th Centuries harvested 
WCRL due to its easy accessibility for supplying food and bait (Melville-Smith and 
van Sittert 2005). Although commercial exploitation began in 1875, little attention 
was paid to the traditional fishery that was operating along the west coast.  This is 
largely attributed to the perceived abundance of the resource and the fact that lobster 
was shunned by the middle class and considered a ‘food for the poor’ (Melville-Smith 
and van Sittert 2005, van Sittert 1994).  As a result, the local market was ignored in 
the early half of the 1900s, while the focus of capitalist interest, and the state, was on 
the lucrative export trade.  In fact, up until the 1920s, customary use rights were 
largely protected. Laws specifically permitted public access to lobster for bait and for 
food and this local fishery was exempt from catch restrictions that were established 
for the export industry (Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005, van Sittert 1994).   
 
However, due to resource declines and resultant quota cuts, the commercial industry 
pressured the state to impose restrictions on boat owners and the public in order to 
sustain the interests of the export economy (van Sittert 1993, 1994).  Thus, the bait 
concession was withdrawn in 1920, lobster sanctuaries were introduced in 1927 and 
the 1960s saw an onslaught of laws aimed at curtailing public access to the resource.  
According to van Sittert (1994), these included limits on daily catch (1961), closed 
seasons (1961), prohibition of sales by the public (1961) and bans on certain landing 
sites (1964).  Furthermore, in 1979, customary ‘eetvis’ was abolished, which further 
restricted traditional harvesting practices.   
 
It is argued that behind all these ‘preservationist’ attempts to sustain the WCRL 
resource, these regulatory measures were in fact big industry’s attempt to centralise 
production and minimise competition for the harvesting and export of lobster (van 
Sittert 1994).  Although some initial attempts were made in the late 1900s to impose 
size limits and closed seasons on the commercial fishery, limited access was further 
imposed through an export quota in 1946, a marketing quota in 1969 and introduction 
of a TAC in 1983 (DEAT 2004a , Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005, van Sittert 
1993, 1994).  Van Sittert (1994) explains that investigations into the quota system 
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were to be undertaken through the establishment of the Quota Board in 1987, but this 
was undermined by the fact that redistribution could only take place amongst existing 
quota holders.  Pressure to reform the industry only emerged again with the 
unbanning of the ANC in 1990 (van Sittert 1994). 
 
As with all other fisheries in South Africa, democratic fisheries legislation 
promulgated in 1998 (MLRA) led to significant changes in the allocation of access 
rights to marine resources (van Sittert et al. 2006).  Whereas there were only 39 
rightsholders in the WCRL fishery in 1992, there were 1019 rightsholders in 2005 
(DEAT 2005). Following the long-term rights allocation process in 2005, the 
commercial fishery was divided into distinct offshore and nearshore sectors (Cockroft 
et al. 2008).  As a result, in the 2007/08 season there were 1068 rightsholders in the 
fishery, consisting of large-scale offshore operators (23%, with allocations of more 
than 1.5t) and the limited commercial nearshore operators (77%, with allocations of 
less than 1.5t – WCRL Sea Management Association 2008b).  Approximately 20% of 
the TAC is allocated to the nearshore fishery (560t in 2007/2008 season), which 
operates less than 30m from shore, and 80% to the offshore fishery (1754t in 
2007/2008 season), which operates greater than 30m from shore (Shannon et al. 
2006).  These percentages are based on the location of the resource (ie: 20% of the 
resource is located nearshore and 80% of the resource is located offshore, according 
to DEAT 2005).  
 
The WCRL fishery was divided into fishing zones in the early 1980s (Cockroft et al. 
2008; see Figure 6.7), and these differ from the abalone zones. Rightsholders in the 
offshore sector harvest according to an inter-area schedule, while the nearshore 
rightsholders are required to harvest in the zone or area where they live (Cockroft et 
al. 2008). As mentioned previously, the historically rich WCRL areas were Zones A-
D, but with the southward shift of the lobster, Zone F was opened for commercial 
exploitation in 2003.   
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Figure 6.7: WCRL fishery zones and areas (adapted from Cockroft et al. 2008) 
 
 
3.2.1  Harvesting and Production 
 
Prior to the introduction of lobster traps in the 1960s, the commercial fishery was 
largely dependent on hoopnets for harvesting, which were most often deployed from 
small boats (rowing or with outboard motors) and mostly used at depths of less than 
30 metres (DEAT 2005, Sauer et al. 2003).  As a result of this basic equipment, most 
fishers harvested close to their homeport.  However, with the introduction of larger 
vessels, it is now common to land lobsters at a number of different ports (Sauer et al. 
2003).  Also, as a means of increasing efficiency in deeper water, lobster traps are 
used and deployed only from inboard motor vessels.  Traps are used exclusively by 
74% of the rightsholders, with hoopnets only used by some of the small quota holders 
(allocations of less than 10t) (Sauer et al. 2003). 
 
South Africa supplies less than 2% of the world’s total lobster market, exporting 
largely to the United States, Europe and the Far East (Sauer et al. 2003).  Lobster 
products include frozen tails, whole frozen, whole cooked and live lobsters, with sales 
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dependent on overseas market trends.  The fishery is valued at approximately R260 
million (approximately US$32.5 million; Cockroft et al. 2008), and is considered 
South Africa’s third most valuable fishery in terms of landed value (Johnston and 
Butterworth 2005). Approximately 4000 people are employed by the fishery, 
including sea-going personnel and others working in processing and marketing 
operations (Cockroft et al. 2008). The WCRL fishery was traditionally an important 
source of seasonal employment for west coast communities, but job losses have 
resulted from the southerly migration of the resource (Cockroft et al. 2008). 
 
3.2.2  Recreational Fishery 
 
Recreational fishers have been required to obtain permits to harvest WCRL (with bag 
limits) since 1980 and it is estimated that, on average, approximately 50 000 permits 
are sold annually (DEAT 2008c). These fishers are required to use hoopnets from 
shore or small vessels and can dive, but without the use of artificial breathing 
apparatus.  Other regulations include a minimum size length, fishing during certain 
times, and closed seasons. During the 1996/97 season, the recreational catch reached 
500t (29.5% of the commercial catch), but measures were put in place, such as a 
reduced fishing season, to try to reduce these catches. The recreational TAC was set at 
320t for the 2004/5 season, intended to be fixed as long as it stayed within 8-12% of 
the commercial TAC (Shannon et al. 2006).  However, for the 2006/7 season the 
recreational TAC decreased, as it did again in 2008, now representing 10% of the 
commercial TAC at 257t (WCRL Association 2008a).  The Minister of DEAT had 
also decreased the recreational fishing season in 2008, restricting fishing to weekends 
and public holidays (Government Gazette No. 30645).  It has been argued that 
increased limitations on the recreational sector have provided a means with which to 
allocate some of the TAC to small-scale fishers for the Interim Relief Permit 
(discussed below; L55). 
 
Although recreational fishers are not permitted to sell their catch, it is well known that 
this practice is common, particularly in impoverished coastal communities where the 
recreational permit is a means to secure a livelihood.  Fishers explained that the 
recreational permit allowed them to be at sea with hoopnets, minimising their 
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  148 
confrontations with law enforcement and preventing a confiscation of their equipment 
(Fisher policy meeting in Kalk Bay 7 June 2007, L1, L3, L8). 
 
3.2.3  Subsistence Fishery 
 
Subsistence permits were allocated for three years from the 1998/1999 season to the 
2000/2001 season. Although permit numbers have not been verified for the earlier 
years, 1700 permits were issued in 2000 (with a TAC of 230t; Sauer et al. 2003).  
Subsistence fishers were required to operate with hoopnets only, from shore or from 
small boats.  Daily limits of four lobster were eligible to be sold to restaurants, 
individuals, fish shops and processing factories, but as with the abalone fishery, there 
were concerns of increased black market sales.  From 2001, following the 
recommendation of the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group, the subsistence permits 
were transformed into small-scale quotas under a newly created limited commercial 
sector. 
 
3.2.4  Limited Commercial Fishery 
 
In 2001, the TAC allocation for subsistence permits was changed to a limited 
commercial quota as a means of providing legitimate access to impoverished fishers 
(DEAT 2002).  In 2001, 511 fishers were allocated limited commercial rights for four 
years with a further 274 limited commercial rights allocated in 2003 in the newly 
opened fishing grounds east of Cape Hangklip (Zone F, DEAT 2004a).  The TAC 
allocations in this sector ranged from 200 kilograms to 1.5t, with an average of 712kg 
per fisher (DEAT 2004a).  Considered the ‘nearshore sector’ by MCM, rights 
allocations could not be more than 1.5t and fishers were required to use hoopnets and 
were not permitted to harvest between fishing zones (DEAT 2005).  However, there 
were still many fishers who were excluded from the fishery. In 2001, there were 1959 
applications for WCRL rights and as stated above, only 511 applicants were 
successful in that year for limited commercial rights, and 189 were successful for full 
commercial rights (DEAT 2002) – resulting in over 1200 (64%) unsuccessful 
applicants. Further, for the long-term rights allocation process, there were 4 070 
applications for the limited commercial, or ‘nearshore’ sector, of which 812 were 
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granted rights, resulting in only 20% of applicants receiving formal access to the 
resource (Cockroft et al. 2008).  
 
3.2.5  Interim Relief Permits 
 
The ongoing exclusion of traditional fishers from the formal fishery led to legal 
action, which was supported by the Human Rights Commission. The rationale for this 
case was briefly outlined in Chapter Four. The fishers challenged the Minister of the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), and demanded that their 
traditional rights of access to marine resources be restored. An out of court settlement 
was reached in May 2007, which required the Minister to initiate a new policy process 
to develop a small-scale fisheries policy for South Africa, and to establish ‘interim 
relief’ for traditional fishers who had been excluded from formal access rights.  A key 
component of this Interim Relief Permit was an allowance of up to 20 lobsters per 
week during May 2007.  A second phase of the Interim Relief Permits was then 
implemented from 15 November 2007 to 15 April 200810.  It was stipulated at the 
outset that 1000 permits would be allocated to fishers on the west and south coasts, 
but in reality 1230 permits were allocated.  Although short-lived, these permits were 
fraught with difficulties, including court action by the commercial WCRL fishery to 
prevent the permits from being issued (WCRL Association and others vs. Minister of 
DEAT and others).  This latest development has highlighted the ongoing challenges 
and conflicts that exist in relation to establishing formal access to small-scale 
fisheries.  
 
3.3  The Informal Fishery 
 
The history of the informal WCRL fishery is well documented by van Sittert (1993, 
1994) from the late 1800s to early 1990s.  He describes the development of a 
traditional fishery that was immersed in the social, cultural and political context of 
coastal communities and was significantly affected by the export-oriented focus of the 
commercial industry.  With increased government restrictions on access to the WCRL 
                                                
10 Although these were the dates stipulated for the second phase of the Interim Relief Permits, no 
permits were issued prior to 21 January 2008 (J. Sunde, Masifundise, in litt). 
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resource from the early to mid-1900s, customary fishing practices became severely 
limited.  Nevertheless, traditional fishing continued as a means to supply food, and 
later a source of income on the black market (van Sittert 1994).  The informal fishery 
continued to thrive, particularly in the midst of increasing local demand and price in 
the 1950s (Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005). The combined impact of the state’s 
‘war on poaching’ in the mid-1960s, through focussed law enforcement efforts, and 
the industry’s attempts to entrench its exclusive access to the resource, resulted in the 
informal trade being driven underground (van Sittert 1994).  This, coupled with a 
growing domestic market, led to a more organised informal fishery from the 1970s.   
 
Although estimates of the size of the informal fishery are difficult to quantify, 
scientists estimate that at least 500t of WCRL are being harvested through the 
informal trade (Branch et al. 2007, L52). Small-scale fishers argue, however, that the 
informal trade will continue to grow in size and sophistication as a result of the 
exclusion to formal access rights (L23 – focus group; L2, L8, L12, L18). Informal 
fishers explain that market opportunities are growing due to increased local demand, 
emergent networks to the export market and close ties to the formal fishery (L4, L13). 
The informal fishery will be described in more detail below, including the different 
sectors that are operating and the scale with which they are harvesting and trading in 
lobster. 
 
3.3.1  Harvesting and Production 
 
3.3.1.1  The Market 
 
As discussed above, despite restrictions on harvesting, local demand for WCRL 
created a substantial local market that grew over time.  This was facilitated by the 
Crawfish Export Act of 1940, which focussed on securing the international export 
market. Thus, ‘the Act’s exclusive export orientation…left the way open for 
customary use rights and the illegal trade to survive on the unregulated domestic 
market’ (van Sittert 1994: 14, italics added). During this time, domestic demand for 
WCRL was considered insignificant by both industry and the state and was largely 
disregarded (Melville-Smith and van Sittert 2005, van Sittert 1994). 
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However, while the resource declined in the 1960s, the domestic demand for lobster 
increased, largely attributed to increased white affluence, and the formal fishery began 
supplying the local market for the first time in 1961 (van Sittert 1994).  Informal trade 
flourished in the 1970s with an ‘unsatisfied domestic demand’, created by the 
monopolisation of the export industry, coupled with price inflation and a weakening 
rand (van Sittert 1994: 33). The impact of this local market on the informal fishery 
was also recognised by a government appointed Commission of Inquiry (Treurnicht 
Commission 1980).  It stated that the growing black market was largely due to 
industry monopolisation and its failure to supply reasonably priced lobster to the local 
market: ‘ 
‘In those instances where rock lobster can be obtained, exorbitant prices are 
demanded and it is offered only in packings too large for the general public. 
These complaints are endorsed most strongly by the hotel and restaurant trade. 
The Commission believes that the illegal catching of rock lobster and the 
flourishing black market developed mainly as a result of the fact that members 
of the general public were unable to obtain reasonable quantities of rock 
lobster at reasonable prices’ (Treurnicht Commission 1980: 26-27). 
 
The informal trade continued to grow as economic conditions on the west coast 
became dire and alternative economic opportunities were scarce.  Thus, opportunities 
to supply the local and export markets were exploited by informal fishers, who were 
increasingly regulated by government, and who had few other livelihood options (van 
Sittert 1994).  This situation appears to have changed very little since the MLRA in 
1998, as many traditional fishers remain excluded from the formal fishery, and have 
few alternative economic opportunities (Cardoso et al. 2005, Isaacs 2003, Sowman et 
al. 2008).  Thus, a strong local demand for lobster by the catering industry, restaurants 
and wine farms provides an ongoing market for fishers who rely on the informal 
fishery to contribute to their household’s income.   
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3.3.1.2  Production 
 
The modus operandi of the informal WCRL fishery varies depending on gear, level of 
organisation and focus of trade (local or global).  There are four modes of operation 
that exist in the informal fishery: handline fishers, divers, rowboats and motorised 
boats.  The latter largely compose of fishers who are trading on the black market 
through recreational or commercial rights, while the other operations involve fishers 
who do not have formal rights and do not have the financial means to purchase large 
boats and motors. A general understanding of the informal fishery has been sought, 
but detailed information has been gathered through the Hangberg case study.  
 
Handline fishing is considered a traditional practice or ‘skill’, whereby a simple 
fishing line is wound around a plastic or wooden rim and held with bare hands.  One 
handline fisher explained that the ‘communication between you and the crayfish is 
between your two fingers’ (L1).  Once a tug is felt at the end of the line, the fisher 
carefully pulls the lobster up by hand and places it in a bag.  Due to the level of skill 
involved, catches are often low, and highly dependent on weather and sea conditions. 
Handline fishers operate largely from shore as individuals or as loosely defined 
groups.  Due to the unpredictable nature of their catches, they have an ad hoc market 
and will sell to local buyers or restaurants with the best price.   
 
WCRL divers, on the other hand, are more sophisticated in their approach and many 
have had links to the informal abalone trade.  They largely dive as individuals, with 
wetsuits and snorkel gear, tying bags to their belts and filling them with lobster.  They 
then have one or two assistants on shore who retrieve their bag and carry it to a 
designated location.  Interestingly, in the Hangberg case study, all of the divers who 
were interviewed considered themselves ‘abalone divers’, but with a scarce abalone 
resource, were utilising their skills to harvest lobster.  Divers are capable of harvesting 
large quantities (40kg per day in some cases), but they are highly reliant on the 
weather.  Most divers sell to middlemen in their local communities. 
 
Outside of the formal fishery, most fishers harvest lobster through the use of 
rudimentary row boats, mostly without a motor. These fishers generally operate in 
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groups, or crews, organised by the boat owner, and use hoopnets to harvest the 
lobster. Figure 6.8 illustrates the modus operandi of this operation as it exists in 
Hangberg.  Other traditional fishing communities also operate informal rowboat 
fisheries, which emanate from historical practices.  Key to this harvesting strategy is 
the level of organisation, in which roles and responsibilities are allocated to different 
crew members and profit distribution is agreed upon in advance (Omari 2006).  In 
Hangberg, this fishery involved the largest number of fishers with the highest catches. 
There were 10-12 groups operating, with about eight of these groups constant over 
many years. New groups emerge, sometimes breaking away from existing groups, but 
this is often dependent on the availability of other forms of employment.   
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The fishers involved in the operations described above largely harvest outside of the 
formal fishery, although during the lobster season, many fishers will purchase a 
recreational permit in order to legitimise their presence at sea.  Most of these informal 
operations supply the domestic market, with varying degrees of organisation 
dependent on their ability to provide reliable catches. A significant outcome of the 
Hangberg case study was the realisation of the entrenched nature of the informal 
fishery, which is a well functioning system embedded in historical fishing practices.  
Thus, despite the fact that the fishery is considered illegal by both the state and big 
industry, it continues to operate with very little conflict at local level.  Although the 
fishery is open access, in that there are no apparent restrictions on who can harvest 
lobster, some fishers expressed concern that more people were getting involved that 
did not have a historical link to fishing (L1, L8, L11).  This raised issues of ‘who 
should gain access’, but most agreed that if there are no alternatives, people have a 
right to turn to the sea (L4, L7, L14, L21).    
 
Formal fishers supply the informal trade by using their commercial quotas to over-
harvest and conceal extra catch (L32, L34, L39).  Hoopnets or diving gear are often 
used, but reports have indicated that undersized lobster from the commercial traps are 
also traded. Middlemen will arrange pickup, either at sea (through boat transfers) or at 
landing. The relationship between the formal and informal fisheries will be further 
discussed in Section 3.3.4 below.   
 
3.3.2  Traditional Fishers in  the Informal  Fishery 
 
The long tradition of WCRL harvesting on South Africa’s coast has been well 
documented, as has the historical marginalisation of this sector (van Sittert 1993, 
1994).  Although various fisheries ‘reforms’ in South Africa have attempted to 
broaden access rights to traditional fishers, these processes have largely resulted in the 
status quo, with the monopolisation of rights in the hands of big capital (Croeser et al. 
2006, Isaacs et al. 2007, van Sittert et al. 2006).  Disenchanted with government for 
decades, impoverished fishers, with formal rights or not, have continued to turn to the 
sea for what they consider a legitimate livelihood.   
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In the case of Hangberg, all of the informal boat owners shared stories of growing up 
on their father’s fishing boats.  Unsustained employment and unsuccessful quota 
applications have led fishers in Hangberg to ‘go back to what we know’ (L8).  One 
informal fisher, whose quota application had been denied on many occasions 
explained: ‘it is the government who has made us illegal.  We have been fishing 
[lobster] all our lives and it is their problem that they see it is as a crime.  We just see 
it as a way to make a living. They will never stop us unless they give us what is 
rightfully ours’ (L13). This sentiment was reiterated by other lobster fishers operating 
along the coast, arguing that it is government that have turned them into ‘poachers’ by 
denying them access to their traditional fishery (Branch et al. 2007). 
 
As van Sittert (1994) explains, despite considerable policing efforts in the 1970s to 
enforce new laws, fishers continued to harvest the resource, particularly in areas 
where poverty was rife and WCRL was a key source of food and/or income: 
‘Either eaten as food or retailed through informal distribution networks for 
cash and kind, crayfish [lobster] in a myriad illegal forms was covertly 
removed from the sea, sanctuaries and industry vessels over and above the 
customary ‘eetvis’ allowed fishermen…with little alternative employment and 
a small, industry controlled local economy, most illegal crayfish fishing was 
for the pot’ (p. 45-46).  
 
The socio-economic circumstances of small-scale fishers were exacerbated by the 
established monopoly in the WCRL fishery, which had ‘enslaved’ the traditional 
fishers through labour (van Sittert 1985).  This was accomplished through fishers 
being required to sell their catch to the companies at a pre-arranged price from the 
1940s and again from the 1970s, as well as through the free housing scheme that was 
initiated at the outset of the industry.  Thus, as van Sittert (1985) argues, ‘instead of 
company profits being used to alleviate labour’s poverty, they were directly 
dependent on labour’s continued poverty and super exploitation by capital. The 
provision of free housing for fishermen thus reinforced rather undermined the poverty 
and misery of pre-war years’ (p. 19).  
 
Further, in the 1970s, when the WCRL season had shrunk to only three to four 
months, commercial fishers were compelled to enter the informal fishery as there was 
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an ‘absence of alternative employment in order to survive’ (van Sittert 1994: 36-37).  
Similar circumstances are still evident in coastal communities, whereby seasonal 
employment, few economic alternatives and fragile livelihoods, continue to drive 
fishers to the informal WCRL fishery (Cardoso et al. 2005, Masifundise 2003, 
Sowman et al. 2008, L23 – focus group).   
 
The fragile socio-economic circumstances of fisher communities is highlighted 
through the Hangberg case study site, which has been identified as a highly 
marginalised area. In the 1950s, fishers in this area were provided council flats, which 
became overcrowded when the fishing industry boomed in the 1970s.  This 
overcrowding led to the development of informal housing behind the flats, which 
remains today.  There is a lack of basic services in Hangberg with only 37% of 
households having toilets inside their home, while 35% use communal toilets, and 
about 10% still use a bucket system (Kapembe et al. 2007).  Monthly household 
income in the Hangberg informal settlement is R2600, lower than the South African 
average of R3 083 and significantly lower than the Western Cape average of R6 250 
(Kapembe et al. 2007).  Further, it has been recognised that with increased limitations 
on access to marine resources, there are few livelihood opportunities in the area 
(Hartnack 2008).  Thus, high levels of poverty, and few economic alternatives, have 
significantly influenced fishers’ involvement in the informal fishery – now and in the 
past. 
 
3.3.3  Syndicates in the Informal Fishery 
 
Organised groups of opportunists have been operating in the WCRL informal fishery 
from the 1970s as a means to supply an increasing local demand (van Sittert 1994). 
These were people with business interests, many of whom did not fish themselves, but 
provided transportation, storage and distribution of WCRL across South Africa. In 
addition, recreational fishers became increasingly more sophisticated with the use of 
diving gear and ski-boats, supplying local middlemen and using the money to 
supplement other forms of income (van Sittert 1994).  
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Formal networks began to develop between individuals, groups and middlemen in 
order to ensure a regular and sufficient supply to the black market (van Sittert 1994).  
Informal fishing therefore developed as a source of seasonal or full time employment 
in Cape Town and along the west coast.  Networks became highly organised and also 
involved in other illicit activities.  In Hangberg, for example, some middlemen are 
also ‘drug merchants’ and the lobster trade is simply another mechanism to make 
money.  As one fisher explained: ‘[the buyer] is also a drug merchant. It is like any 
other business – you poach to get into other things…he poaches to help his drug trade’ 
(L1).   
 
Although law enforcement authorities had linked Chinese Triads to the WCRL trade 
in the mid-1990s, the focus of international syndicates has largely been on abalone 
(PICOC 1998).  Nevertheless, the quantities of lobster harvested in the 1990s was 
high, with one key middleman on the south coast receiving about 1500 lobster per day 
(PICOC 1998).  Prices then were R2.50 per tail and R6.00 for a whole lobster.  In 
2007, informal fishers in Hangberg were receiving approximately R10.00 per tail and 
R25.00 per lobster. Later that year, lobster began to sell per kilogram, ranging from 
R50.00-60.00 per kilogram.  If there is a middleman, he will increase this price to at 
least R80 per kilogram to an end buyer (such as a restaurant).  
 
Discussions with various stakeholders, however, indicate that the most organised 
aspects of the informal fishery are linked to the commercial industry (L32, L39).  The 
quantities and price for WCRL are significantly higher when export markets are 
targeted, which are easily accessible through established exporters.  Some law 
enforcement authorities indicated that commercial factories were being utilised to 
pack and export informally harvested lobster (L32, L34) and this was also mentioned 
by others (L2, L15, L48).  A highly publicised case in 2002 implicated 21 commercial 
fishing boats for harvesting ten times their allocated quotas for WCRL (Le May 
2002).  This lobster was sold to Hout Bay Fishing, an established company, which 
had later been found guilty of large-scale over-harvesting and illegal trade of other 
marine species (Hauck and Kroese 2006). Thus, in addition to the traditionally-based 
informal fishery for the local market, more organised syndicates are operating for both 
the domestic and international markets.  
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3.3.4  Overlap between Formal and Informal Fisheries 
 
The symbiotic relationship between the formal and informal fisheries has existed from 
the early 1900s, when attempts were first made to regulate the WCRL fishery (van 
Sittert 1994).  In a highly competitive environment, industry turned to the black 
market as a means of subsidising its income.  Thus, traditional fishers, who were 
increasingly being restricted by government since the 1920s, continued to fish by 
supplying the domestic market through their own networks as well as the formal 
fishery for export.  Van Sittert states: 
‘by far the biggest market for illegal crayfish… was the canning and freezing 
industry which encouraged the catching on undersized, berry and poached 
crayfish by both omission and design. Natural and legal constraints on 
secondary production compounded by competition between companies for 
labour, raw material and market share made the illegal trade an integral and 
indistinguishable facet of legal factory production in both boom and bust 
cycles’ (van Sittert 1994: 14). 
 
Examples of industry buying from the black market are given throughout the 1900s, 
with informal lobster being exported in the 1980s through formal channels (van Sittert 
1994).  The Hout Bay Fishing case, as mentioned above, indicates that such 
relationships are continuing to operate in the 2000s.  In addition to informal trade 
being channelled through commercial export, formal fishers are also selling their 
catch for the informal market.  For example, fieldwork in Hangberg has indicated that 
strong cooperation exists between the formal and informal fishers.  The most frequent 
stories related to undersized catch being sold by the industry vessels to the black 
market and sold for tails (L4, L13, L18, L48).  The most interesting story, however, 
had links to management decision-making.  A main middleman in Hangberg told how 
quota holders had approached him at the end of the WCRL season to buy black 
market lobster. He explained: ‘MCM screwed up with permits – the permits might 
only be issued at the end of the season when the guys don’t have enough time to catch 
their quota.  They don’t want to be seen by MCM to be under-catching, so they come 
to me to fill their quota. I end up selling the quota holders poached lobster!’.  The 
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quota holders therefore sell the lobster to factories and this is calculated against their 
quota allocation.   
 
There are also allegations by the larger companies that the limited commercial quota 
holders – or inshore fishers – are catching ‘illegally’ because their quotas are not 
economically viable (L41, L43).  Recent cuts in the TAC, coupled with increased fuel 
costs, crew and other materials, have significantly impacted on income.  Thus, with 
readily available local markets, the opportunities exist for black market trade.  One 
boat owner in Hangberg explained that ‘when times were tough’, a local quota holder 
would contact him and he would take his rowboat out to sea to pick up tails from 
undersized lobster (L4).  They both benefit – they ‘help each other out’.  Another 
informal fisher in Hangberg explained that he had contact with a commercial vessel 
that would request lobster from him.  They then had an arrangement where he would 
transport the lobster to him on the sea, and the commercial fishers would transport the 
lobster to a ‘Chinese boat’. He said the prices were very high, but it didn’t happen 
very often (L18). The situation is exacerbated for the formal fishers by the fact that 
the lobster fishery is seasonal and rightsholders are limited from accessing other 
fishing rights (such as linefish), which historically provided diverse livelihood options 
for the entire year.   
 
Evident from this discussion of the informal fishery is the recognition that the 
informal trade operates at different scales, in terms of harvesting, production and 
markets.  There remain many small-scale traditional fishers operating along the coast, 
who rely on the informal fishery as an important source of food and/or income.  In 
addition, however, are the opportunists that range from recreational fishers to highly 
industrialised commercial companies, which are attracted to the economic benefits 
associated with the informal trade.   
 
4. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
The section below will highlight the key management strategies and approaches that 
have been implemented in the WCRL fishery.  Although reference will be made to 
van Sittert’s (1993, 1994) historical research, emphasis will be placed on those 
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strategies that have been developed and implemented since the promulgation of the 
MLRA.  There have been a number of difficulties in trying to incorporate the social, 
political and economic dynamics into fisheries management, particularly due to the 
resource-oriented approach that has dominated decision-making. Scientists 
themselves have acknowledged that they ‘are united in promoting [resource] 
sustainability as the over-riding objective’ (Cockroft and Payne 1999: 599). Thus, 
although there were genuine government attempts to broaden WCRL fishing rights, to 
enhance consultation with stakeholders and to improve enforcement, many challenges 
have remained.  These will be discussed in greater detail below, in addition to the 
implementation of a Marine Protected Area (MPA), which raises particular issues in 
relation to the case study site of Hangberg. 
  
4.1  Broadening Rights of Access to the WCRL Fishery 
  
As with the abalone fishery, rights of access to the WCRL fishery have been 
broadened since the promulgation of the MLRA in 1998, particularly to small-scale 
fishers.  As compared to 39 rightsholders in 1992, there were 1019 rightsholders in 
2005, with 785 of these rights allocated to small-scale fishers (DEAT 2005).  With the 
introduction of the limited commercial sector, 91.5% of these rightsholders were from 
previously disadvantaged backgrounds (DEAT 2004a).  As a means of 
accommodating this increased number of rightsholders, the average allocation in 2002 
was 6.8t as compared to the average of 56t in 1992.  The redistribution of rights to 
different sectors in the formal fishery is depicted in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: A timeline of formal rights in the different sectors of the WCRL fishery 
highlighting the redistribution of rights following the MLRA in 1998 
 
 
Fishing rights were broadened throughout the medium term (2001-2004) and long 
term (from 2005) rights allocation processes.  A significant increase in the number of 
rightsholders, particularly in the nearshore sector is evident.  Table 6.2 clearly 
highlights the increasing number of rightsholders. Although the fishery expanded in 
terms of the numbers of fishers participating, and transformed in terms of the 
inclusion of historically disadvantaged individuals, the legitimacy of this process has 
been disputed by traditional fishers.  Many fishers argue that they have still been 
excluded from the fishery while undeserving opportunists were allocated rights 
(Isaacs 2003, Masifundise 2003).  They believe the allocation process was fraught 
with difficulties, including monetary barriers (high application fees), complicated 
application procedures and illegitimate verification processes.  In the Hangberg case, 
for example, one fisher’s wife, and community leader, explained that she was 
encouraged by the knowledge that MCM would verify quota applications. However, 
in reality, she said that they were given a list of names to comment on in writing: ‘It’s 
not the same thing. Anyone could write anything about other people.  It wasn’t a valid 
way of verifying who was a fisher or not. They should have people from the 
Department into the community to speak to people, find out who we are, how we live. 
Now the wrong people are sitting with the quotas’ (L49). 
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Season Sector No. of 
Permits/ 
Rightsholders 
TAC (t) Source 
 Commercial 39 2400 Cockroft & Payne 
1999, DEAT 2004a 
1992/3 Subsistence * *  
 Recreational 59 202 469 Cockroft & Payne 1999 
 Commercial 200 1720 D. van Zyl in litt 
1999/00 Subsistence * 170 WCRL Association 
2008a 
 Recreational 49 994** 447** DEAT 2008c 
 Commercial 
-offshore 
234 1717 WCRL Association 
2008a,b 
2001/2 Limited Commercial 
-nearshore 
511 409 WCRL Association 
2008a,b 
 Subsistence * *  








2007/8 Limited Commercial 
-nearshore 
822 560 WCRL Association 
2008a,b 
 Interim Relief 
Permits 
1240 79-175# DEAT 2008c, Keulder 
& van Zyl 2008 
 Recreational No data 257 WCRL Association 
2008a,b 
 
*Subsistence rights were only allocated for three years from the 1998/1999 to the 2000/2001 WCRL 
fishing seasons.  No record exists for the number of permits for the 1999/2000 season. In 2001 these 
rights were changed to limited commercial small-scale quotas.  
**No data is available for the recreational permits for this year so the average for the three previous 
years is provided.  
#This figure is uncertain due to poor catch data, with estimates ranging from 79-175t, based on daily 
limit and number of sea days.  However, the higher estimate is based on the assumption that the second 
phase of the Interim Relief was from 15 November 2007-15 April 2008, however no permits were 
issued prior to 21 January 2008 (J. Sunde, Masifundise, in litt). 
 
Table 6.2:  Evolution of rights allocation in the WCRL fishery 
 
 
The controversy around the allocation of rights was glaringly apparent when a 
spontaneous informal meeting took place at the Hout Bay harbour between a 
commercial quota holder, an informal fisher and a fisheries law enforcement official.  
When discussing some of the key issues around the fishery it became apparent that the 
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informal fisher had been fishing rock lobster for 30 years and had numerous rejected 
quota applications. On the other hand, the quota holder, who had been granted a right 
to harvest rock lobster, had been working for the municipality for ten years prior.  The 
quota holder chuckled and said ‘its all about who you know’, indicating that he had 
hired a consultant to finalise his quota application – someone who knew the ‘system’ 
(informal meeting on 17 March 2007). 
 
The new WCRL (nearshore) Policy, which was drafted in 2005 in preparation for the 
allocation of long term rights (DEAT 2005), identified a number of key objectives 
that included: ongoing transformation, fair and equitable allocation of rights, 
particularly to historical lobster fishers, sustained economic viability and long term 
environmental sustainability of the fishery.  The policy stated that applicants who 
have a historical involvement in the fishery may ‘be rewarded’, but it explicitly stated 
that involvement might include being a crewmember in the WCRL commercial 
fishery, or any other commercial fishery (DEAT 2005: 11).  However, many of the 
informal fishers argued that it was very difficult for them to prove that they had a 
historical connection to the fishery because they were rarely formally employed in the 
fishery.  Those who admitted to being a ‘poacher’ on their application forms (as a 
means of proving historical involvement) felt that they were penalised for this by not 
being granted a right (L1, L3, L4, L8).  Furthermore, some informal fishers who had 
infringements against the MLRA (due to illegal catch) were penalised, as it was 
stipulated in the policy that even ‘minor infringements’ would be negatively scored 
(DEAT 2005).  Thus, informal fishers, even if they had years of experience harvesting 
WCRL, were at a disadvantage when applying for rights. 
 
These concerns were emphasised at a national workshop on compliance in the WCRL 
fishery, in which informal fishers were given the opportunity to raise their concerns.  
They explained that traditional fishers, who have been denied access to the formal 
fishery, have been turned into ‘criminals’ by flawed government policy (Branch et al. 
2007).  Therefore, they argued that bona fide fishers needed to be identified and 
recognised as legitimate users of the resource (Branch et al. 2007).   
 
The most recent attempt to broaden harvesting rights to traditional fishers was through 
the Interim Relief Permit, allocated in May 2007.  However, in monitoring the process 
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in Hangberg, it highlighted the flawed rights allocation process, resulting in the 
almost complete exclusion of informal WCRL fishers from accessing Interim Relief 
permits11.  The 65 permit holders who were granted rights in Hangberg were mostly 
fishers who were operating as crew for the commercial fishery (mainly WCRL and 
linefish).  Although MCM resists accountability, as they argue that it was a 
community driven process, little assistance was given to the fishers to establish a 
legitimate process (L53).  Thus, ‘the poachers’ were not considered fishers by their 
own community as the ‘crew’ felt that they should receive priority access to this 
opportunity (meeting in Hangberg 28 January 2008). Thus, the informal lobster 
harvesters, for whom the permits were also intended, were again excluded, much to 
their infuriation.  As one informal fisher exclaimed: ‘crew members have 
opportunities – we have nothing. We live from the sea every day but they say we 
aren’t fishers. We have been left out again, AGAIN, AGAIN!!’ (L8).  
 
The conflict and exclusion that has been inherent in the rights allocation process was 
acknowledged by all stakeholder groups at a WCRL compliance workshop (Branch et 
al. 2007).  However, the redistribution of rights remains controversial, as evidenced 
by the WCRL Association’s court order to stop the implementation of the Interim 
Relief permits.  Big industry argued that their long term rights were being jeopardised 
by these interim measures as it would have a significant impact on the resource, and 
on the TAC allocated to the commercial sector (WCRL Association Founding 
Affadvit 2008).  In an interesting turn of events, the Minister opposed the court case, 
arguing that there were ‘compelling reasons’ to override scientific advice in terms of 
the resource. He stated: ‘now that the allocation of long term fishing rights has been 
finalised, we are ready to make allocations of fishing to our poorest fishers a priority’ 
(DEAT 2008a). Although the objectives may be sound from the fishers’ perspective, 
experience shows that the allocation of these rights remains ad hoc, problematic and 
conflict ridden. 
                                                
11 Only three informal rock lobster fishers were allocated an interim relief permit. 
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4.2  Management Approach and Consultation 
 
Van Sittert’s (1994) overview of the WCRL fishery during the 1900s highlighted the 
limited scope of ‘management’, which in essence aimed to secure the lobster resource 
for the formal export industry. Although concerns of a growing black market trade 
were highlighted by the state as early as the 1920s, methods to control the domestic 
market, limit access to the resource and boost law enforcement, were ineffective in 
terms of minimising the informal fishery and achieving resource sustainability (van 
Sittert 1994).  However, following the promulgation of the MLRA, political 
transformation required a shift in management approach. The state was thus faced 
with the considerable challenge of managing a fishery using the precautionary 
approach, at the same time as facing the raised expectations of traditional fishers 
following the political transition in South Africa (Cockroft and Payne 1999).  Further, 
the situation was exacerbated by ‘the depressed economy and the concomitant 
escalation of poaching of the accessible resource, in addition to a burgeoning 
recreational catch’ (Cockroft and Payne 1999: 588).  Almost a decade down the line, 
the same challenges are plaguing the fishery’s stakeholders (Branch et al. 2007). 
 
Although attempts were made in the late 1990s to broaden consultation in the 
management of the WCRL fishery, such processes have not been adequately 
developed nor sustained.  In Cockroft and Payne’s (1999) overview of the 
management of the lobster fishery in 1999, they highlight the important progress that 
had been made in terms of consulting with industry, engaging with broader 
stakeholder groups and developing consultative management plans. There were two 
key developments: (1) the establishment of informal Industry – Sea Fisheries Fora 
(INSEFs), which encouraged interested and affected parties to participate in 
management; and (2) the appointment of fishery-specific scientific working groups, 
which included industry appointed scientists as well as industry representatives as 
observers (Cockroft and Payne 1999).  Following the redistribution of rights in 2001, 
however, the INSEFs largely disintegrated, partly due to the significant broadening of 
the fishery that included a considerable increase in the number of stakeholders.  This 
not only meant that industry representation was difficult, but the interests of the 
various rightsholders (particularly between the nearshore and offshore sectors) were 
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sometimes in conflict and one ‘industry voice’ was not easy to achieve amidst the 
political climate of redistributed rights. 
 
Following the disintegration of the INSEFs, the most effective formal mechanism for 
the commercial sector to collaborate with MCM is through the scientific working 
groups.  The primary mandate of these groups is to monitor the resource and make 
recommendations regarding the TAC.  With industry appointed scientists, the 
legitimacy of the scientific process is increased, and they are in a stronger position to 
negotiate TAC allocations.  However, management decision-making does not take 
place in these working groups as the focus is on scientific research and resource-
oriented decision-making related to the TAC. Discussions and debates about the 
socio-economic aspects of management, or compliance issues, are neglected as there 
are only ad hoc opportunities for communication. Although a WCRL management 
committee is supposed to exist, which entails meetings between industry and MCM, 
interaction is inconsistent and industry perceives these to be largely ineffective (L43, 
L44, L45). 
 
A lack of effective engagement with MCM was evident at a WCRL workshop 
initiated by the commercial fishery in January 2007.  A once-off attempt by the 
industry to bring together all the key stakeholders involved in, or affected by the 
WCRL fishery, only one person from the management section of MCM was present, 
out of 62 participants (Branch et al. 2007).  Nevertheless, this initiative achieved 
interaction between MCM scientists, MCM compliance personnel, commercial 
fishers, informal fishers, one recreational fisher representative, and researchers, which 
proved productive in terms of identifying key challenges and possible solutions for 
managing the fishery and addressing compliance (Branch et al. 2007).  This diverse 
group of stakeholders recognised a wide array of issues that were influencing the 
fishery, and which needed to be addressed. These were: (1) inadequate relationships 
among stakeholders; (2) concerns about allocation procedures; (3) inadequacies in 
enforcement; (4) lack of information or knowledge; and (5) socio-economic 
circumstances.  Interestingly, even in 1999, with their optimistic analysis of industry-
government consultation, Cockroft and Payne stated, ‘there is a need to work on 
greater participation…by at least recreational and ‘informal’ (poaching) sectors. All 
have something to contribute towards better fisheries management…’ (1999: 597).  
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Despite this acknowledgement, however, and the initiation of the WCRL workshop in 
2007, senior MCM personnel did not take the process further.  Thus, the 
recommendations of the workshop, as well as a follow-up meeting, were not 
implemented. The result, therefore, is ongoing frustration by the commercial sector, 
and complete despondency by the informal sector. 
 
Although scientific research and the establishment of Operational Management 
Procedures (OMPs) are important aspects of management, complimentary socio-
economic research is largely absent and is not contributing to management decision-
making. In their scientific assessment of an ecosystem approach to managing the 
WCRL fishery, Shannon et al. (2006) concede that ‘socio-economic studies to assess 
the forces motivating poachers are suggested, and market research is needed to assess 
the economic forces driving the large-scale illegal catch’ (p. 141).  Further, big 
industry acknowledged the importance of poverty alleviation in coastal communities 
as a means of impacting the informal fishery (meeting held on 1 March 2007), and a 
broader, strategic approach to managing the fishery in its entirety was proposed at the 
WCRL workshop (Branch et al. 2007).  Little has been done to take this forward, 
however, and attempts to think strategically about the fishery have been thwarted by 
court cases and severely inadequate consultation procedures between the different 
stakeholders. 
 
4.3  Marine Protected Areas 
 
While Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are globally promoted as an important 
management tool for fisheries, it is increasingly recognised that their success hinges 
as much on social organisation as on technical design (McClanahan et al. 2008).  A 
discussion on MPAs is relevant for this chapter due their significance in the Hangberg 
case study site, and the overarching issues they raise in terms of small-scale fisheries 
in South Africa.  Many MPAs also incorporate no-take zones, which prohibit the 
harvesting of marine resources in a particular geographic area.  Jones (2006) argues 
that there are many debates and challenges related to no-take zones, and there is a 
need to collaborate between disciplines in order to understand the underlying issues 
and problems.  He argues that fishers’ benefits, as well as perceptions and attitudes 
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towards the no-take zone, are critical to the severity of the problems that may emerge, 
and ultimately to compliance.   
 
The first formally declared MPA in South Africa was in 1964, following the drive of 
the IUCN in 1962 to establish a global system of protected areas (Sunde and Isaacs 
2008). In 2008, almost 18% of South Africa’s coast is protected through MPAs 
(Sunde and Isaacs 2008). However, examples of species-specific no-take zones (or 
‘sanctuaries’) were evident in the early 1900s.  Van Sittert (1994), for example, 
highlights the establishment of rock lobster sanctuaries as early as 1918, set up in 
response to industry concerns about resource depletion.  The Hout Bay rock lobster 
sanctuary, adjacent to Hangberg, was proclaimed in 1934 (van Sittert 1994).  
However, in 1952, all but two lobster sanctuaries were deproclaimed as government 
stated that the sanctuaries had minimum conservation importance in the absence of 
effective enforcement.  Thus, throughout the early to mid-1900s, with resource 
instability, the sanctuaries were proclaimed and deproclaimed with various law 
enforcement effort, but they ultimately had little impact as fishing (both formal and 
informal) continued irrespective of the laws (van Sittert 1994).   
 
The state in fact opened the sanctuaries to ‘experimental’ commercial fishing from 
1984 to 1993, but continued to restrict access to anyone outside the formal fishery 
(van Sittert 1994: p.41).  The Hout Bay lobster sanctuary was reinforced as a ‘no-
take’ zone through the promulgation of the Table Mountain National Park Marine 
Protected Area in 2004. Renamed the ‘Karbonkelberg Sanctuary’, it encompasses the 
Hout Bay sanctuary adjacent to Hangberg/Hout Bay (see Figure 6.9).  In DEAT’s 
notice of intent to declare the MPA, it states: ‘the purpose of Sanctuary Zones is to 
allow marine species and ecosystems in those zones to exist in a natural state to 
further fulfil South Africa’s commitments to the conservation of biodiversity and to 
enhance eco-tourism opportunities’.  In addition, it states that ‘all forms of fishing 
shall be prohibited within the Sanctuary Zones’ (DEAT 2004c: 5).   
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Figure 6.9: The Table Mountain National Park Marine Protected Area, highlighting 
its six sanctuaries or ‘no take zones’, including the Karbonkelberg Sanctuary adjacent 
to Hangberg (adapted from DEAT 2004c). 
 
Although eco-tourism opportunities are recognised, the rights of traditional fishers to 
secure a livelihood are not.  In the case of Hangberg, with rudimentary rowing boats, 
most without an engine, it is extremely difficult for fishers to harvest outside the 
sanctuary.  As informal fishers, their only mechanism to secure formal access to the 
rock lobster resource is through a recreational permit.  However, even with this, they 
are unable to access a ‘legal’ fishing zone as they do not have the gear to do so.  This 
sense of injustice was highlighted frequently during the fieldwork in Hangberg (L3, 
L4, L8, L11, L14, L48), with one fisher articulating his frustration so well: ‘we are 
traditional fishers and we can’t fish in our own backyard! We can’t afford to go to 
other areas to fish – even with a recreational permit – because we don’t have the boats 
or the petrol to do it…even the guys who fish on the rocks like they used to all those 
year ago – they can’t do it either.  It isn’t right that we’re being excluded from the sea 
that we live next to’ (L1).  Another fisher said: ‘why can Kommetjie and Oceanview 
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and Gansbaai and Kleinmond people all get to fish next to where they live – are we 
not people too?’ (L8). 
 
This frustration is further exacerbated by the fact that commercial vessels are in fact 
permitted to harvest WCRL in the Karbonkelberg Sanctuary during March of every 
year.  The formal fishery is allocated 30t per annum from the no-take zone as a 
‘research quota’, which is seen as a critical source of scientific data for monitoring 
lobster growth rates (van Zyl 2001).  While the scientists argue that the experimental 
fishery is not suited to hoopnets due to the location of tagged lobster in waters deeper 
than 30m, the Hangberg fishers have never been consulted about this fishery. Further, 
the fishers feel a sense of injustice as they are entirely excluded from any form of 
access to the sea adjacent to them, while they witness the extraction of lobster by 
commercial rightsholders.  One informal fisher explained: ‘large quota holders 
already have so much of the TAC and now they come and take out tons in our 
backyard and we have to stay out…it needs to be looked at…at the moment we don’t 
care about the rules and the laws of government because it is all so unfair’ (L3). 
 
In retaliation, the informal fishers take their boats out at night and raid the traps of the 
commercial vessels while they harvest in the sanctuary.  One night a fisher boasted of 
a 25kg ‘catch’ simply by lifting the traps (L4).  In addition, stories were told of 
cutting the lines and sabotaging the traps, which were also confirmed by industry and 
government.  The frustration and anger of the local fishers is evident and one fisher 
questioned – ‘how can government get it so wrong?’ (L4).  When pressed by the 
media about commercial fishing activity in MPAs, MCM conceded that it was true 
(SAPA 2007).  Table Mountain National Park (TMNP), which has been delegated 
compliance authority in the MPA, has also questioned the legitimacy of the no-take 
zone while commercial vessels are still permitted to harvest (L37, L39).  The 
institutional arrangements in this regard have been problematic as TMNP personnel 
are expected to enforce the laws, but they are not involved in formulating regulations, 
nor in the allocation of access rights.  Decision-making power thus remains in the 
hands of MCM. 
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4.4  Law Enforcement 
 
During times of resource crisis, emphasis is increasingly placed on the role of law 
enforcement to sustain the formal fishery.  This has been the case historically, in 
terms of enforcing new regulations and laws in the 1900s (van Sittert 1994), and 
remains the case today.  With increasing concerns over reductions in the TAC, and 
blatant informal fishing, there is ongoing pressure from scientists and industry to 
enhance law enforcement capacity and effectiveness.  Strategic meetings and 
workshops have been initiated by the WCRL commercial sector as a means to 
catalyse MCM to implement plans for increased law enforcement along the coast 
(Branch et al. 2007, Industry-MCM meeting 9 May 2007).  However, frustration 
remains high as little progress has been achieved in this regard.   
 
Almost all of the fishers who were interviewed, however, spoke of some altercation 
with law enforcement, including being fined, having nets taken, bait dumped or boats 
confiscated.  Regardless, every single fisher indicated that it would not stop them 
from fishing.  As one fisher explained: ‘if you have to put food on the table then you 
just have to do it’ (L14).  One boat owner explained that he has a good relationship 
with his buyer whereby he borrows money to buy nets and other gear if they have 
been confiscated, and he then pays back his buyer in lobster (L4).  Although fishers 
claimed that law enforcement would not deter their behaviour, observation indicated 
that it took time for many of the fishers to regain their positions with new or borrowed 
gear.   
 
A further impact of law enforcement, from the fishers’ perspective, was that it 
promoted the dangerous practice of fishing at night, or in bad weather.  With most 
patrols taking place during the day, many of the informal fishing boats launch at 
night, which increases their safety risks due to poor visibility and rough seas.  
Incidents of drowning occur every year.  Significant to this research was the drowning 
of a key informant, who was a skipper on one of the informal boats.  In the words of 
the boat owner: ‘…he was like a son to me.  This is government’s fault…for making 
us go over the mountain, when it isn’t safe, because we have no other choice…’ (L4).  
This young man of 27 was supporting his girlfriend and four children.   
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4.4.1  Delegation of Compliance Authority  
 
In recognising their capacity and resource constraints, MCM began delegating 
compliance authority to other institutions in the early 2000s.  This is the case of the 
Table Mountain National Park MPA, where South African National Parks 
(SANParks), through TMNP, was contracted to undertake fisheries compliance in the 
MPA since 2005.  Since this time, management arrangements have been affected by 
the promulgation of the Protected Areas Act (No. 57 of 2003), which states that 
‘marine and terrestrial protected areas with common boundaries must be managed as 
an integrated protected area by a single management authority’ (Section 38(4)). 
Although the institutional arrangements under this Act are still being finalised for 
TMNP, the initial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance fisheries 
compliance in the TMNP MPA, was an important development in enhancing visibility 
along this stretch of coast.  
 
Thus, TMNP established a Marine Rangers Section in March 2005, which was 
operational under a two-year contract to MCM.  In 2006 there were 19 people 
working in this section with a R1.9 million budget, patrolling the coast in vehicles and 
on foot, as well as conducting inshore patrols with two boats.  Their mandate was to 
ensure fisheries compliance in the MPA, and in order to produce the necessary 
statistics, this was achieved through arrests and confiscations (L33).  However, senior 
personnel explained that it was more important to them to keep the resources in the 
sea, and to make a presence along the coast. The problem with this approach, 
however, was that it was difficult to justify to MCM that their objectives were being 
met: ‘it is very difficult to monitor the success of compliance activities’ (L33).  
 
4.4.2  Law Enforcement Challenges 
 
Law enforcement remains the key strategy of government to respond to the WCRL 
informal fishery, but a number of challenges remain.  First, there were a number of 
examples of complacency within law enforcement sectors of MCM.  There seemed to 
be a sense that there was little top-level support for local decision-making and that 
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managers were not aware of the challenges that they were facing on the ground (L33, 
L34, L35, L39).  The frustrations were made apparent in one MCM field station when 
the following discussion took place: 
Interviewer: do you do inshore patrols in this area? 
MCM Fishery Officer (L36): No, we just do road patrols along the coast. We 
are trying to organise the papers for our patrol boat but right now it is 
just sitting in the harbour. 
Interviewer: Oh – so you can’t patrol on your boat because of administrative 
issues – you need certain papers to be finalised? 
MCM Fishery Officer: Yes. But even if we had the boat, there is no one in this 
office that has a skipper’s license anyway. 
 
Further frustrations included not having uniforms and not receiving training. 
Respondents explained that they had to learn things ‘like laws and regulations and 
species identification on the job’ (L34, L35, L36).  The absence and ineffectiveness of 
law enforcement in terms of monitoring the formal commercial fishery were broadly 
highlighted as being highly problematic (Branch et al. 2007, L37, L42, L43, L45). 
 
Second, a number of obstacles were apparent in terms of the delegation of compliance 
authority, particularly in relation to the disjunction that existed between management 
decision-making and compliance activities.  A two day workshop with TMNP marine 
rangers indicated that although they were required to enforce fisheries laws and 
regulations, they were not in a position to ‘get creative’ in terms of achieving 
compliance (L37, L39).  By working under MCM, they were limited in terms of their 
activities and they were not involved in developing laws or in making management 
decisions.  Thus, ‘problems faced on the ground aren’t considered by the people 
making decisions at MCM’ (L40).  This was the clear message that was emerging in 
relation to informal fishers in the MPA adjacent to Hangberg.  Although TMNP 
recognised that the fishers were contravening the MLRA, and therefore they were 
mandated to intervene, they felt frustrated that the root causes of the ‘poaching’ were 
not being acknowledged nor addressed by MCM (L37).  Although they recognised 
that there were highly organised syndicates operating in both the abalone and lobster 
trade, they also acknowledged that there were traditional fishers who were harvesting 
illegally because they had no other economic options (L37, L39).  Nevertheless, they 
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had no decision making power in terms of management, and they were expected to 
continue to patrol and fine these fishers.  Thus, there was a frustration that their 
contribution was only in terms of short-term law enforcement, rather than developing 
strategies to enhance compliance in the long term (L37, L39). 
 
This disjunction between law enforcement and management was glaringly apparent 
during a hostile outburst between TMNP marine rangers and approximately 40 
informal lobster fishers in the Karbonkelberg Sanctuary in November 2005.  When 
the situation diffused, TMNP proposed a meeting to discuss the key issues – ‘we 
needed to resolve the problem’ (L33).  However, when the meeting was set up at the 
harbour, in MCM offices (because it is in close proximity to the fishers), a senior 
MCM compliance official cancelled the meeting because ‘MCM is not allowed to 
meet with poachers’ (L33).  Although some TMNP officials managed to meet with 
the fishers anyway, there was very little follow-up because the issues were 
management related – in terms of the proclamation of the sanctuary, subsistence 
fishing rights and communication with MCM.  TMNP rangers felt that these decisions 
were ‘out of our hands’ (L39).  From the fishers’ perspective, they felt that TMNP had 
made an initial effort with them (more so than MCM had ever done) but they were 
frustrated that two years later nothing more had happened (L1, L3, L4, L49).   
 
A third challenge was that all the law enforcement personnel interviewed for this 
study, from the various institutions, were empathetic towards the informal fishers.  
There was a conflict of interest because the officers on the ground acknowledged that 
they needed to ‘do their work’ (which includes patrols, giving fines, confiscating fish 
and equipment and sometimes making arrests), but they understood that many of the 
fishers harvest informally because ‘they need food for their families’ (L34, L35, L37).  
There is some reluctance on their part to arrest or fine the fishers, and in some cases, 
law enforcement officials are doing routine checks in the sanctuary, but largely ‘leave 
them to their business’ (L34).  This approach frustrates industry and civil society, but 
highlights the fact that the underlying drivers of informal fishing are not understood 
nor addressed.  
 
Interestingly, the recognition of the socio-economic drivers of informal fishing were 
also highlighted by the few commercial rightsholders who were interviewed in the 
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community.  One rightsholder explained that he knows that the resource is being 
impacted, and that this will ultimately affect him, but he said that the people in his 
community have few alternatives: ‘I don’t motivate it. But there must be a law that 
you must respect. The poachers do it to put bread on the table’ (L2). This was also 
reiterated by the informal fishers themselves, some stating that even if they received 
legal access, they wouldn’t be able to keep poachers out: ‘how can I deny someone 
bread? I’ve been there – I couldn’t do it to someone else’ (L11).  As one teacher in the 
secondary school stated: ‘the poaching is a big issue for the learners…but they could 
be doing drugs or breaking into houses – this is a better alternative’ (L51). Law 
enforcement, therefore, was not supported as an effective means to address the issues 
underlying the informal fishery.  
 
From the perspective of law enforcement officials, the illicit abalone trade was more 
of a priority and they were required to focus their resources and effort on that.  
Interestingly, lobster fishers observed that law enforcement presence was much higher 
since abalone became a focus of government, and they also perceive this to be a 
greater priority by the authorities.  Law enforcement is a frustration for the fishers, but 
they don’t feel that it has a significant long-term impact on their operations. 
 
Thus, the research indicated that the informal WCRL fishery was thriving, despite law 
enforcement efforts.  Even if enforcement personnel were present, conducting their 
operations and producing their ‘numbers’ (arrests, fines, confiscations etc.), they were 
having little long-term impact on the operations of the informal fishers.  Harvesting 
activities continued despite the setbacks and financial implications of enforcement 
efforts.  If anything, frustration mounted as fishers perceived the state preventing 
them from a legitimate livelihood while big fishing companies entered the ‘sanctuary’ 
with impunity.  Attempts to explore alternative compliance strategies are largely 
hampered by the lack of coordination that exists between compliance effort and 
management decision-making, both between, and within, the different government 
agencies.   
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5. FACTORS INFLUENCING COMPLIANCE IN WCRL 
FISHERY 
 
There are a number of underlying issues in this case study that are influencing fishers’ 
decisions to comply or not with rules and regulations.  The preliminary conceptual 
framework, introduced in Chapter Three (Figure 3.2), will again be drawn on for this 
case study as a means to highlight the diverse and complex factors that are influencing 
behaviour. Van Sittert’s (1993, 1994) historical reflection on the development of the 
WCRL fishery, for example, has highlighted the power of industry and the state 
throughout the 1900s to marginalise the small-scale sector.  The result was a 
monopoly industry with an export oriented focus.  Even after the promulgation of the 
MRLA, the power of big industry to secure foreign investment and establish 
international markets has continued to be prioritised over the interests of small-scale 
fishers to secure their livelihoods.  This is evident in the fact that the WCRL industry 
legally opposed the allocation of an Interim Relief Permit to traditional fishers that 
allowed 20 lobsters per week to be harvested.  Big industry argues that an estimated 
120-200 tons of lobster was likely to be harvested in 2007 through this interim 
permit12. They argue that this additional offtake will jeopardise the sustainability of 
the resource and future catches – ultimately penalising the commercial fishery in the 
long term (WCRL Association Founding Affadavit 2008).  The small-scale fishers, on 
the other hand, have argued that the Interim Relief Permit was a significant source of 
poverty relief during its allocation, and was highly valued by the fishers (Garcia 2008, 
L1, L4, L55, L56).  In response to the court case, one small-scale fisher (who was 
allocated an Interim Relief Permit) explained: ‘how can we threaten the big industry? 
We take nothing compared to them. THEY are threatening us and our way of life’ 
(L8).  There is a genuine injustice that industry is legally contesting the Interim Relief 
permit, while a 257t recreational fishery goes unquestioned, and discussions around 
the 500t ‘illegal catch’ (which is incorporated into TAC modelling) are not initiated.  
 
This frustration is further exacerbated by the fishers in the Hangberg case study as big 
industry is permitted to harvest a research quota in the ‘no-take zone’ in the MPA.  
                                                
12 While scientists acknowledge that data is of poor quality, they estimate the harvesting levels to be 
around 178t (Keulder and van Zyl 2008). Fishers, however, argue that catches were much lower due to 
delays in issuing permits, weather and other logistical constraints. 
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Although scientific research is still considered pertinent in this area, traditional lobster 
fishers do not benefit in any way, and the injustices of the rights allocation process is 
exacerbated through this policy.  Thus, it seems evident that the power of big industry, 
whether through the courts or in collaboration with the state, to influence laws and 
policies in their favour continue to marginalise small-scale fishers, many of whom 
have a long history of harvesting the WCRL resource.   
 
Thus, from an institutional perspective, the ongoing exclusion of traditional fishers 
from the formal fishery has exacerbated the informal trade.  With no small-scale 
fisheries policy to protect customary rights, even the post-democratic fisheries 
‘transformation’ process entrenched rights in the hands of big industry, largely 
through internal transformation.  Access to the WCRL fishery was undoubtedly 
extended through the limited commercial sector, but the resource-oriented approach of 
the state resulted in a rights-allocation process that was deemed illegitimate by many 
of the fishers.  Thus, despite law enforcement efforts, informal fishers who did not 
gain access to the formal fishery continued to harvest WCRL.  There is no obligation 
to comply with the law and there are few social sanctions in place in coastal 
communities.  The divisiveness of the rights allocation process has made it difficult 
for rightsholders to sanction informal fishers who are friends or relatives.  Thus, the 
state relies almost solely on law enforcement to enforce rules, which is problematic 
due to weak capacity and the conflict that results.  Further, although the delegation of 
compliance authority to other government agencies has been considered important, its 
narrow implementation has resulted in the separation of fisheries management from 
law enforcement.  This has created confusion and frustration for compliance 
personnel, and has led to the failure to develop a strategic approach to addressing non-
compliance. 
 
There are two key social factors that have emanated from the research that are 
influencing fishers’ behaviour.  The first is the importance associated with customary 
fishing practices, and the perceived right of fishers to protect that tradition.  For those 
who have grown up on the sea with their fathers and grandfathers, they argue that 
their fishing culture should be preserved and that they should receive preferential 
rights of access to marine resources.  This is related to the second social factor, which 
is the weak presence of social controls.  With an illegitimate rights-allocation system, 
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there is little cohesion within coastal communities and few incentives to protect 
resources as a collective.  Even formal rightsholders have recognised the need of 
informal fishers to eke out a living from the sea, arguing that they were once doing the 
same.   
 
From an economic perspective, the informal WCRL fishery is thriving through local 
market demand.  With the industrial fishery having a long history of an export-
oriented trade, the domestic market was largely ignored.  This provided an 
opportunity for those traditional fishers who had been squeezed out of the fishery 
from the 1950s.  Lobster was historically considered an important source of protein 
for the poor, but increasingly became of cultural importance during times of 
celebration for many communities on the west and south coasts.  Further, with a 
growing tourism trade, South African lobster was in high demand.  Although some 
informally harvested lobster is destined for the overseas market, the majority is used 
to supply the local market.  This trade, therefore, has provided an important livelihood 
for many informal WCRL fishers, many of whom depend on this as a sole source of 
income.  More organised operations have also developed as a result of the economic 
gains of the lobster fishery.  This has led to the involvement of opportunists, who are 
not supported by the general community, but who are attracted to the fishery as a 
source of easy money. 
 
Finally, fishers’ behaviour is influenced by biophysical factors, which are key to the 
effective management of the fishery.  The weather, for example, plays a role in the 
sustainability of the resource as fishers are often prohibited from entering the sea due 
to high swells and unsafe conditions.  In addition, the southerly migration of the 
lobster, as well as ‘walkouts’ due to red tides, have affected the availability of the 
resource.  For some formal fishers, who are unable to harvest their whole quota, turn 
to the informal fishery at various times of the year to supplement their income.  The 
uncertainty of the southerly migration has also raised concerns of stability in the 
small-scale sector, which erodes incentives to comply with rules. These dynamics of 
the natural system, therefore, are important to understand in relation to the social and 
economic impacts, and how this influences fishers’ behaviour. 
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A summary of the key factors that influence compliance in the WCRL fishery have 
been highlighted above.  These factors have been particularly explored through the 
Hangberg case study, emphasising the need to acknowledge, understand and respond 




The WCRL fishery is at a pivotal stage in its development.  The commercial export-
oriented fishery has a long history, operating for over a Century and dominated by the 
powerful interests of big capital. With an even longer history, however, traditional 
fishers along the west coast have been harvesting lobster as a source of food, bait and 
income, which has significantly contributed to their livelihoods.  Thus, an informal 
fishery began to develop in the early-1900s as small-scale fishers became increasingly 
regulated in terms of access to the resource.  Concerns over resource declines led to 
further exclusion in the mid-1900s, despite significant poverty along the coast.  
Although fishing for the black market remained an important source of subsistence 
and alternative employment (van Sittert 1994), it was during the political transition of 
the mid-1990s that MCM began to reassess the inequities in the WCRL fishery. 
 
In this context, MCM has been required to acknowledge the marginalisation of small 
scale fishers at the same time as protecting a dwindling resource and addressing the 
disenchantment of an economically unstable commercial industry.  This unenviable 
balancing act has ultimately led to high levels of non-compliance.  The informal 
fishers, with significant resentment against MCM and big industry, continue to 
operate in an organised fishery and plan to enhance their operations and grow their 
informal markets.  In addition, small-scale rightsholders, who see declining annual 
TACs and uncertain futures, are drawn to the informal trade as a means to sustain 
their income.   
 
The broader initiatives of MCM do, however, need to be recognised, including the 
attempt to allocate fishing rights to small-scale fishers, to build government-industry 
working relations and to decentralise compliance activities. In addition, the initiation 
of a WCRL fishery workshop, by industry, in January 2007 highlighted an openness 
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to ‘get strategic’ about managing the fishery in its entirety.  Many of the key issues 
plaguing the fishery were highlighted, including the exclusion of traditional fishers, 
ineffective law enforcement, poverty and inadequate government-industry 
collaboration.  However, there was little leadership by MCM to take the process 
forward, and in early 2008, industry reaffirmed its own economic interests by 
challenging the Minister of DEAT in a court of law to suspend the Interim Relief 
Permits. Ironically, the Minister defended the small-scale fishers, arguing that they 
needed to be catered for.   
 
Although there have been important attempts by the state to recognise small-scale 
fishers and to explore broader management strategies, law enforcement continues to 
be the main strategy employed by MCM to achieve compliance, and issues such as 
commercial fishing in a ‘no-take zone’, adjacent to a traditional fishing community, 
are not addressed. Further, a court case to challenge interim relief permits, while a 
257t recreational fishery continues to operate, highlights the inequity in the fishery. A 
number of underlying challenges in this fishery have been raised and this research 
emphasises the importance of tackling these, and clarifying the key factors that 
influence fisher behaviour.  Trends in the WCRL fishery highlight the importance of 
acknowledging the informal fishery as a key component of the fishery system as a 
whole, which needs to be understood and incorporated into broader management 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE FACTORS, DRIVERS AND UNDERLYING 
PRINCIPLES OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES 






Traditionally, the key objective of fisheries management has been to sustain fish 
stocks and ensure the ecological integrity of the natural system (Raakjær-Nielsen et al. 
2004).  The concept of sustainability, however, has significantly evolved over the 
years to acknowledge the inextricable link between the social and natural systems.  In 
this context, a sustainable fisheries system is one that leads to social, economic, 
ecological and institutional sustainability of the fishery as a whole (Charles 2001).  
Threats to any of these components of the fishery system need to be understood and 
addressed in order to achieve sustainability in this broad sense.  Non-compliance has 
been identified as a threat to resource sustainability (Sutinen et al. 1990) and efforts to 
enhance compliance have largely been implemented in isolation of understanding the 
broader factors that may influence fisher behaviour.  As a result, despite enhanced law 
enforcement programmes, such as those in South Africa, fisheries remain threatened, 
with both the resources and the fishers at risk.  This has highlighted the need to gain a 
broader understanding of the factors, and key drivers, that motivate fishers to comply 
(or not) with rules and laws. 
 
This chapter aims to consolidate and analyse the information that has been collected 
in this study.  A revised conceptual framework for understanding small-scale fisheries 
compliance will be briefly presented, which is based on the empirical research, as well 
as the theoretical concepts that were introduced in Chapter Three. Although the 
underlying factors that influence fisher behaviour will not be specifically discussed 
again in this chapter, they are drawn on to highlight the key drivers influencing 
compliance.  Section Three of this chapter then provides an analysis of the application 
of the conceptual framework to the case studies investigated, and the small-scale 
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sector broadly in South Africa. This analysis assists in understanding the combination 
of factors that lead to change in the nature of the fishery, and which result in shifts 
between the informal and formal sectors.  In analysing these factors and drivers, it has 
been necessary to revisit the theoretical ideas underpinning the conceptual framework. 
By doing so, the chapter ends with a discussion of a set of key principles that should 
guide the development of an alternative and more integrated approach to fisheries 
compliance.  
 
2. FACTORS INFLUENCING FISHER BEHAVIOUR 
 
Drawing on the preliminary conceptual framework, which was introduced in Chapter 
Three, key factors have been highlighted that influence fisheries compliance in South 
Africa.  Both the formal and informal fisheries are influenced by these factors, which 
are interconnected and change over time. As these factors emerged from data 
collection, they were further explored through additional fieldwork and by revisiting 
the literature. This iterative research process also led to ongoing conceptual 
development, which is presented in this chapter. As highlighted in Figure 7.1, an 
understanding of compliance behavior first requires an understanding of law, and the 
power dynamics that have shaped it. These laws, and their historical context, then 
influence the dynamics that exist between the other factors in the fishery system, all of 
which have been highlighted in this research as important in influencing fisher 
behavior.  Thus, increased law enforcement strategies, which are expected to enforce 
rules that are created in isolation of the political, social, economic, institutional and 
biophysical context, will have little long-term impact.  An understanding of 
compliance, therefore, is embedded in an understanding of the fishery system as a 
whole.  
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Figure 7.1:  A conceptual framework for understanding small-scale  
fisheries compliance 
 
Thus, by relying on an approach to compliance that is based on reductionism, or 
which assumes that fishers are inherently self-maximising individuals, ignores the 
diversity of factors that influence behaviour. Further, it is not only necessary to 
identify the factors that influence compliance behaviour, but also how they interact. 
This framework, therefore, highlights a new approach to understanding small-scale 
fisheries compliance.  Although this framework has been developed through an 
examination of case studies in South Africa, there is potential for it to have broader 
applicability.   
 
3. KEY DRIVERS OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR 
 
Fundamental to this research has been the realisation that different factors, and the 
way they interact, influence compliance behaviour in different ways and at different 
times. As a result, a combination of factors, acting together, become ‘drivers’ that 
change the way fishers’ behave.  Berkes (2006) defines drivers as ‘those key factors 
that cause change in a system’ (p. 48).  The change in fisher behaviour, as a result of 
these key drivers, needs to be understood in order to develop appropriate strategies to 
intervene. However, Berkes (2006) states that drivers are contested and are socially 
constructed. As a result, the drivers that are identified by the state, and which are 
acted upon, may be different from those identified by the fishers.  In South Africa, 
this explains the state’s focus on law enforcement, which is argued to address the 
economic drivers of non-compliance. However, as is evident from this research, there 
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are many other factors, and subsequent drivers, that are influencing compliance 
behaviour. Thus, this section will apply the conceptual framework outlined in Figure 
7.1 to the two case studies, and the small-scale fisheries sector in South Africa more 
generally.  By doing so, an understanding of the diverse factors that are influencing 
fisher behaviour emerge and the key drivers that lead to changes in the way the 
fishery system operates are identified. Figure 7.2, therefore, illustrates how 
compliance behaviour changes over time and how different factors have combined to 
drive change.  
 
 
Figure 7.2:  Key drivers influencing compliance in an evolving fishery system. The 
large dotted arrows illustrate a continuum of fishing activity that is  
shifting from one sector to another. 
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Evident from this figure, based on the case study research, is that there is an evolution 
taking place in which fisheries are moving toward ‘informal syndicates’.  Although 
the scale, and extent to which this takes place will depend on each fishery context, 
there are similar trends occurring within the case studies investigated for this research.  
The section below will discuss this evolving fishery system in greater detail, drawing 
on the empirical evidence presented in the case study chapters. 
 
3.1  Key Drivers Influencing the Shift f rom ‘Traditional 
Fishers’ to  the ‘Informal Traditional’ Fishery 
 
The involvement of traditional fishers in the informal traditional fishery is largely 
driven by political decision-making (laws and policies), as well as fishers’ social and 
economic circumstances.  In this context, social relates strongly to customary 
practices, and the perceived traditional rights of fishers to harvest resources that they 
have historically accessed.  The economic drivers relate to poverty, and the fishers 
perceived right to secure a livelihood from the sea, to provide for their families and to 
meet basic needs.  As stipulated in the case study chapters, the informal traditional 
fishery is considered illegal by the state, largely consists of traditional fishers and 
resources are harvested on a small-scale, as a means to secure a livelihood. 
 
The case studies have indicated that the traditional informal fishery is significantly 
driven by inequitable laws and policies that excluded the majority of small-scale 
fishers from legally accessing marine resources.  This has both a historical and a 
contemporary context, with van Sittert (2002b, 2003) arguing that South Africa has a 
legacy of inequality in its fisheries. Even through attempts at ‘transformation’, small-
scale fishers have remained marginalised, while the interests of big industry capital 
have remained secured (Croeser et al. 2006, Isaacs et al. 2005, Raakjær-Nielsen and 
Hara 2006).   
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In the West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) case, although communities harvested 
lobster for centuries, increased government control over the open access fishery in the 
early 1900s led to stricter regulations and limits on public access (van Sittert 1985, 
1993, 1994).  Locally considered a ‘food for the poor’, it was the booming overseas 
market that had directly influenced local management measures, which sought to 
secure foreign investment through export (van Sittert 1993, 1994). As a result, 
conservation (or exclusion) measures were put in place to sustain the overseas market 
at the expense of small-scale fishers.  This became evident in terms of increased limits 
on open access fishing and the centralisation of the lobster industry in the hands of 
monopoly industry by the 1950s.  As one of the oldest fishers in the Hangberg case 
study community explained: ‘I have been catching kreef [lobster] since I was a boy. 
Then there were all the rules that were made to stop us.  We kept fishing, though, 
because that is what we are – fishermen’ (L10). One of the legacies of the past, which 
was discussed in Chapter Six, is the existence of a Marine Protected Area (MPA) on 
the doorstep of Hangberg.  In addition to the fishers being prohibited from any fishing 
activity in this zone (DEAT 2004c), the fishers’ perceived injustice is exacerbated by 
the fact that commercial vessels are permitted to harvest a 30t research quota from 
this zone every year.   
 
In the abalone fishery, as discussed in Chapter Five, harvesting also began as an open 
access system.  Limits on harvesting were increasingly put in place as a means to 
protect the resource and to secure a valuable, and growing, export industry. With the 
introduction of a production quota in 1970, five white owned companies eventually 
became entrenched, and dominated the industry. Despite the overseas market, a local 
demand for abalone remained, particularly to seafood and Asian restaurants in Cape 
Town, which provided the local market for informal fishers.  As one traditional fisher 
explained: ‘I used to dive abalone – I dived in the ‘60s in the Transkei. Then they took 
away my permit when the system changed. I used to sell my abalone for 9 pence each!  
I continued to dive all those years, and the market really opened up in the ‘80s – for 
the Chinese restaurants’ (A62).  
 
Both of the case studies in this research have had a history whereby the political and 
economic power of the state and monopoly capital have marginalised the interests of 
the small-scale fishers in order to secure a lucrative export industry. Thus, the 
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traditional informal fishery emerged as a result of the formal rules that were put in 
place to limit access. These laws, which were implemented to ‘conserve’ the 
resources, essentially drove traditional fisheries underground, as fishers and their 
families relied on marine resources as a key source of food and/or income (van Sittert 
1993, 1994). As one informal lobster fisher explained: ‘the sea is a source of income 
for us – it has always been that way in our families.  It is the big companies that tell us 
that what we do is wrong – because they benefit from the system – we don’t.  People 
here don’t have a choice – it is how we live to bring food to our families’ (L1).   Thus, 
with widespread coastal poverty (Glavovic and Boonzaier 2007), and with fishers 
perceiving their situation as ‘worse off than before’ (Cardoso et al. 2005), poverty 
remains a key driver influencing fisher behaviour.   
 
As a result, in many small-scale fisheries in South Africa, the broader fishing 
community does not perceive informal traditional fishing to be ‘wrong’ – but it is 
considered a legitimate right for those living adjacent to the sea to feed their families, 
whether they have a formal permit to fish or not (Hauck et al. 2002, Masifundise 
2003).  Linked to this are the social and moral values that are attributed to customary 
fishing practices. The right to sustain one’s culture, and one’s livelihood, are 
considered important values that fishers’ believe should be respected and incorporated 
into fisheries policy and law.  For fishers who have not gained formal access to 
fisheries, customary rights override their obligation to comply with formal rules. 
Thus, marine resources became part of the ‘freedom struggle’ in the 1990s, to fight 
for what people believed was their ‘right’ (A62, A1).   
 
Thus, in both case studies, the informal traditional fishery became established as an 
accepted livelihood strategy in many coastal communities. As one fishers’ wife 
explained: ‘it puts food on the table.  This is what [my husband] knows – he has been 
doing it since a child.  The people here do not see it as wrong – they understand why 
it happens – they are not upset by it’ (L50).  Even formal fishers, who may be 
threatened by the impact of informal fishing, acknowledged the economic need of 
informal fishers and their traditional right to access marine resources.  As one formal 
lobster fisher explained: ‘some of these guys have been poaching over the mountain 
for more than 20 years and they still don’t have a quota. It isn’t fair – I understand 
why they do it.  They need to put bread on the table. You can’t tell someone they 
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can’t fish if they need to put bread on the table’ (L6).  This was also the case in the 
early-1990s in the abalone fishery, when the informal traditional fishery was gaining 
legitimacy due to protest fishing and the lobbying of fishers for access rights (Hauck 
1997).   
 
Other small-scale fisheries in South Africa exhibit similar trends to those outlined 
above.  The research of the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) clearly 
highlighted that many traditional fishers along South Africa’s coast were fishing 
informally, and considered ‘illegal’ by the authorities (Harris et al. 2002a, Hauck et al. 
2002).  This was largely due to their exclusion from formally accessing marine 
resources.  Although recreational permits were available to everyone, the restrictions 
of these permits, in terms of fees, harvesting limits and restrictions on sale, were not 
appropriate or sufficient for those fishers relying on marine resources for their 
livelihood (Harris et al. 2002a, Sowman 2006).  Furthermore, widespread poverty in 
coastal communities, a high reliance on marine resources as a livelihood strategy and 
few economic alternatives (Branch et al. 2002, Glavovic et al. 2002, Hauck and 
Sowman 2003, Sowman et al. 2008), have all contributed to the norms and values that 
fishers’ associate with resource use.  Thus, fishing activity is based on fishers’ 
perceived rights, whether legal or not, to sustain their customary fishing practices as 
well as their livelihoods.  These drivers, coupled with political decision making that 
has led to inequitable laws and high levels of exclusion, have contributed to a thriving 
traditional informal fishery.   
 
3.2  Key Drivers Influencing the Shift  from the ‘Informal  
Traditional’ Fishery to  the ‘Formal’  Fishery 
 
 
The onset of democracy in South Africa provided new opportunities for those fishers 
who had been denied access to coastal and fisheries resources in the past (Hauck and 
Sowman 2005).  A fisheries policy process was introduced in 1995, with a key aim to 
address the inequitable access to marine resources.  The political transition, therefore, 
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from the Apartheid policies of the past, to a newly democratised nation, was a key 
driver to recognising the rights of traditional fishers.  The promise of the new 
government was ‘the upliftment of impoverished coastal communities through 
improved access to marine resources’ (ANC 1994: 104).  This political environment, 
coupled with new institutional arrangements, was fundamentally important for 
recognising, and formalising, traditional fishers.   
 
One of the most significant developments in terms of small-scale fisheries was the 
legal recognition of subsistence fishers for the first time in fisheries legislation in 
South Africa.  The MLRA (1998) promoted reform in terms of redistributing access 
rights to historically disadvantaged individuals (Witbooi 2006).  In the abalone and 
rock lobster fisheries, subsistence permits were allocated to fishers from 1998, which 
was the first time they were formally recognised outside the recreational sector.  
Following the recommendations of the SFTG, subsistence permits were abandoned in 
favour of small-scale quotas, through the limited commercial sector from 2001. For 
many informal fishers, this had been an ideal opportunity for them to gain legal access 
to marine resources.  As one abalone fisher explained: ‘…the quotas have been a good 
thing for this community.  It has given a lot of people a source of income and the 
poaching had really decreased.  It gave the guys security and they didn’t want to take 
chances – they didn’t want to lose those quotas’ (A14).  
 
In addition to broadening access rights, new institutional arrangements were set up to 
manage these newly formalised fisheries.  In the abalone fishery policy of 2003 
(DEAT 2003), for example, progressive fisheries management concepts were being 
introduced, such as co-management and the Territorial User-Rights Fishery (TURF). 
Underpinning these concepts was the objective of instilling ownership amongst rights 
holders and ensuring cooperative management between the rightsholders operating in 
these TURFs and the authorities. In addition, other institutional arrangements such as 
Scientific Working Groups and Management Working Groups were initiated by 
MCM for the different fisheries, including abalone and WCRL.  In the small-scale 
fisheries sector, an important development was the establishment of a Subsistence 
Fisheries Management Unit at national level, as well as the appointment of some 
extension officers at provincial level.  Thus, in addition to formalising access to small-
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scale fishers, attempts were also being made to increase fisher participation in 
management. 
 
However, as was discussed in the case study chapters, despite the attempts by MCM 
to broaden access rights to traditional fishers, and to develop progressive policies, 
they were often implemented in isolation of the realities on the ground.  For example, 
a number of bona fide fishers continue to remain excluded from formally accessing 
marine resources (Cardoso et al. 2005, Isaacs 2006a, Masifundise 2003, Sowman 
2006).  For example, the focus on broadening access to ‘historically disadvantaged 
individuals’, in some cases meant that powerful local elites benefited at the expense of 
traditional fishers (Isaacs 2003).  Further, although MCM recognised that institutional 
arrangements needed to be put in place to facilitate increased participation of new 
resource users, in reality it was difficult to implement. Some argue that the fisheries 
authority was ill-equipped, from an institutional perspective, to engage and govern the 
small-scale fisheries sector (Sowman 2006). 
 
The province of KwaZulu-Natal, however, where there has been a delegation of 
fisheries authority, is the only province in South Africa where institutional structures 
have been put in place to manage small-scale fisheries at both provincial and local 
level.  A co-management policy has been developed to implement co-management 
arrangements between fishers and the provincial authority (EKZN Wildlife), in order 
to jointly manage inshore marine resources (Harris et al. 2007).  Thus, in KZN, the 
formalisation of traditional fisheries was complemented by active attempts to 
establish cooperative institutional arrangements, whereby small-scale fishers could 
participate in the development of rules and the management of the fishery.  While 
both successes and weaknesses of these co-management arrangements have been 
identified (Clark 2006b, Hasler 2006, Kapfudzaruwa et al. 2008, Napier et al. 2005), 
the authorities argue that compliance is ‘high’ amongst the small-scale fishers (Harris 
et al. 2003, Hauck and Hasler 2006).   
 
Pilot co-management projects have been initiated in other coastal provinces, but they 
have been ad hoc, with varying degrees of commitment from the national fisheries 
authority (Hauck and Sowman 2003).  The institutional arrangements at national level 
have not adequately changed to engage effectively with the small-scale fisheries 
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sector.  As a result, the fishers interviewed for this study, as well as others (Cardoso et 
al. 2005, Hauck et al. 2002, Masifundise 2008b, Sowman et al. 2008), have argued 
that greater cooperation and engagement is required between the fishers (both formal 
and informal) and MCM to manage and sustain small-scale fisheries. As one abalone 
fisher explained: ‘once we had our quotas it felt like MCM was handing everything 
over to us to sort out.  But we needed each other.  We needed help from them, and 
they needed help from us. But it never happened’ (A28). 
 
Thus, although attempts were made through the MLRA and subsequent policies to 
broaden participation in fisheries management, and to increase the legitimacy of the 
new management regime, it was difficult to achieve in practice.  Institutional 
arrangements remained highly centralised, which resulted in ineffective 
implementation on the ground. Although the fishers recognised the importance of 
broadening access rights, the reality was that many were still excluded.  This, 
therefore, impacted on the legitimacy of the institutional arrangements, as well as the 
sense of ownership that was expected to have been created through ‘legal’ access. 
 
South Africa is now embarking on a new small-scale fisheries policy, which has the 
potential to address some of the challenges in small-scale fishery systems. This policy 
could provide an opportunity to reassess both access rights and institutional 
arrangements.  However, as discussed in Chapter Four, the challenge of MCM to 
formalise customary fishing practices is exacerbated by the limited resources 
available in the nearshore zone (Cockroft et al. 2002). This dilemma was recognised 
by the SFTG, which stated that if small-scale fishers are to be adequately 
accommodated, there would need to be a reallocation of rights among existing sectors 
(i.e. commercial and recreational) (Harris et al. 2002a). However, with long-term 
rights allocated to the commercial fisheries since 2005, redistribution will be difficult, 
and will likely lead to more court cases.  Thus, the small-scale fishery policy process, 
which rests on the premise that traditional fishers should be given preferential access 
to marine resources, is unfolding in an uncertain political environment.  Nevertheless, 
important steps have been taken to broaden access to small-scale fishers in South 
Africa, which need to be acknowledged.  Further, the lessons and challenges that have 
been raised in KZN, through the implementation of more participatory approaches to 
small-scale fisheries, need to be explored further. Significant political will is required 
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to prioritise the rights of small-scale fishers, and to secure and sustain these rights 
through legitimate institutional arrangements.  
 
3.3  Key Drivers Influencing the Shift from a ‘Formal’  
Fishery to ‘Informal Syndicates’ 
 
The involvement of formal fishers in the informal fishery has been discussed in both 
case study chapters.  This shift, which must be understood as operating at different 
scales and levels of organisation, is largely driven by the institutional arrangements of 
the fishery, coupled with the socio-economic circumstances of the fishers.  The social 
drivers in this context refer to the limited social sanctions evident among resource 
users, and the perceived legitimacy of informal fishing.  The economic drivers largely 
relate to the importance of achieving economic stability, but also include aspects of 
greed.  Formal fishers may engage in both the traditional or syndicated informal 
fisheries, but the trend indicates that there is a growing shift toward becoming 
involved in syndicates.  In the abalone fishery, the informal trade is largely dominated 
by syndicates that are controlled by highly organised outsiders linked to an 
international black market.  Formal WCRL fishers, however, are largely trading with 
the informal traditional fishery, with links to the domestic market.  Nevertheless, large 
scale informal trade through international syndicates has been known to take place 
(Le May 2002) and there is concern that the lobster fishery may evolve in a similar 
direction to that of the abalone fishery (L42, L43).   
 
Although there was widespread support for the broadening of formal access rights, 
most fishers argued that institutional arrangements were ineffective in protecting these 
rights, securing their livelihoods and minimising the informal trade.  In relation to the 
abalone TURF policy, for example, there was widespread agreement amongst the 
fishers that they received inadequate support from MCM to make the TURF system 
work: ‘There was never a TURF system – most of the zones were being shared with 
other people.  And no one from MCM came to us to strategise and to make it work.  
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We were expected to do it all ourselves – it was totally unrealistic’ (A19).  Animosity 
towards MCM grew over the years, particularly as formal fishers argued that they 
were ‘penalised’ with quota cuts while the informal fishers continued to fish with 
impunity (A1). 
 
Although there was an expectation by MCM that the abalone fishers, and their 
communities, would protect their zones (DEAT 2005), most fishers felt that this was 
far from reality.  In addition to the informal fishery becoming highly organised, and 
‘out of our control’ (A5), fishers also expressed a reluctance to stop informal fishers 
who they knew as family or friends (A3, A9, A14, A19, A20).  They justified the 
informal fishery on political grounds, arguing that fishers were unjustly excluded 
from the rights allocation process, and that MCM had not intervened to provide 
employment or other economic opportunities.  As one fisher argued: ‘MCM never 
came to us to ask us “how can we assist to help you to make your area viable?”’ 
(A28).   
 
Centralised decision-making was particularly evident during the process leading up to 
the closure of the commercial abalone fishery in February 2008.  All informants 
adamantly stated that they had not been adequately consulted on this decision and that 
closure of the commercial fishery would not save the abalone resource anyway. Some 
argued that this process was a reflection of how decisions had been made all along.  
One formal fisher explained: 
‘They close Dyer Island and Betty’s Bay Reserve for the commercial divers 
but they open them for the poachers.  What is the government doing? I don’t 
understand it?  Who is the government making the decisions for? The abalone 
or the people? If they close the fishery for 20 years they do it so that my child 
will see an abalone in 20 years time. But what about now? What about my 
family now? They close it and there still won’t be abalone in 20 years time 
because the poachers will have taken it’ (A1). 
 
Thus, with a burgeoning informal trade, coupled with an uncertain future, many of the 
formal fishers chose short-term economic gains through the informal trade.  The 
economic drivers, therefore, relate to both need and greed.  In terms of ‘need’, formal 
fishers in both case studies argued that the lack of security in fisheries (due to 
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decreasing TACs), economically unviable quotas, and limitations on the number of 
species that they are permitted to harvest, all contributed to economic instability at an 
individual level.  Although there was the recognition that many of the formal fishers 
were engaging in the informal trade, some argued that this was largely occurring on a 
small-scale: ‘a lot of the guys are doing it because they need the money. Our quotas 
have decreased and there are school fees to pay. But they are scared of losing their 
quotas – they won’t take big chances.  It isn’t big scale – they just do what they need 
to do’ (A14).  On the other hand, some argued that there were fishers making big 
money: ‘It is about greed. They are used to living a certain lifestyle and can’t say 
good-bye to it.  We could live from the original quotas – but it wasn’t enough for 
them’ (A1).  Thus, the economic incentives, from different perspectives, were key 
drivers to engaging in the informal fishery. 
 
In the formal WCRL fishery similar drivers were emerging, albeit at different scales.  
For example, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of engagement 
between the commercial fishery and MCM (Branch et al. 2007, L42, L43, L44).  
Government decision-making around the allocation of rights was considered highly 
problematic, not only in terms of the number of people that were excluded, but also in 
terms of the institutional arrangements that were set up to gain access to the fishery.  
Joint venture agreements, and the establishment of small companies with many 
shareholders, often resulted in economically unviable businesses.  With annual cuts in 
the commercial TAC since 2005, there is a fear that economic instability will fuel 
increased engagement with the informal trade (L2, L31). One informal fisher justified 
the activities of the commercial fishers by stating: ‘some of the guys are only 
shareholders in a company. The directors get all the money and they are left with 
nothing.  They are lucky if they get into a boat.  They bring us tails because that is 
what makes ends meet’ (L13).   
 
This economic instability of small-scale fishers was further threatened by the 
government decision to prohibit them from accessing a ‘basket’ of marine resources, 
or from pursuing supplementary income. Policies on the allocation of long-term rights 
specifically limited other forms of employment, and limited access by restricting the 
variety of species that could be harvested (DEAT 2003, 2005).  These policies, 
however, immediately contradicted historical fishing practices, in which different 
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species were harvested at different times of the year, or other income-generating 
activities were pursued as a means to compliment livelihood strategies (Isaacs et al. 
2005, Sowman 2006, Sowman et al. 2008).  For those fishers who have struggled to 
diversify their income, the informal fishery has been an important source of additional 
income (L1, L48). 
 
Even in other less lucrative fisheries in South Africa, the formalisation of small-scale 
fishers has been problematic in terms of institutional arrangements.  A key assumption 
of MCM is that once rights have been allocated, fishers will take greater responsibility 
of fish resources and compliance will result (L52, L53, Tarr 2000).  However, even in 
fisheries where a co-management approach is adopted, the perceived economic need 
to harvest marine resources is often prioritised over other laws (agreed upon or not). 
Some of the mussel collectors in KZN, for example, expressed concern that they were 
only permitted to harvest mussels twice a month, which did not meet their basic needs 
(Hasler 2006).  Thus, in KZN, alternative sources of income were considered key to 
diversifying livelihoods and sustaining co-management arrangements (Clark 2006b).   
Similar findings were also found in other provinces, but few functioning co-
management arrangements are present outside the province of KZN.  In the Eastern 
Cape Province, for example, centralised decision-making exists, with little legitimacy 
of the management system or its rules (Calvo-Ugarteburu and Raemaekers 2007, 
Raemaekers in prep, Sowman et al. 2008).   
 
Thus, although an effort has been made in South Africa to allocate access rights to 
traditional fishers, the process of this allocation, coupled with ineffective institutional 
arrangements, have largely alienated small-scale fishers from management.  In the 
case studies outlined above, fishers have either questioned the legitimacy of the rules 
or they have questioned the legitimacy of the management authority, which they 
perceive to be ineffective and unjust.  Due to the exclusion of some traditional fishers, 
the newly formalised fisheries were not considered legitimate by some of the fishers, 
and this undermined the institutional arrangements proposed to govern them.  
Centralised decision-making contributed to the fishers’ inability and unwillingness to 
exert the necessary social controls to mitigate the informal fishery.  Finally, the 
economic drivers that relate to both need and greed significantly influenced fishers’ 
decisions to supplement their income through the black market trade. 
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3.4  Key Drivers Influencing the Shift f rom an ‘Informal  
Traditional’ Fishery to  ‘Informal Syndicates’ 
 
The transition from the informal traditional fishery to one that is highly organised and 
dominated by syndicates is particularly relevant for the abalone fishery.  By 
monitoring this fishery for more than a decade (Hauck 1997, Hauck 1999a,b, Hauck 
and Hector 2003), the researcher has observed the evolution that has taken place.  
While the abalone fishery may be unique in its level of sophistication, and considered 
‘the most organised illegal fishery in South Africa’ (A49), there are signs in the 
WCRL fishery that a similar evolution could occur.  Further, other less lucrative 
fisheries in South Africa may also lead to the creation of informal syndicates. 
Although at a smaller scale in terms of economic value, market demand and level of 
organisation, they are also impacted by the involvement of outside opportunists who 
establish a black market trade for economic gain. 
 
The key drivers that have emanated from the case studies are both political and 
economic.  The political drivers relate again to the inequitable laws that have 
excluded traditional fishers from the formal fisheries. With growing animosity and 
defiance towards the state, fishers have turned to highly organised operations, with 
little to lose.  Coinciding with political transformation in the fisheries, growing 
markets provided the opportunity for high economic gains.  Thus, in recognising the 
high profits to be gained by trading marine resources on the black market, outside 
opportunists emerged in the fisheries. These drivers, coupled with weak law 
enforcement, fuelled an informal trade – with few risks. 
 
The abalone fishery, of course, is the classic case study in this regard, highlighting the 
transition from a highly politicised informal traditional fishery, to one that is now 
dominated by powerful groups involved in other illegal activities (such as the drug 
trade – Steinberg 2005).  Interestingly, within coastal communities, and between the 
resource users themselves, there is a moral distinction that has been made between 
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those informal fishers who are ‘legitimate’, because they are protecting their rights, 
and those who are not, because they are in it for big money (Hauck 1997, Hauck and 
Nursey-Bray 2002; A1, A2, A11, A13, A15, A54).   
 
This is best highlighted through the proposal that was developed by the Abalone 
Rights Holder Association (ARHA) in 2001. Although the proposal recognised a suite 
of challenges, it was an attempt to bring stakeholders together to legitimise the fishery 
and recognise traditional rights of fishers who had been excluded from the fishery at 
the time.  This proposal, however, received no government response, despite months 
of deliberation and negotiation in the coastal communities affected.  Interestingly, this 
proposal clarified the distinction between informal fishers who were considered 
legitimate and those who were not. It stated the intention to create an ally between 
traditional informal fishers, the formal industry and MCM, in order to address the 
encroachment of outside syndicates and build a strong formal fishery.  Thus, it 
recognised the need to build a fishery based on legitimacy, which acknowledged the 
rights of traditional fishers at the same time as building cohesion, in order to keep 
outsiders out.  A current formal fisher, who had been an informal fisher at the time 
and had worked closely on this proposal stated: ‘I felt proud about the fact that we all 
sat together and developed that proposal.  It would have worked and this fishery 
would be different today. But nothing came of it – MCM never accepted it’ (A15). 
 
Although the new abalone policy of 2003 broadened formal access to the resource, 
many fishers still claim that too many key people were left out (A1, A3, A14, A15, 
A19, A23, A28, A30).  This conflict with the rights allocation process coincided with 
a growing Asian demand for abalone, which provided an economic incentive for the 
informal trade to grow.  With rising prices, and a favourable exchange rate, abalone 
became a highly lucrative resource.  The economic opportunities associated with 
informal abalone fishing began to attract wider role-players, with interests in high 
economic gains and low perceived risks.  As a result, the fishery effectively became 
open access as fishers and opportunists (including gangs and international syndicates) 
worked together to feed consumer demand.  The entry of outside syndicates occurred 
at a time when there was political uncertainty around access and stewardship of the 
abalone resource in the early 1990s.  With no long term incentives to protect the 
resource, coupled with bigger markets and higher prices, syndicates forged 
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relationships with fishers in local communities as a means to develop highly 
organised operations.   
 
Further, there was widespread acknowledgement that law enforcement was weak, 
with many fishers arguing that the authorities should have focussed on targeting the 
growing number of opportunists entering the fishery. However, there were 
innumerable stories of corruption, many from informal fishers who had personal 
experiences.  One fisher, who had been heavily involved in the informal sector 
provided a detailed description of his perception of the market and his exposure to 
corruption: 
‘You will never stop the poaching.  The market will always be there. There are 
too many people involved – including the police and the inspectors – and the 
money is too good.  You get someone out of the system and someone new will 
come in…It is not unusual for law enforcement to make R10 000 a night. We 
had contacts everywhere – including the red patrol boats. If we went out to 
Dyer Island we would tell them to stay on one side of the island – then we 
would call them to tell them we were finished and they would move to the 
other side. If they were getting pressure to move around the island – they 
would call us and tell us to scoot.  Technology is great! With cellphones it is 
so easy now.  Anyway, there are people in MCM who are well connected to 
the poaching – while they are in place it will be impossible to stop the 
poaching’ (A34). 
 
The informal lobster fishery has not reached the widespread level of organisation that 
is evident in the abalone fishery.  Although there have been reports of highly 
organised operations through the formal fishery (Hauck and Kroese 2006, Le May 
2002), and suspicion of black market lobster channelled through formal factories 
(L32, L39, A49), the bulk of the informal trade is targeted at the local market.  A 
domestic demand for lobster has a long history (van Sittert 1994), and has important 
cultural significance for many Western Cape families (L1, L4, L23, L56).  In addition, 
with a booming tourist industry, hotels, restaurants, wine farms and caterers turn to 
the informal fishery to supply them with lobster that they are reluctant to purchase 
from high-priced formal suppliers.  The informal fishers in Hangberg indicated that 
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there was an ongoing demand for their catch and they were never in a position where 
they couldn’t sell the lobster that they had harvested.  
 
The involvement of outsiders in the informal WCRL trade since the 1970s has been 
mentioned by van Sittert (1994), who particularly referred to the recreational fishers, 
and other opportunists, who saw the trade as an extra source of income.  Formal 
networks began to develop in order to ensure a regular supply to the market.  The 
scale of operation in the informal lobster trade is varied, ranging from organised 
middlemen, with regular suppliers and markets, to subsistence fishers willing to risk 
selling their lobster on the road in order to put food on the table.  There is significant 
animosity toward MCM in terms of fishing rights, and the sentiment is that ‘if they 
don’t let me benefit from fishing legally, then I will do it illegally.  What do I have to 
lose?’ (L18).   
 
This statement is directly linked to the potential to grow the informal trade.  The 
sentiments of the fishers in Hangberg were not very different from those of the 
informal abalone fishers in the mid-1990s (Hauck 1997).  As one informal lobster 
fisher explained: ‘lobster is moving in the direction of abalone.  We are saving for 
rubber ducks so we can fish in the deep water. We won’t stop. We have the same 
problem as the abalone guys – we want fishing rights’ (L20).  There is certainly a 
willingness to develop bigger operations, and to export lobster for higher prices, if the 
opportunities present themselves.  One fisher explained that there was so much anger 
amongst the fishers that their ethic has changed: ‘the guys don’t care anymore. They 
take undersize or females in berry – Fuck MCM is what they have to say.  They will 
take any opportunity they can get!’ (L1).   
 
Other small-scale fisheries in South Africa have also been exposed to outside 
middlemen and markets that increase incentives to local fishers, and others, to supply 
demand.  As Mann (2003) explains of the gillnet fishery in Lake St. Lucia in KZN, 
‘…there is a well-established poaching network. Many netters supply fish to 
middlemen who come into the area with light delivery vehicles, pick up large 
quantities of fish and sell these for considerable profit in markets further afield…’ (p. 
109).  The transition from subsistence based activities, to commercialisation of marine 
resources for sale, has been highlighted as a concern in terms of market demands and 
 
Rethinking Small-scale Fisheries Compliance  200 
pressures from outside buyers (Kyle 2003, Steyn in press).  A decision to prevent the 
small-scale sale of the east coast rock lobster in KZN, however, has simply driven the 
harvesting and sale underground (Kapfudzaruwa et al. 2008).  It seems clear that there 
is an increasing demand for fish and fish products in South Africa, which is a 
worldwide phenomenon (Ahmed et al. 2006, Dietz et al. 2003). Thus, with growing 
markets, the resultant economic incentives, few controls and the political 
marginalisation of small-scale fishers, South African fisheries are vulnerable to 
organised syndicates.  Despite the different scales, movement of fisheries in the 
direction of syndicates seems to be taking place (as outlined in Figure 7.2), posing 
significant challenges, and repercussions, for marine resources, and the bona fide 
fishers that depend on them. 
 
This section has highlighted the complexity of understanding the various factors that 
influence fisher behaviour.  Key drivers of change have been identified through an 
analysis of the combination of factors that lead to a shift in the nature of the fishery 
system over time. This analysis has clarified why shifts have taken place between the 
informal and formal fisheries.  The key trend emerging in the case studies, and which 
may be applicable more broadly, is that fisheries are moving towards more organised 
informal syndicates.  The next phase of this analysis, however, is to explore whether it 
is possible to prevent this trend from continuing. In order to do so, it is necessary to 
revisit the conceptual framework developed in this study, as well as the theoretical 
ideas informing the framework, and identify the principles that should be guiding an 
alternative and more integrated approach to fisheries compliance.  The section that 
follows will identify and discuss these principles, which it is argued are critical to 
understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries compliance in a more holistic and 
integrated manner. 
 
4. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF SMALL-SCALE 
FISHERIES COMPLIANCE 
 
In attempting to understand the factors affecting compliance behaviour in the case 
studies investigated, a number of key principles have emerged.  The remaining section 
of this chapter, therefore, will discuss these principles and highlight their importance 
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to understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa. In 
addition to the South African experience, however, the international literature has also 
been drawn on to emphasise the importance of these principles within a broader 
context.  Figure 7.3 highlights these principles, which have, as their foundation, 
equitable laws and policies.  Further, it is argued that the core principle for achieving 
compliance is social justice. This encapsulates the concept of human rights, and more 
specifically, the critical importance of acknowledging and protecting customary 
fishing practices and the livelihoods of fishers.  Emanating from social justice is the 
principle of legitimacy, which in its broadest sense reinforces the importance of moral 
support for the institutional arrangements developed to govern a fishery.  Finally is 
the principle of deterrence, which is identified as key to reinforcing laws and rules, 
and in enhancing the legitimacy of the management system.  Thus, both the normative 
action and rationalist approaches to compliance are highlighted. Fundamental to an 
understanding of Figure 7.3, however, is that before the principle of deterrence can 
have effect, legitimacy needs to be in place, and before the concept of legitimacy can 
have effect, the principles of social justice need to be embraced.  Underpinning all of 
this is the acknowledgement that none of these principles can be adopted without a 
supporting legal and policy framework. 
 
 
Figure 7.3: The underlying principles required to guide a more integrated approach 
to  small-scale fisheries compliance 
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4.1  Equitable Policy and Law 
 
Following the democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the country embarked on 
a radical law and policy reform process (Glazewski 2000).  Underpinning this process 
was the enactment of the Constitution in 1996, which promoted a human rights based 
approach that was guided by the Bill of Rights (Witbooi 2006).  As discussed in 
Chapter Three, this legislation provided the backbone for all other sectoral laws and 
policies, including those related to the environment, and management of natural 
resources.  The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA 107 of 1998), 
which guides environmental governance in the country, promotes the principles of 
sustainable development. The Act advocates: 
 ‘the promotion of equitable access to environmental resources to meet basic 
needs and ensure well-being, in accordance with the environmental right, 
including taking special measures to ensure access by previously 
disadvantaged persons. [It] further endorses the participation of all interested 
persons in environmental governance and promotes decision-making that takes 
into account the interests and needs of affected parties’ (Witbooi 2006: 36).   
All organs of state are therefore bound by these principles of NEMA when making 
decisions related to any environmental law, including fisheries law.   
 
Thus, the development of new fisheries law, which led to the MLRA in 1998, 
embraced a number of the core principles outlined above.  Most critically, the MLRA 
emphasised the need to ‘restructure the fishing industry to address historical 
imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches of the fishing industry’ (Section 
2(j)).  Additional objectives included ensuring the ecological sustainability of marine 
resources and promoting the economic stability of the fishing industry through 
economic growth and employment (Witbooi 2006).  Although these objectives are all 
important, the reality of balancing them in practice has proved challenging and 
controversial (van Sittert et al. 2006), which will be discussed further in Section 4.2 
below. Another important section of the MLRA was the identification and definition 
of ‘subsistence fishers’, but problems emerged in practice when the definition proved 
to be too restrictive (Sowman 2006).   
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In addition to this new fisheries law, South Africa has also supported a number of 
international and regional agreements that are particularly relevant to small-scale 
fisheries management.  The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is voluntary, but is an influential 
policy document (Witbooi 2006).  In its general principles, it specifically stipulates 
the rights of small-scale fishers: 
‘Recognising the important contributions of artisanal and small-scale fisheries 
to employment, income and food security, States should appropriately protect 
the rights of fishers and fishworkers, particularly those engaged in subsistence, 
small-scale and artisanal fisheries, to a secure and just livelihood, as well as 
preferential access, where appropriate, to traditional fishing grounds and 
resources in the waters under their national jurisdiction’ (FAO 1995: Article 6: 
18).   
 
In the regional context, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Protocol on Fisheries came into force in 2003 when it was approved in South Africa’s 
Cabinet, but it has not yet been ratified by Parliament (Witbooi 2006).  Key goals of 
the Protocol include food security, economic opportunities and sustainable livelihoods 
of fishers, sustainable use of marine resources and the alleviation of poverty (Article 
3).  In terms of small-scale fisheries, it specifically emphasises that State Parties shall 
institute: 
‘legal, administrative and enforcement measures necessary for the protection 
of artisanal and subsistence fishing rights, tenure and fishing grounds; and 
[take] particular account of the needs of socially and economically 
disadvantaged fishers’ (Article 12(1)). 
 
Further, the Protocol states that when an aquatic species or habit is endangered each 
State Party, among other things, is to ‘seek alternative economic activities for those 
whose livelihoods impact on the survival of the species’ (Article 14(4) (d)). 
 
These laws and agreements provide a strong foundation with which to develop 
effective small-scale fisheries management policies.  The overarching principles, in 
particular those of social justice and environmental sustainability, emphasise the need 
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to protect marine resources as well as the rights and livelihoods of fishers.  Thus, it is 
argued here that a strong legal foundation exists in South Africa to establish equitable 
policies and laws for small-scale fisheries.  However, although environmental law 
embraces these principles, there are still inequities, driven by power imbalances that 
need to be addressed in the fisheries sector.  Many of the social justice principles in 
the FAO Code of Conduct and the SADC Protocol, for example, that emphasise the 
preferential rights of small-scale fishers, are not recognised nor incorporated into 
domestic fisheries law.  The challenge of balancing the objectives of social equity, 
environmental sustainability and economic stability, as outlined in the MLRA, remain 
problematic.  The realities on the ground, as highlighted by the case studies, indicate 
that there is still a long way to go in protecting the rights of small-scale fishers. 
Fisheries legislation needs to be broadened to reflect the principles outlined above 
(Cullinan et al. 2005).  The recognition by the Minister of DEAT, for the need to 
embark on a new small-scale fisheries policy for South Africa, is a very important 
step to enable the incorporation of these key principles into future fisheries law and 
policy.  
 
4.2  Social Justice 
 
The lack of integration of the objectives of the Bill of Rights, contained in the 
Constitution, into the fisheries sector is highlighted by MCM’s resource-management 
approach to fisheries, in which the objectives of environmental sustainability are 
prioritised.  Although it is acknowledged that inshore marine resources are limited, 
and decreasing in some cases (Branch and Clark 2006), the broadening of access 
rights should include socio-economic considerations, including how resources are 
allocated amongst sectors, as well as scientific ones (Martin and Raakjær-Nielsen 
1997). The allocation of subsistence and limited commercial rights, therefore, which 
was based on resource characteristics rather than on the socio-cultural practices 
adopted by fishers to sustain their livelihoods, has been highly problematic from the 
start (Cardoso et al. 2005, Isaacs 2006a, Sowman 2006).   
 
The incompatibility between the needs of traditional fishers and the natural limits of 
marine resources reflects the significant challenge of identifying a number of 
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objectives within law that conflict in practice.  This is glaringly apparent with macro-
level laws that have been developed in democratic South Africa, which promote 
social, economic and environmental objectives.  These objectives have also been 
incorporated into the MLRA, but in practice: ‘the evolutionary pursuit of social equity 
is always powerfully opposed by the conservative demands of sustainability and 
stability’ (van Sittert et al. 2006: 97).  This challenge of balancing competing 
objectives in fisheries management is acknowledged internationally, and Hanna 
(2003) argues that it is ultimately a ‘search for balance in the distribution of authority 
and power’ (p. 309).  
 
In addition to the role of Apartheid policies in marginalising fishers by race, van 
Sittert (2002a,b, 2003) argues that the history of South African fisheries also needs to 
be understood in relation to the role of large capitalist interests in marginalising small-
scale fishers.  He states that despite attempts at fisheries reform, in both the 1940s and 
1990s, which promised the redistribution of marine resources, both processes in fact 
established big capital’s power over the fisheries (van Sittert 2002a).  This is 
emphasised by the fact that following implementation of the MLRA, internal 
transformation in the fishing industry simply entrenched ‘endemic inequality in the 
fisheries by raising up a black capitalist class alongside the white in the name of 
redistribution’ (van Sittert 2002a: 302). This resulted in the ‘blackening’ of the fishing 
industry, while the interests of the state and big industry remained aligned, and 
traditional small-scale fishers remained marginalised (Croeser et al. 2006, Isaacs 
2006a, Isaacs et al. 2007, van Sittert et al. 2006). The power of capitalist interests was 
affirmed through victorious court cases, in which big industry managed to secure its 
rights to marine resources (Witbooi 2006).   
 
This issue of conflicting policies has emerged in many fisheries around the world, 
with preferential policies that favour large-scale, industrialised fishers over small-
scale, traditional ones (Fisheries Coalition Action Team 2001, Ghee 1990, Gupta and 
Sharma 2004, Mathew 1990, McGoodwin 1987, Silvestre et al. 2003, Sunderlin and 
Gorospe 1997).  This problem was identified as a key issue by the FAO Advisory 
Committee on Fisheries Research: ‘One of the main policy thrusts in the past has been 
to promote economic growth at a national level, based on the assumption that all 
sectors of society (including small-scale fishers) will benefit. In fisheries, this has 
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tended to favour the development of large-scale approaches over small-scale ones and 
the resources being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands’ (2003: 9).  As Platteau 
(1989) explains, many governments in developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s 
initiated modernisation programmes, with resources being absorbed in the 
industrialised fisheries at the expense of the small-scale sector. 
 
An understanding of social justice in South Africa requires an understanding of the 
historical role of government, and other powerful elites, in developing laws and 
establishing socio-economic policies. The two sub-sections below will discuss two 
critical aspects of social justice that were particularly highlighted through the 
empirical research.  These are the importance of protecting customary use rights of 
fishers, and ensuring stable and sustainable livelihoods.   
 
4.2.1  Protecting Customary Rights 
 
The allocation of fishing rights is fundamentally a political issue (Hoel and Kvalvik 
2006).  Jentoft and McCay (2003) argue that it is therefore necessary to understand 
political influences by asking: ‘who are the stakeholders and what are their political 
assets, how are public and private interests played out, how do unequal distribution of 
power among stakeholders and user-groups impact on decisions made, and who 
benefits and who loses from fisheries management’ (p. 302).  In South Africa, the 
case study research has emphasised the reality that allocating rights to some fishers 
has deemed them ‘legal’, while others who have been excluded have been deemed 
‘illegal’.  The latter group of fishers are therefore considered ‘poachers’, and 
sanctioned through law enforcement measures. As the fishers themselves explain: 
‘government has turned us into criminals because they won’t let us fish what is 
rightfully ours’ (L28; with similar sentiments expressed in Branch et al. 2007, Hauck 
et al. 2002). The process of criminalisation is discussed in criminological literature, 
and it is widely recognised that power, and the interests that it protects, plays a critical 
role in identifying that which is considered ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ by the state (Lynch and 
Stretsky 2003, White 1999, 2003).  Further, the relations of power influence policies, 
which prioritise some objectives over others, often further marginalising the 
powerless (Barton et al. 2007a,b, Scraton 2002, Scraton and Chadwick 1991).  This 
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has already been discussed above, and will be picked up further below in the 
discussion on livelihoods. 
 
What is important to emphasise here is that political decision-making that is based on 
an unequal distribution of power is likely to lead fishers to break rules that are 
imposed on them (Jentoft and McCay 2003). The economic and political power of 
large commercial companies and the state has been highlighted through the case study 
research, emphasising how these interests have been entrenched to the detriment of 
small-scale fishers.  As a result, traditional fishers who have been excluded from 
accessing formal rights continue to harvest marine resources despite it being ‘illegal’ 
to do so.  From the fishers’ perspective, there is no moral obligation to obey formal 
law as they perceive it to be unjust.  Customary practices, therefore, are perceived as 
rights that should be protected and sustained through formal legal processes. The FAO 
(2005a) argue that ‘recognising the existing rights of fishing communities is a 
fundamental element in building a successful fisheries management system. Doing so 
provides a basis of legitimacy, which can significantly enhance system compliance’ 
(p. 41).  Therefore, what is argued in this thesis is that without this recognition of 
fishers’ rights in law (i.e. social justice), resistance to state-driven rules and 
regulations will persist (Hernes et al. 2005). 
 
In South Africa, although important attempts have been made to reallocate rights to 
small-scale fishers through the subsistence and limited commercial fisheries, this has 
been limited due to a prioritisation of the historically favoured commercial and 
recreational sectors (Sowman 2006).  As a result, political will is required to provide 
preferential rights to small-scale fishers, which is highlighted in international and 
regional agreements, and specifically recommended by the SFTG (2000).  The fact, 
for example, that many traditional fishers remain excluded from formally accessing 
marine resources while there are an estimated 750 000 recreational fishers operating 
along South Africa’s coast (Branch and Clark 2006) needs to be explored.  A further 
anomaly exists in the WCRL fishery, where for example, an interim relief permit for 
1230 traditional fishers is being challenged, yet there are an estimated 65 000 
recreational permits issued each year (Shannon et al. 2006). This needs to be 
questioned at a political level.  
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Although the idea of reallocating rights across three sectors in South Africa 
(commercial, recreational and small-scale) is not a simple task, and will require social 
and economic considerations, the fact remains that the rights of traditional fishers 
(which are enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution) are currently being undermined 
(Sowman 2006).  By being defined as ‘illegal’ or ‘criminal’, marginalised groups 
(such as small-scale fishers) are being criminalised by powerful groups who are 
protecting their own interests (Box 1996, Chambliss 1975, Scraton 2002).  South 
Africa’s long history of inequality needs to be acknowledged, which has left a legacy 
of coastal poverty, an imbalance of power between large-scale and small-scale 
fisheries, racial segregation, land dispossession and unequal distribution of natural 
resources (Glavovic and Boonzaier 2007, Harris et al. 2007, Hauck and Sowman 
2005, Hersoug 2002, van Sittert 2002a,b).  Thus, the concept of social justice in 
fisheries cannot be ignored by fisheries managers, but ‘must be addressed from the 
very beginning’ (Hernes et al. 2005: 105). 
 
4.2.2  Sustainable Livelihoods 
 
Conflicting policy objectives, as discussed above, need to be emphasised in relation to 
the livelihoods of small-scale fishers and their right to meet basic needs. The powerful 
interests of big industry, to benefit from neo-liberal policies and the export-orientated 
focus of fisheries policy, needs to be understood in this context of social justice. A 
national prioritisation of neo-liberal economic policies in South Africa has had a 
broad and significant negative impact on poverty and livelihoods (UNDP 2003).  The 
ANC had proposed socio-economic reform through its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) in 1994, but ultimately abandoned its underlying 
principles by subsequently adopting the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Strategy (GEAR), which promoted economic growth, foreign investment and 
privatisation (Croeser et al. 2006, Isaacs et al. 2007, van Sittert et al. 2006).  The 
result is not the radical intervention of the state in poverty alleviation, as expected 
through the transition to democracy, but rather an emphasis on capital production, 
which was assumed to ‘trickle down’ economic benefits to the poor in the form of 
employment (Isaacs et al 2007).  Poverty and inequality have in fact increased in 
South Africa since democracy in 1994 (May and Meth 2007, UNDP 2003).   
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Thus, with vulnerable livelihoods, and few economic alternatives, small-scale fishers 
in South Africa are increasingly relying on marine resources for food security and 
basic income (Cardoso et al. 2005, Hauck et al. 2002, Sowman and Cardoso in prep, 
Sowman et al. 2008).  Further, the biophysical factors that were discussed in the case 
study chapters have also impacted on livelihood strategies.  Environmental variability 
and the resulting impacts of these natural system changes, including the seasonality of 
fish species, may significantly affect income and food security.  Traditional fishing 
practices, therefore, often incorporated harvesting a ‘basket of resources’ that would 
involve fishers harvesting different species at different times of the year in response to 
availability, seasons and weather (Clark et al. 2002, Masifundise 2003). However, 
small-scale fisheries rights allocation policies have discouraged this diversification 
(DEAT 2003, 2005).  Therefore, it is argued that the objectives of resource 
sustainability cannot be achieved without ensuring the sustainability of fishers’ 
livelihoods (Sowman et al. 2008).  This is emphasised by Chuenpagdee et al. (2005), 
who explicitly state that ‘social justice is directly related to power and poverty’ and in 
order for fishers’ ‘to make a living when no alternative sources of employment are 
available and one’s bargaining position is weak, the only response…is for fishers to 
increase their fishing efforts’ (p. 33).   
 
Similarly, in his ethnographic study of two fishing villages in Norway and Canada, 
Gezelius (2002, 2003) explained that the perceived economic need to violate formal 
rules of the fishery resulted in no moral obligation within the collective to abide by 
that rule. Thus, he argued, the social and economic wellbeing of individual fishers, as 
well as the future of the community (in recognising that fishing is an important social, 
cultural and economic activity), were recognised as ‘rights’, and the importance of 
securing these rights were ‘regarded as a moral buffer against the obligation to obey 
the law’ (Gezelius 2002: 312).  The same can be said for small-scale fishers in South 
Africa.  Until their human rights are secured, and sustainable livelihoods are achieved, 
they will remain disenchanted with formal laws and policies, and they will 
‘vigorously defend perceived traditional rights’, even if it is illegal to do so (Cardoso 
et al. 2005: 35). The fact that there are significant resource constraints, however, 
needs to be recognised, and supplementary income-generating activities should be 
explored. The identification of complimentary livelihoods has been highlighted as a 
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critical aspect of sound fisheries management, in order to sustain fishers’ livelihoods, 
reduce pressure on diminishing resources, and limit vulnerability during times of 
resource shortage or due to environmental variability (Allison and Horemans 2006, 
FAO 2005a).   
 
4.3  Legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy is directly linked to the principles underpinning social justice.  As Hernes 
et al. (2005) explain, if a management system is considered ‘unjust’, fishers are likely 
to resist it: ‘in order to be legitimate, [fisheries] decisions must satisfy some basic 
criteria – or principles – of justice’ (p. 105).  Thus, legitimacy is increasingly being 
recognised as an important variable influencing fisheries compliance. There are many 
case studies around the world that have emphasised the importance of developing 
fisheries rules that reflect the norms, values and beliefs of fishers, in order to enhance 
legitimacy, and it is argued, compliance (Acheson 1998, Acheson and Gardner 2004, 
Bavinck 1996, Berkes et al. 2001, Dietz et al. 2003, Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004, 
Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Ostrom 2000, Raakjær-Nielsen 2003, van Ginkel 2005).  
If rules are considered fair, social mechanisms will often develop to ensure adherence 
to these rules (Berkes 1987, Ostrom 2000).  However, if formal laws conflict with 
customary practice and morality, as discussed above, an obligation to comply with 
formal laws is eroded (Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004, Jentoft 2000).   
 
In South Africa, the social factors that play a role in enhancing compliance are often 
weak.  This is due to a combination of fishers perceiving laws to be illegitimate, 
fishers perceiving moral beliefs as ‘rights’, which they are willing to defend even if 
they are contrary to formal law, and a breakdown of social cohesion within some user 
groups and coastal communities.  Some key informants participating in this study felt 
strongly that ‘fisheries transformation’ in South Africa (since 1994) exacerbated 
divisions and conflicts within coastal communities.  As one fisher explained: ‘by 
allocating individual rights in traditional fishing communities, some people got access 
and others didn’t.  This created an ethic of each person out for themselves, which took 
away our culture of fishing and led to competition and animosity’ (A35).  Thus, the 
case studies, as well as other research, indicate that many small-scale fishers do not 
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believe that their needs and values are incorporated into fisheries management 
systems (Hauck et al. 2002, Isaacs 2006a, Masifundise 2003).  Without adequate 
recognition of these values, the legitimacy of the management system erodes.   
 
Fundamental to any fisheries system are the institutional arrangements, which are the 
rules and structures in place to manage resource use (Ostrom 2000). Key to an 
understanding of institutions, however, is the recognition that they are not developed 
in isolation of other factors, but are in fact embedded in social, economic, political 
and ecological realities (Acheson 2006, Jentoft 2004a,b, McCay 2002).  Thus, 
institutions are a fundamental component of the management system, and crucial to 
getting them ‘right’ is ensuring that they are ‘ethically sound and socially just’ 
(Jentoft 2007: 361). Further, Jentoft (2004a) argues that ‘fisheries management 
institutions must work from the realisation that they are nested in social structures, 
moral norms and values that impinge on them’ (p. 94). Institutions therefore, 
fundamentally govern fisheries resources by creating the limits – and incentives – to 
ensure sustainability (ecologically, socially and economically) (Charles 2001, 
McClanahan and Castilla 2007).  
 
It is argued that institutions are legitimate insofar as they are created through 
participatory processes, ensuring that the fishers who are affected by them are also 
directly involved in creating them (Berkes et al. 2001, Jentoft 1989, Ostrom 2000).  
The assumption is that by moving away from conventional, centralised management, 
stakeholders other than government (including fishers) share decision-making power, 
thereby leading to a greater acceptance of rules and norms.  As Hall-Arber (2005) 
states: ‘It is now almost a cliché to note that those who participate in the development 
of regulations are more apt to abide by them’ (p. 144).   
 
Fisheries compliance research has also identified cases where law enforcement is 
weak (usually due to lack of capacity and resources), and where penalties are low, but 
the majority of fishers still comply with the regulations (Gezelius 2003, Sutinen and 
Kuperan 1999).  Thus, other than the small number of chronic violators, other factors 
have been identified that help shape compliant behaviour.  These factors, which are 
shaped by the theory of normative action, include moral and social norms, social 
pressure, perceived legitimacy of the management authority and fisher involvement in 
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decision-making and management (Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004, Hatcher et al. 2000, 
Hønneland 2000, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Kuperan et al. 1997, McKinley and 
Millington 2000, Raakjær-Nielsen 2003, Raakjær-Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003, 
Sutinen and Kuperan 1999).  The co-management approach, therefore, has been 
implemented worldwide as one mechanism to enhance legitimacy in fisheries. 
 
Significant experimentation, research and reviews have been undertaken on fisheries 
co-management around the world (Pomeroy et al. 2001, Wilson et al. 2003, 
Viswanathan et al. 2003), and some argue that it is the way forward for fisheries 
management (Gray 2005).  However, the results of co-management are highly 
variable. Although some have argued that co-management arrangements are still 
relatively government-driven through top-down processes (Hara and Raakjær-Nielsen 
2003), others argue that co-management has been successful in strengthening 
participation, self-regulation and compliance, and have contributed to improving 
fishers’ livelihoods and resource sustainability (Ahmed et al. 2006, Castilla et al. 
2007, McClanahan et al. 2008, Morenzo et al. 2007).  
 
In South Africa, the analysis of fisheries co-management has also had mixed reviews 
(Clark 2006b, Hauck and Sowman 2003, Napier 2005, Sowman et al. 2003).  Other 
than the province of KZN, small-scale fisheries remain driven by the managers and 
scientists in MCM, where a resource-oriented, command and control approach to 
fisheries has been adopted. Raakjær-Nielsen and colleagues (2004) refer to this as 
‘instrumental co-management’, in which governments perceive co-management to be 
less about genuine participation and more about a means to reach its own objectives: 
‘when co-management was initiated, it created huge expectations for genuine 
participation and empowerment, but the practical adaptation of the co-management 
turned out to be business as usual and not an institutional reform’ (Raakjær-Nielsen et 
al. 2004: 155). 
 
Thus, although there is a great deal of international rhetoric to move towards 
participatory approaches to management, Symes (2006) argues that policy making in 
this regard is more apparent than real. He states: ‘there is common concern that 
institutional changes are not keeping pace with the needs of the new forms of 
governance and that until these transformations are complete, power will remain in 
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the hands of the old oligarchy’ (Symes 2006:116).  This is the case in South Africa, 
where issues of power, and access to resources, remain pertinent issues to be 
addressed. As a result, what emanated from this research was that the legitimacy of 
institutional arrangements requires power imbalances to be addressed, equitable 
sharing of benefits to be achieved, and participatory institutional arrangements to be 
implemented.   
 
4.4  Deterrence 
 
The principle of deterrence ensures that the costs of prohibited actions are greater than 
the benefits of those actions. This emanates from an economic model of compliance, 
and rests on the assumption that rational individuals will comply with rules and laws 
if the perceived costs outweigh the benefits (Becker 1968).  Thus, in fisheries, this 
principle has led to enhanced law enforcement mechanisms as a means to increase the 
costs, through the probability of detection and conviction (Sutinen et al. 1990).  
Although crime control models have largely been relied upon by States to impose 
fisheries compliance, it is increasingly recognised in the literature, as has emerged 
from this research, that there are other strategies that should be explored to address the 
underlying drivers of fisher behaviour (Gezelius 2002, 2003, 2004, Hatcher et al. 
2000, Hønneland 2003, Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen 2003, Sutinen 
and Kuperan 1999).  Nevertheless, it is argued through the rationalist approach to 
compliance theory, that both formal and informal controls and sanctions are important 
for the small percentage of chronic violators in every fishery who are motivated by 
economic gain (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Sutinen et al. 1990).  Further, the 
importance of enforcing rules has also been emphasised as a means to enhance the 
legitimacy of the management system (Gezelius 2002, Hønneland 2000, Tyler 1990).  
In common property theory, Ostrom (2000) and others (Dietz et al. 2003) have argued 
that there will always be ‘free-riders’, and there is a need to ensure that rules are 
enforced. However, what is emphasised in this study is that the enforcement of rules 
must first be based on the assumption that rules themselves are considered fair and 
just, and are therefore accepted.   
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If law enforcement is expected to enforce laws that are not morally binding, costs will 
be high. Although it is recognised that command and control methods are not 
economically efficient (Dietz et al. 2003), they are increasingly relied upon to enforce 
rules (Raakjær-Nielsen 2003), particularly those that are devised through top-down 
management strategies (Hanna 1995). However, as Levi argues, ‘if an institution 
depends only on coercion for the successful implementation of its policies, the costs 
of enforcement will be unsupportably high’ (1990; quoted in Jentoft 2004b: 146). 
Further, Gezelius (2002) warns, if the authorities are not enforcing the rules, the 
incentive for fishers to obey rules that have no moral integrity is diminished. The 
result, as is the case in many small-scale fisheries in South Africa, is that a largely 
open access system is in place, whereby both formal and informal fisheries are 
operating simultaneously.  The centralised establishment of rules, which hold little 
legitimacy on the ground, is coupled with weak law enforcement, which translates to 
the state’s inability to enforce the rules that it creates.   
 
In South Africa, although fisheries law enforcement capacity has increased since 2000 
– particularly in the area of special investigations (Hauck and Kroese 2006), there is 
widespread acknowledgement of its ineffectiveness on the ground.  As a result, the 
law enforcement authority has little legitimacy, which is exacerbated by high levels of 
corruption.  With the national police commissioner of South Africa arrested for 
corruption in late 200613, there are high levels of mistrust of enforcement agencies. 
Studies have indicated that half of South Africans have little or no trust in the police, 
and believe that most police officers are corrupt (Faull 2007).  This lack of confidence 
in law enforcement, coupled with weak social controls emanating from illegitimate 
rules, has reinforced a ‘culture of non-compliance’ in which there is little moral 
obligation to comply.  Furthermore, even when compliance authority was delegated to 
local level (such as to the MARINES and to SanParks), law enforcement personnel 
recognised the incompatibility of having to enforce rules that they, and local 
stakeholders, were divorced from creating (A46, A49, L33, L37). 
 
However, an important distinction emerged in this research between those who are 
maximising gains from informal fishing (perceived to be making large profits) and 
                                                
13 The case against the police commissioner for fraud and corruption is still underway through the High 
Court of South Africa (Maughan 2008). 
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those who are simply relying on resources for their livelihood (‘just getting by’ or 
‘putting food on the table’).  This distinction, between fishing for ‘need or greed’ 
(Hauck 1997), was also highlighted by Gezelius (2002, 2003, 2004).  Gezelius 
explained that informal fishing as a result of economic need was generally tolerated 
by the community, whereas informal fishing that was practised for profit was 
considered unacceptable by the community and sanctioned. Thus, ‘the fear of social 
degradation or exclusion from the collectivity was usually enough to prevent 
opportunistic, utility-maximising action beyond the law’ (Gezelius 2002: 310). In 
South Africa, although it was recognised that high economic gain had motivated 
fishers to violate rules, social pressure was weak largely due to the perceived 
illegitimacy of the rules.  However, in the abalone fishery for example, when outside 
opportunists emerged in the fishery, there was an increased acceptance of the need to 
enhance formal controls. 
 
The ineffectiveness of formal law enforcement, however, was considered highly 
problematic by most stakeholders, and in fact led to the ‘domino effect’ in which 
fishers violated rules because they saw others getting away with it (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1994, 1998, Sutinen et al. 1990).  As Sutinen et al. (1990) explain, ‘non-
violators stand to lose out on the resource if much of it is taken by the violators, thus 
pushing them to violate as well’ (p. 246).  This was manifest in the abalone fishery, in 
which many formal fishers expressed their involvement in the informal trade due to 
the fact that informal fishers were continuing to fish with impunity, while their 
activities became increasingly restricted by the state. The importance of law 
enforcement to deter chronic violators, therefore, has been identified as important for 
reasserting the legitimacy of rules and regulations, and for enhancing the moral 
obligation of fishers to comply (Kuperan and Sutinen 1994, 1998, Raakjær-Nielsen 
and Mathiesen 2003, Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). 
 
Thus, this research has emphasised two critical points in relation to law enforcement 
and deterrence.  The first relates to the theory of normative action. It is unrealistic to 
expect law enforcement to address fisheries non-compliance if it is implemented in 
isolation of broader strategies that address the social, political, economic and cultural 
factors that are driving fishers to behave in the way that they do.  The second 
incorporates the rationalist approach to compliance, emphasising that law 
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enforcement, and other informal controls, are necessary for deterring chronic, profit-
maximising individuals, and for enforcing the legitimacy of the management system.  
Thus, while the monitoring and enforcement of rules have been identified as 
important for enhancing compliance, they need to be implemented through legitimate, 




This chapter has aimed to consolidate and analyse the empirical evidence that has 
emerged from the case study research to highlight the key drivers and principles 
influencing small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa.  In order to do so, it has 
been necessary to reflect on both theory and practice to determine the underlying 
factors that influence fishers’ behaviour.  Key to this understanding is the recognition 
that compliance is influenced by a variety of different factors, driving decision-
making differently in different circumstances, influencing shifts in the fishery system 
over time.  The summary of the empirical evidence outlined in this chapter reaffirms 
the complexity of fisheries management, not only in terms of the natural and socio-
economic systems themselves, but also in terms of the linkages between them over 
time.  It is evident that in order to achieve the objective of resource sustainability, 
which seems to drive fisheries management in South Africa, it is equally important to 
ensure the sustainability of the economic, social and institutional systems that rely on, 
and influence the fishery.  Resource limits need to be acknowledged at the same time 
as exploring the redistribution of access rights between sectors, and the feasibility of 
supplemental economic activities.  
 
This interconnectivity between human and natural systems is widely acknowledged in 
other discourses related to environmental and human security (Buzan et al. 1998, 
Thakur and Newman 2004, UNDP 1994) and is directly embraced by new approaches 
to fisheries governance (Garcia et al. 2008, McClanahan and Castilla 2007, de Young 
et al. 2008).  However, what underpins the small-scale fisheries compliance 
framework introduced at the beginning of this chapter, which may be applicable to 
fisheries compliance more generally, is that an understanding of compliance requires 
an understanding of power and law. Further, by applying this framework to case 
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studies in South Africa, the principles of social justice, legitimacy and deterrence have 
been identified as key to understanding and addressing compliance in a more 
integrated manner. By adopting these principles, it is argued that fisheries policies 
will shift away from a sole reliance on criminal justice approaches to achieve 
compliance, to a more integrated approach that aims to sustain the fishery system as a 
whole.  
 









Fisheries compliance theory has been developing since the 1980s (Anderson and Lee 
1986, Sutinen and Andersen 1985), borne out of a concern for ‘illegal fishing’ and the 
over-exploitation of fish resources.  Fisheries compliance thinking emerged from a 
rationalist perspective, in which fishers’ behaviour is argued to be determined by the 
costs and benefits of their actions. Further research began to expand this thinking to 
include a theory of normative action, in which fishers’ norms and values have been 
identified as important factors influencing their behaviour. It is widely recognised, 
however, that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but an integrated 
theory of compliance would include elements of both (Gezelius 2003).  The aim of 
this thesis has been to contribute to this evolution of fisheries compliance thinking by 
developing a conceptual framework to better understand the factors that are 
influencing fishers to comply, or not, with formal rules and regulations.  In order to do 
so, this study has focussed on the small-scale fisheries sector in South Africa.  Few 
empirical studies on small-scale fisheries compliance have been conducted 
worldwide, which provides an opportunity for the findings from this study to be 
applied more broadly, beyond the South African context. 
 
The importance of studying small-scale fisheries compliance has been highlighted 
internationally, as there is an increased recognition of the need to adopt new 
approaches to understanding and addressing compliance in this sector (Berkes et al. 
2001).  However, the trend worldwide is to continue to enhance law enforcement as 
the mechanism to achieve compliance.  This was highlighted in Chapter One, with a 
discussion of the international focus on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) 
fishing. Despite the discourse of IUU fishing emerging from the industrial sector, and 
focussing on illegal fishing on the high seas, the concepts, approaches and 
interventions aimed at this problem are being adopted for the small-scale fisheries 
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sector.  This is evident in recent studies conducted in Southern Africa (MRAG and 
CapFish 2008), which do little to differentiate the drivers of compliance between the 
industrial and small-scale fisheries.  As a result, there is an emphasis on law 
enforcement as the primary strategy to address illegal fishing. This is reaffirmed in the 
South African context, where an increased reliance on crime control strategies has led 
to the assumption that more policing will lead to increased fisheries compliance.  
However, despite enhanced law enforcement efforts, and as clearly highlighted in the 
abalone case, inshore resources remain threatened (Cockroft et al. 2002, Branch and 
Clark 2006), fishers’ livelihoods remain insecure (Cardoso et al. 2005, Sowman et al. 
2008) and conflicts continue to erupt (as seen by the number of court cases).  This 
highlights the importance of thinking differently about small-scale fisheries 
compliance, and developing a more integrated understanding of the drivers of fisher 
behaviour, and the approaches that are necessary to achieve a sustainable fishery 
system. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
The overall aim of this study was to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries compliance in South Africa. In 
order to do so, the research set out to address a number of objectives.  They were: 1) 
to understand the nature of the small-scale fishery systems investigated, 2) to identify 
the factors that influence compliance behaviour in the context of these fisheries, 3) to 
analyse these factors, and how they interact, in order to determine the drivers that 
change the fishery system over time, 4) to identify the principles that are required to 
develop a more integrated approach to small-scale fisheries compliance, and (5) to 
contribute to fisheries compliance theory by fundamentally enhancing the debate to 
include issues of power and law.  
 
In order to achieve these objectives, four approaches were adopted to guide the 
research. The first was systems thinking, which led to an investigation of the fishery 
as an integrated system, exploring the natural, social, political, economic and 
institutional factors influencing fisher behaviour.  Other approaches included 
grounded theory and action research, which were fundamental to ensuring that the 
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collection and analysis of information were conducted through an iterative process, 
and that the research findings had practical implications for fisheries policy.  In terms 
of grounded theory, the importance of analysing data and developing the conceptual 
framework in between trips to the field, ensured that concepts and ideas were 
emerging directly from information gathered, and were being refined over time.  This 
process was important not only for contributing to theory, through conceptual 
development, but also for informing policy in the future, which needed to reflect the 
realities on the ground.  Although the findings of this research contradicted many of 
the approaches currently adopted by South Africa’s fisheries authority, Marine and 
Coastal Management (MCM), it has been important for highlighting new ways of 
thinking about compliance.  As was discussed in Chapter Three, one of the key 
objectives of policy research is to influence the way in which governments think 
about old problems (Majchrzak 1984). 
 
A further approach, which compliments those outlined above, is the use of qualitative 
research methods to undertake empirical research.  Gezelius (2003) states that there is 
a scarcity of qualitative research in this field, and this study has highlighted the 
valuable information and rich insights that can be gleaned from this approach.  
Furthermore, the research process has identified that the development of relationships 
is a critical tool for studying ‘illegal’ behaviour, and this was facilitated through the 
qualitative methods that were employed to spend time with fishers and to build trust.  
 
In addition to an overall review of small-scale fisheries in South Africa, which also 
drew on primary data, the focus of this research was on two case studies that were 
‘telling’ examples for a study on fisheries compliance.  The abalone and West Coast 
Rock Lobster (WCRL) fisheries have a history of traditional use with social, 
economic and cultural significance to many coastal communities. Furthermore, 
although at different scales, both fisheries have an established informal trade that is 
vigorously targeted through law enforcement interventions.  In addition to these cases 
having particular relevance to theoretical development, they have also been important 
for contributing knowledge to two priority compliance issues in South Africa. 
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3. RESEARCH RESULTS: RETHINKING SMALL-SCALE 
FISHERIES COMPLIANCE 
 
This thesis has argued that we need to think differently about understanding and 
addressing small-scale fisheries compliance.  By drawing on empirical evidence, as 
well as the literature review, a conceptual framework has been developed that 
enhances existing compliance theory and proposes a more integrated approach to 
tackling compliance challenges.  By applying the conceptual framework to two case 
studies in South Africa, key drivers for influencing fisher behaviour over time were 
identified and changes within the fishery system were understood.  This then led to a 
clarification of the underlying principles that were identified in this research as 
necessary for understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries compliance.  Each of 
these contributions, which have emanated from this study, will be summarised below. 
 
First is the conceptual framework that was developed to understand small-scale 
fisheries compliance (see Figure 7.1).  This framework encompasses two key concepts 
that have emerged from the research conducted in South Africa.  The first is that law 
cannot be taken as a given. Rather than conducting research to enhance compliance of 
existing rules, this study argues that it is necessary to take the analysis of fisheries 
compliance one step further. This research has highlighted the importance of 
understanding how law has evolved, examining its history, and the power dynamics 
that have shaped it.  Social and economic inequities that are found in laws and 
policies have been identified as significant factors influencing compliance behaviour 
of small-scale fishers in South Africa.  Thus, it is argued in this thesis that existing 
laws that marginalise small-scale fishers need to be understood, and challenged, in an 
attempt to enhance fisheries compliance. 
 
The second concept incorporated into the framework is the integration of the diverse 
factors that are influencing fisher behaviour.  This has emphasised the need to 
understand compliance within a fishery system, acknowledging that social, economic, 
institutional and biophysical factors all impact on whether or not fishers’ comply with 
rules and laws.  Each of these factors will be briefly discussed below, but it is 
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important to emphasise that they are themselves influenced by power and law, which, 
as discussed above, need to be understood. 
 
The social dynamics of fishers, the morals and norms that influence their behaviour, 
and the informal rules and sanctions that operate (or not) in existing fisheries have 
been important to understand.  As emphasised by the cases in this study, fishing is a 
source of livelihood (socio-cultural and economic) that is embraced as a moral right, 
irrespective of formal law. The economic factors of the fishery system that strongly 
emerged from this study were the fragile economic circumstances of small-scale 
fishers and the influence of global and local markets on harvesting strategies.  Further, 
this research emphasised that government policies that limit resource use, access to 
diverse species, and supplementary income, reinforce fishers’ reliance on diminished 
marine resources.  From an institutional perspective, fishers are influenced by 
centralised decision-making, weak law enforcement and lack of tenure. MCM’s 
approach to fisheries management has largely alienated small-scale fishers and has 
exacerbated the illegitimacy of laws and policies, thereby weakening the moral 
obligation to comply.  The biophysical factors that influence fisher behaviour relate to 
the natural characteristics of the fish resources as well as the environmental variability 
and ecosystem effects that occur.  These factors influence fishing practices and can 
significantly impact livelihood strategies.  
 
In addition to identifying the diverse factors that are influencing fisher behaviour, the 
conceptual framework further emphasises the need to understand the dynamics 
between these factors, and how they influence change in the fishery system.  Thus, it 
has been necessary to determine the combination of factors, and their linkages, that 
drive the shifts in fisher behaviour between the formal and informal sectors.  The 
research findings have emphasised the importance of understanding these drivers over 
time, in order for appropriate compliance strategies to be developed.  It has further 
highlighted that MCM’s reliance on law enforcement to address the perceived 
economic drivers of non-compliance, ignores the complexity of the various factors, 
and the interactions between them, in influencing fisher behaviour. A key concern in 
South Africa, emanating from this research, is that small-scale fisheries are shifting 
towards organised informal syndicates.  The abalone fishery is largely dominated by 
this sector of the fishery, and the trend indicates that WCRL is moving in the same 
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direction.  Thus, there is a need to question how this shift can be reversed away from 
informal syndicates as a means of establishing a sustainable fishery system. 
 
The second key contribution of this thesis, therefore, is the identification of the 
underlying principles for understanding and addressing small-scale fisheries 
compliance in South Africa in a more integrated manner.  These principles were 
identified from an analysis of the key drivers that influenced change in fisher 
behaviour in the two case studies, as well as from the theoretical ideas that informed 
the conceptual framework.  It is argued that the core principle for achieving 
compliance is social justice, which ensures the protection of customary fishing 
practices in law, and facilitates the economic security of fishers’ livelihoods.  Linked 
to social justice is the principle of legitimacy, which reinforces the moral support for 
the institutional arrangements governing the fishery.  The third principle is that of 
deterrence, which reinforces rules and laws and contributes to the legitimacy of the 
management system.  Further, it is argued that each of these principles require an 
enabling legal and policy framework. The key concept underpinning these principles 
is that deterrence will have little impact without legitimacy, and legitimacy will have 
little impact without social justice. Thus, without social justice all other attempts to 
achieve compliance will have little long-term impact, and in some cases, may in fact 
exacerbate non-compliance and conflict. 
 
Interestingly, these underlying principles that have emerged from the research reflect 
the theoretical developments in fisheries compliance theory.  The principle of 
legitimacy is embraced by the theory of normative action, while the principle of 
deterrence is embraced by the rationalist perspective of compliance.  The principle of 
social justice, however, has been highlighted in this research as an important concept 
that needs to broaden current compliance thinking. By challenging existing laws, and 
attempting to understand the history and power behind their development, an 
important analytical process has unfolded that has significantly contributed to an 
understanding of fisher behaviour in South Africa.  While the concept of social justice 
has been emerging in fisheries discourse more broadly (Chenpagdee et al. 2005, 
Hernes et al. 2005), it is argued in this thesis that it needs to be adopted more 
vigorously into compliance theory.  As Jentoft (2000) states: ‘…a management 
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system that cannot be defended on grounds of social justice is likely to be challenged, 
however solid its legal foundation’ (p. 142). 
 
The importance of adopting the principle of social justice in an understanding of 
compliance was emphasised in Chapter Three by drawing on criminological 
discourse.  Criminologists have long been arguing that political factors, such as law 
and power, are critically important in our understanding of why certain activities are 
deemed to be ‘illegal’.  It is emphasised that the definition of ‘crime’ is often 
developed to protect the interests of powerful groups, which in turn criminalise threats 
to that power (Box 1996, Chambliss 1975, Scraton 2002). In the South African 
context, it is argued that harms in this country should not be constituted as crimes 
simply because they are defined as such by state law, but should be recognised and 
tackled by broader social policy in order to ‘advance the cause of equality’ (Dixon 
2006: 187).  Thus, the underlying factors, and drivers, of fisheries non-compliance 
need to be understood and tackled in a more integrated manner.  Ongoing reliance on 
crime control models will only exacerbate inequities in the fishery system, further 
marginalising fishers and increasing pressure on resources.  Thus, as Barton et al. 
(2007b) argue, social harms need to be thought of ‘in terms of social justice rather 
than criminal justice, to enhance, rather than undermine, democratic and legal 
accountability, and to develop research agendas that provide the potential to 
challenge, rather than consolidate, the interests of the powerful’ (p. 211, italics in 




This thesis has argued that there is a need to rethink our approach to small-scale 
fisheries compliance.  In South Africa, where rules governing small-scale fisheries are 
embedded in historical legacies and power inequities, crime control methods will not 
achieve sustainable fisheries.  A shift needs to take place that moves away from 
asking ‘how do we increase compliance with rules’ to ‘how do we enhance the 
sustainability of the fishery system as a whole’. By adopting this broader approach, it 
is argued that fisheries compliance theory is taken one step further in its analysis.  In 
addition to acknowledging the many factors that influence fisher behaviour, the 
conceptual framework introduced in this thesis also emphasises the need to 
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understand law – how it is formulated, and in whose interests. Thus, a key finding of 
this research is that power inequities lead to unjust laws, which carry little legitimacy 
on the ground, and which result in little obligation to comply.  As a result, in addition 
to the principles of legitimacy and deterrence, which are incorporated into existing 
theories of compliance, this study emphasises that the principle of social justice is 
fundamental to a more integrated approach to understanding and addressing small-
scale fisheries compliance.   
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No DATE MEETING COMMENTS 
1 07-Nov-06 
Abalone fisher meeting 
with MCM 
Meeting to discuss TAC allocations with 
reps of TURFs 
2 10-Nov-06 
Abalone fisher meeting 
with MCM 
Meeting to discuss TAC allocations with 
reps of TURFs 
3 21-Nov-06 
Abalone fisher meeting 
with MCM 
Meeting to discuss area allocations with 
reps of TURFs 
4 12-Mar-07 
Abalone Scientific 
Working Group (SWG) 
Met with abalone scientific working group, 
exl industry to discuss way forward for year 
5 12-May-07 Abalone SWG 
Meeting with Scientific WG with fishers - 
highlighting key issues for fishery 
6 14-Jun-07 Abalone SWG 
Discussed change to working group 
document for TAC - fishers very unhappy. 
7 26-Jun-07 MCM Scientists 
Discuss abalone fishery and explore 
research opportunities 
8 28-Jun-07 Abalone SWG 
Identify priorities for research and other 
key issues 
9 2 Aug 07 Abalone SWG Discuss poaching analysis in Zones A-D 
10 13-Aug-07 Abalone SWG 
TAC proposed recommendations for each 
zone discussed 
11 19-Sept-07 MCM Compliance 
Meeting to discuss compliance issues with 




Workshop with MCM and abalone fishers 
to identify challenges and way forward in 
terms of compliance issues 
13 7-Nov-07 
Abalone Management 
Working Group (MWG) 
Meeting to discuss harvesting arrangements 
for final fishing season 
14 12-Nov-07 Abalone MWG 
Meeting b/w resource managers and 
abalone fishers to discuss abalone ban and 
allocation of 75t - fishers walked out after 
about 45min. 
15 23-Nov-07 Abalone MWG 
Meeting to allocate 75t - proportionate cut 
amongst all zones and cross-allocation in 
zones 
16 27-Nov-07 Abalone MWG Decision to allocate 75t 
17 7-Dec-07 Abalone SWG 
Discussion of research priorities for 
abalone fishery – excluding industry 
18 16-May-08 Abalone SWG 
First meeting to determine research 
priorities now that fishery is closed 
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WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER 
1 22-Jan-07 WCRL compliance 
Workshop with key stakeholder groups to 
discuss and strategise compliance 
2 21-Feb-07 Compliance 
Meeting with MCM and WCRL 
rightsholders to discuss compliance & co-
management strategy 
3 9-May-07 WCRL compliance 
Meeting between WCRL rightsholders and 
MCM 
GENERAL 
1 June 07 Fisher workshop 
Meeting with fishers around Cape Town to 




Meeting with key stakeholders to discuss 
new small-scale fisheries policy 
3 1 & 2 Nov-07 Small-scale policy summit 
Two day workshop with key stakeholder 
groups around entire coast to discuss small-
scale fisheries policy 
 11 & 12 March 07 
Small-scale fishery 
workshop 
Workshop with fishers around coast and 
other stakeholders re: policy development 
 








CODE # INTERVIEWS DESCRIPTION COMMENTS 
    
A1 3 Fisher Key Informant 
A2 2 Fisher  
A3 2 Fisher  
A4 1 Fisher  
A5 1 Fisher  
A6 1 Fisher  
A7 1 Fisher  
A8 1 Fisher  
A9 2 Fisher  
A10 1 Fisher  
A11 2 Fisher  
A12 1 Fisher  
A13 3 Fisher  
A14 1 Fisher  
A15 1 Fisher  
A16 1 Fisher  
A17 1 Fisher  
A18 1 Fisher  
A19 3 Fisher Key Informant 
A20 1 Fisher  
A21 1 Fisher  
A22 1 Fisher  
A23 4 Fisher Key Informant 
A24 1 Fisher  
A25 1 Fisher  
A26 1 Fisher  
A27 1 Fisher  
A28 3 Fisher  
A29 3 Fisher Key Informant 
A30 3 Fisher Key Informant 
A31 2 Fisher  
A32 1 Fisher  
A33 1 Fisher  
A34 1 Fisher  
A35 4 Fisher Key Informant 
A36 1 Fisher  
A37 3 Fisher Key Informant 
A38 1 Fisher  
A39  Fishers Focus Group 
A40 1 Fisher  
A41  Fishers Focus Group 
A42  Fishers Focus Group 
A43  Fishers Focus Group 
A44  Fishers Focus Group 
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A45 3 Law Enforcement  
A46 2 Law Enforcement  
A47 2 Law Enforcement  
A48 1 Law Enforcement  
A49 2 Law Enforcement  
A50 3 Law Enforcement  
A51 1 Law Enforcement Focus Group 
A52 2 Law Enforcement General 
    
A53 1 Community member  
A54 3 Community member  
A55 1 Community member  
A56 1 Community member  
A57 1 Community member  
    
A58 3 Fisheries Authority  
A59 3 Fisheries Authority  
A60 2 Fisheries Authority  
A61 2 Fisheries Authority  
    
TOTAL 97   
WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER 
L1 7 Fisher Key Informant 
L2 2 Fisher  
L3 4 Fisher Key Informant 
L4 7 Fisher Key Informant 
L5 1 Fisher  
L6 1 Fisher  
L7 1 Fisher  
L8 3 Fisher  
L9 1 Fisher  
L10 1 Fisher  
L11 1 Fisher  
L12 1 Fisher  
L13 2 Fisher  
L14 2 Fisher  
L15 1 Fisher  
L16 1 Fisher  
L17 1 Fisher  
L18 2 Fisher  
L19 1 Fisher  
L20 2 Fisher  
L21 2 Fisher  
L22 1 Fisher  
L23  Fishers Focus Group 
L24  Fishers Focus Group 
L25  Fishers Focus Group 
L26  Fishers Focus Group 
L27  Fishers Focus Group 
L28  Fishers Focus Group 
L29  Fishers Focus Group 
L30 1 Fisher  
L31 2 Fisher  
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L55 4 Fisher Representative Key Informant 
L56 5 Fisher  Key Informant 
    
L32 1 Law Enforcement  
L33 3 Law Enforcement General 
L34 1 Law Enforcement  
L35 1 Law Enforcement  
L36 1 Law Enforcement  
L37 1 Law Enforcement Focus Group 
L38 1 Law Enforcement Focus Group 
L39 1 Law Enforcement  
L40 1 Law Enforcement  
    
L41 1 WCRL Industry  
L42 1 WCRL Industry  
L43 1 WCRL Industry  
L44 1 WCRL Industry  
L45 1 WCRL Industry  
    
L46 1 Community member Key Informant 
L47 2 Community member  
L48 2 Community member  
L49 2 Community member  
L50 3 Community member  
L51 1 Community member  
    
    
L52 2 Fisheries Authority  
L53 1 Fisheries Authority General 
L54 1 Fisheries Authority  
    
TOTAL 88   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
